Editing Robert McNamara (section)

===Overview===
[[File:President meets with Secretary of Defense. President Kennedy, Secretary McNamara. White House, Cabinet Room - NARA - 194244.jpg|thumb|President John F. Kennedy and McNamara, 1962]]After his [[1960 United States presidential election|election]] in 1960, [[President-elect of the United States|President-elect]] John F. Kennedy first offered the post of Secretary of Defense to [[Robert A. Lovett]], who had already served in that position in the [[Truman administration]]; Lovett declined but recommended McNamara. Kennedy had read about McNamara and his career in a [[Time (magazine)|''Time'' magazine]] article on December 2, 1960, and interviewed him on December 8, with his brother and right-hand man [[Robert F. Kennedy]] also being present.{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=25}} McNamara told Kennedy that he didn't know anything about government, to which Kennedy replied: "We can learn our jobs together. I don't know how to be president either".{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=25}} McNamara had read Kennedy's ghostwritten [[Pulitzer Prize]] winning book ''[[Profiles in Courage]]'' and asked him if he had really written it himself, with Kennedy insisting that he did.{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=25}} McNamara's confidence and self-assurance impressed Kennedy.{{sfn|Langguth|2000|p=41}} Kennedy offered McNamara the chance to be either Secretary of Defense or [[Secretary of the Treasury]]; McNamara came back a week later, accepting the post of Secretary of Defense on the condition of having the right of final approval in all appointments to the [[Department of Defense (United States)|Department of Defense]], with Kennedy replying: "It's a deal".{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=25}} McNamara's salary as the CEO of Ford was $3 million per year while by contrast the position of the Defense Secretary paid only $25,000 per year.{{sfn|Langguth|2000|pp=42–43}} Given the financial sacrifices, McNamara was able to insist to Kennedy that he have the right to appoint his officials and run the Pentagon his own way.{{sfn|Langguth|2000|pp=41–42}}

According to Special Counsel [[Ted Sorensen]], Kennedy regarded McNamara as the "star of his team, calling upon him for advice on a wide range of issues beyond national security, including business and economic matters."{{sfn|Sorensen|2008}}{{Page needed|date=April 2021}} McNamara became one of the few members of the Kennedy Administration to socialize with Kennedy, and he became close to Attorney General [[Robert F. Kennedy]], eventually serving as a pallbearer at the younger Kennedy's funeral in 1968.{{sfn|McNamara|1995}}{{Page needed|date=April 2021}}

[[File:Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara at The Pentagon in 1963.jpg|thumb|[[United States Secretary of Defense|U.S. Secretary of Defense]] Robert McNamara with [[Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force|U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff]] General [[Curtis LeMay]] at The Pentagon on April 10, 1963. During World War II, McNamara served under LeMay's command as a [[statistician]] for the United States Army Air Forces.]]
Initially, the basic policies outlined by President Kennedy in a message to [[United States Congress|Congress]] on March 28, 1961, guided McNamara in the reorientation of the defense program. Kennedy rejected the concept of [[first-strike attack]] and emphasized the need for adequate strategic arms and defense to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies. U.S. arms, he maintained, must constantly be under [[civilian control of the military|civilian command and control]], and the nation's defense posture had to be "designed to reduce the danger of irrational or unpremeditated general war." The primary mission of U.S. overseas forces, in cooperation with its allies, was "to prevent the steady erosion of the [[Free World]] through limited wars". Kennedy and McNamara rejected massive retaliation for a posture of [[flexible response]]. The U.S. wanted choices in an emergency other than "inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation", as the president put it. Out of a major review of the military challenges confronting the U.S. initiated by McNamara in 1961 came a decision to increase the nation's "limited warfare" capabilities. These moves were significant because McNamara was abandoning President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]]'s policy of massive retaliation in favor of a flexible response strategy that relied on increased U.S. capacity to conduct limited, non-nuclear warfare.

Aside from the Cuban Missile Crisis and the war in Indochina (Laos and Vietnam), other conflicts that involved the US Defense Department under Robert McNamara included support for the Cuban [[Bay of Pigs Invasion]], [[United States aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union|reconnaissance flights around the periphery of the Soviet Union]], the [[Congo Crisis]], the [[Berlin Crisis of 1961]], [[Martyrs' Day (Panama)|riots in the Panama Canal Zone]], intervention in the [[Dominican Civil War]], the beginning of the [[Korean DMZ Conflict]], and the [[USS Liberty incident|USS ''Liberty'' incident]].