Editing Reform Judaism (section)

===Ritual, autonomy and law===
Reform Judaism emphasizes the ethical facets of the faith as its central attribute, superseding the ceremonial ones. Reform thinkers often cited the [[Nevi'im#Latter prophets|Prophets]]' condemnations of ceremonial acts, lacking true intention and performed by the morally corrupt, as testimony that rites have no inherent quality. Geiger centered his philosophy on the Prophets' teachings (he had already named his ideology "Prophetic Judaism" in 1838), regarding morality and ethics as the stable core of a religion in which ritual observance transformed radically through the ages. However, practices were seen as a means to elation and a link to the heritage of the past, and Reform generally argued that rituals should be maintained, discarded or modified based on whether they served these higher purposes. This stance allowed a great variety of practice both in the past and the present. In "Classical" times, personal observance was reduced to little beyond nothing. The postwar "New Reform" lent renewed importance to practical, regular action as a means to engage congregants, abandoning the sanitized forms of the "Classical".

Another key aspect of Reform doctrine is the personal autonomy of each adherent, who may formulate their own understanding and expression of their religiosity. Reform is unique among all Jewish denominations in placing the individual as the authorized interpreter of Judaism.<ref>Dorff, p. 132; Dana Evan Kaplan, ''American Reform Judaism: An Introduction'', Rutgers University Press, 2009. pp. 41–42; Jonathan Sacks, ''Crisis and Covenant: Jewish Thought After the Holocaust'', Manchester Uni. Press, 1992. p. 158.</ref> This position was originally influenced by [[Kantian]] philosophy and the great weight it lent to personal judgement and free will. This highly individualistic stance also proved one of the movement's great challenges, for it impeded the creation of clear guidelines and standards for positive participation in religious life and definition of what was expected from members.

The notion of autonomy coincided with the gradual abandonment of traditional practice (largely neglected by most members, and the Jewish public in general, before and during the rise of Reform) in the early stages of the movement. It was a major characteristic during the "Classical" period, when Reform closely resembled Protestant surroundings. Later, it was applied to encourage adherents to seek their own means of engaging Judaism. "New Reform" embraced the criticism levied by Rosenzweig and other thinkers at extreme individualism, laying a greater stress on community and tradition. Though by no means declaring that members were bound by a compelling authority of some sort – the notion of an intervening, commanding God remained foreign to denominational thought. The "New Reform" approach to the question is characterized by an attempt to strike a mean between autonomy and some degree of conformity, focusing on a dialectic relationship between both.<ref>Leon A. Morris, "Beyond Autonomy: the Texts and Our Lives", in: Dana Evan Kaplan, ''Platforms and Prayer Books: Theological and Liturgical Perspectives on Reform Judaism'', Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002. pp. 271–284.</ref>

The movement never entirely abandoned ''halachic'' (traditional jurisprudence) argumentation, both due to the need for precedent to counter external accusations and the continuity of heritage. Instead, the movement had largely made ethical considerations or the spirit of the age the decisive factor in determining its course. The German founding fathers undermined the principles behind the legalistic process, which was based on a belief in an unbroken tradition through the ages merely elaborated and applied to novel circumstances, rather than subject to change. Rabbi [[Samuel Holdheim]] advocated a particularly radical stance, arguing that the ''halachic'' [[Dina d'malkhuta dina|Law of the Land is Law]] principle must be universally applied and subject virtually everything to current norms and needs, far beyond its weight in conventional Jewish Law.

While Reform rabbis in 19th-century Germany had to accommodate conservative elements in their communities, at the height of "Classical Reform" in the United States, ''halakhic'' considerations could be virtually ignored and Holdheim's approach embraced. In the 1930s and onwards, Rabbi [[Solomon Freehof]] and his supporters reintroduced such elements, but they too regarded Jewish Law as too rigid a system. Instead, they recommended that selected features will be readopted and new observances established in a piecemeal fashion, as spontaneous ''[[minhag]]'' (custom) emerging by trial and error and becoming widespread if it appealed to the masses. The advocates of this approach also stress that their [[Responsa#In Judaism|responsa]] are of non-binding nature, and their recipients may adapt them as they see fit.<ref>Walter Jacob, ''Liberal Judaism and Halakhah'', Rodef Shalom Press, 1988. pp. 90–94.; Michael A. Meyer, [https://www.jstor.org/stable/23536120 "Changing Attitudes of Liberal Judaism toward Halakhah and Minhag"], Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies, 1993.</ref> Freehof's successors, such as Rabbis [[Walter Jacob]] and [[Moshe Zemer]], further elaborated the notion of "Progressive ''Halakha''" along the same lines.