Editing Samnite Wars (section)

====Modern views====
The historical accuracy of Livy's account is disputed among modern historians.  They are willing to accept that while Livy might have simplified the way in which the Sidicini, Campani and Samnites came to be at war, his narrative here, at least in outline, is historical.{{Sfn | Salmon | 1967 | p = 201}}{{Sfn | Cornell | 1995 | p = 347}}{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 285}}{{Sfn | Forsythe | 2005 | p = 288}}  The Sidicini's stronghold at Teanum controlled an important regional crossroads, which would have provided the Samnites with a motive for conquest.{{Sfn | Salmon | 1967 | p = 195}}{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 289}}{{Sfn | Forsythe | 2005 | p = 288}}  The First Samnite War might have started quite by accident, as Livy claimed.  The Sidicini were located on the Samnite side of the [[Liri|river Liris]], and while the Roman-Samnite treaty might only have dealt with the middle Liris, not the lower, Rome does not appear to have been overly concerned for the fate of the Sidicini. The Samnites could therefore go to war with Sidicini without fear of Roman involvement. It was only the unforeseen involvement of the Campani that brought in the Romans.{{Sfn | Salmon | 1967 | p = 201}}

Many historians have however had difficulty accepting the historicity of the Campanian embassy to Rome, in particular whether Livy was correct in describing the Campani as surrendering themselves unconditionally into Roman possession.{{Sfn | Salmon | 1967 | p = 197}}{{Sfn | Cornell | 1995 | p = 347}}{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 285}}  That Capua and Rome were allied in 343 is less controversial, as such a relationship underpins the whole First Samnite War.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 286}}

Historians have noted the similarities between the events leading to the First Samnite War and events, which according to [[Thucydides]], caused the [[Peloponnesian War]],{{Sfn | Forsythe | 2005 | pp = 284–285}} but there are differences as well.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 294}}  It is clear that Livy, or his sources, has consciously modelled the Campanian embassy after the "Corcyrean debate" in Thucydides' [[History of the Peloponnesian War]].{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 285}}{{Sfn | Forsythe | 2005 | p = 285}} There are many parallels between the speech given by the Campanian ambassador to the Roman senate in Livy and the speech of the Corcyrean ambassador to the Athenian assembly in Thucydides. But while Thucydides' Athenians debate the Corcyreans' proposal in pragmatic terms, Livy's senators decide to reject the Campanian alliance based on moral arguments.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 285}}{{Sfn | Forsythe | 2005 | p = 285}}  Livy might have intended his literary educated readers to pick up this contrast.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 285}}  The exaggerated misery of the surrendering Campani contrast with the Campanian arrogance, a stock motif in ancient Roman literature.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 305}}  It is also unlikely that Livy's description of the Samnite national assembly is based on any authentic sources.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 306}}  However, it does not necessarily follow that because the speeches are invented, a standard feature for ancient historians, the Campanian surrender must be invented as well.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 286}}

The chief difficulty lies in how, in 343, rich Capua could have been reduced to such dire straits by the Samnites that the Campani were willing to surrender everything to Rome.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 286}}  During the [[Second Punic War]] (218 to 201 BC), Capua famously sided with [[Carthage]], but after a lengthy siege by Rome, she had to surrender unconditionally in 211 BC, after which the Capuans were harshly punished by the Romans.  {{Harvtxt | Salmon | 1967 | p = 197}} therefore held that the Campanian surrender in 343 is a retrojection by later Roman historians. This invention would serve the double purpose of exonerating Rome from treaty-breaking in 343 BC and justifying the punishment handed out in 211 BC. What Rome agreed to in 343 was an alliance on terms similar to the treaties she had with the Latins and the [[Hernici]].  {{Harvtxt | Cornell | 1995 | p = 347}} accepts the surrender as historical. Studies have shown that voluntary submission was a common feature in the diplomacy of this period.  Likewise {{Harvtxt | Oakley | 1998 | pp = 286–289}} does not believe the surrender of 343 BC to be a retrojection, not finding many similarities between the events of 343 and 211.  The ancient historians record many later instances, whose historicity are not doubted, where a state appealed to Rome for assistance in war against a stronger enemy.  The historical evidence shows the Romans considering such supplicants to have technically the same status as surrendered enemies, but in practice, Rome would not want to abuse would-be allies.  {{Harvtxt | Forsythe | 2005 | p = 287}}, like Salmon, argues that the surrender in 343 is a retrojection of that of 211, invented to better justify Roman actions and for good measure shift the guilt for the First Samnite War onto the manipulative Campani.

Livy portrays the Romans selflessly assuming the burden of defending the Campani, but this is a common theme in Roman republican histories, whose authors wished to show that Rome's wars had been just. Military success was the chief road to prestige and glory among the highly competitive Roman aristocracy. Evidence from later, better documented, time periods shows the Roman Senate quite capable of manipulating diplomatic circumstances so as to provide just causes for expansionary wars. There is no reason to believe this was not also the case in the second half of the 4th century BC.{{Sfn | Forsythe | 2005 | pp = 285–287}}  There are also recorded examples of Rome rejecting appeals for help, implying that the Romans in 343 BC had the choice of rejecting the Campani.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 289}}