Editing Prudence (section)

== In rhetoric ==
[[File:Main_ornate_of_the_facade,_Castellania_Malta.jpeg|thumb|left|Main gate of 18th-century [[Castellania (Valletta)|Castellania]] portraying [[Lady Justice]] and [[Prudentia|Lady Prudentia]] above]]
{{transliteration|grc|[[Phronesis]]}}, or practical wisdom, holds an important place in [[Rhetoric|rhetorical theory]] as a central aspect of judgment and practice. [[Nicomachean Ethics#Practical judgement (phronesis)|Aristotle's notion of {{transliteration|grc|phronesis}}]] fits with [[Rhetoric (Aristotle)|his treatise on rhetoric]] because neither, in his estimation, could be reduced to an {{transliteration|grc|[[episteme]]}} or a {{transliteration|grc|[[techne]]}}, and both deal with the ability to deliberate about contingent, variable, or indeterminate matters.<ref>{{cite book|author=Aristotle|title=[[Nicomachean Ethics]]|at=[https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/aristotle/nicomachean-ethics/f-h-peters/text/book-6#chapter-6-1-7 VI.7]}}</ref>

[[Cicero]] defined {{lang|la|prudentia}} as a rhetorical norm in ''[[De Oratore]]'', ''[[De officiis]]'', ''[[De Inventione]]'', and ''[[De re publica]]''. He contrasts the term with {{lang|la|imprudens}}, young men failing to consider the consequences before they act. The {{lang|la|prudens}}, or those who had prudence, knew when to speak and when to stay silent. Cicero maintained that prudence was gained only through experience, and while it was applied in everyday conversation, in public discourse it was subordinated to the broader term for wisdom, {{lang|la|sapientia}}.<ref>{{cite book |last=Hariman |first=Robert |title=Prudence: classical virtue, postmodern practice |publisher=The Pennsylvania State University Press |year=2003 |page=37}}</ref>

In the modern era, rhetorical scholars have tried to recover a robust meaning for the term. They have maintained consistency with the ancient orators, contending that prudence is an embodied persuasive resource.<ref name="Jasinski">{{cite book |last=Jasinski |first=James |year=2001 |title=Sourcebook on Rhetoric |publisher=Sage Publications |page=463}}</ref> Although sets of principles or rules can be constructed in a particular culture, prudence cannot be derived from a set of timeless principles. Instead, through gauging the situation and through reasoned deliberation, a speaker should determine the set of values and morals by which to base his or her actions. The capacity to take into account the particularities of the situation is vital to prudential practice. For example, as rhetorical scholar Lois Self explains, "both rhetoric and {{transliteration|grc|phronesis}} are normative processes in that they involve rational principles of choice-making; both have general applicability but always require careful analysis of particulars in determining the best response to each specific situation; both ideally take into account the wholeness of human nature; and finally, both have social utility and responsibility in that both treat matter of the public good".<ref>{{cite book |first=Lois |last=Self |chapter=Rhetoric and Phronesis: The Aristotelian Ideal |title=Philosophy and Rhetoric |publisher=Penn State University Press |year=1979 |page=14}}</ref> [[Robert Hariman]], in his examination of [[Malcolm X]], adds that "aesthetic sensibility, imitation of a performative ideal, and improvisation upon conventions of presentation" are also components of practical reasoning.<ref>{{cite book |last=Hariman |first=Robert |title=Theory without Modernity |year=1991 |page=28}}</ref>

Rhetorical scholars differ on definitions of the term and methods of analysis. [[Hans-Georg Gadamer]] asserted that prudence materializes through the application of principles and can be evaluated accordingly.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Gadamer|first=Hans-George |title=Truth and Method |journal=Crossroad |year=1982 |page=7}}</ref> Jasinski argues that [[Andrew Cuomo]]'s speech to the Catholic Church of Notre Dame cannot be judged solely on the basis of its consequences, since prudence is not reducible to ''episteme'' (knowledge or understanding) or ''techne'' (technique or art). Rather, he contends, it should be judged based on its embodied rhetorical performance — that is, how it is perceived by those who experience it. So, for example, one might evaluate the speech based on how persuasive it was, how emotionally moving it was, or how well it captured the audience's attention.<ref name="Jasinski"/> Thus, while Gadamer judges prudence based on a set of principles, Jasinski emphasizes the artistry of communication and its reception by its audience. For Jasinski, communication should balance [[compromise]] and [[courage]], rather than merely achieving a specific result.

In his study of [[Machiavelli]], examining the relationship between prudence and moderation, rhetorician Eugene Garver holds that there is a middle ground between "an ethics of principles, in which those principles univocally dictate action" and "an ethics of consequences, in which the successful result is all".<ref name="Garver">{{cite book |last=Garver |first=Eugene |title=Machiavelli and the History of Prudence |publisher=University of Wisconsin Press |year=1987 |isbn=0-299-11080-X}}</ref> His premise stems from Aristotle's theory of virtue as [[golden mean (philosophy)|an "intermediate"]], in which moderation and compromise embody prudence. Yet, because elevating moderation is not an active response, prudence entails the "transformation of moderation" into a fitting response, making it a flexible situational norm. Garver also asserts that prudential reasoning differs from "algorithmic" and "[[heuristic]]" reasoning because it is rooted in a political community, the context in which common problems regarding stability and innovation arise and call for prudential reasoning.<ref name="Garver"/>