Editing Principle of bivalence (section)

===Future contingents===
{{main|Problem of future contingents}}
A famous example<ref name="Tomassi1999"/> is the ''contingent sea battle'' case found in [[Aristotle]]'s work, ''[[De Interpretatione]]'', chapter 9:

: Imagine P refers to the statement "There will be a sea battle tomorrow."

The principle of bivalence here asserts:

: Either it is true that there will be a sea battle tomorrow, or it is false that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.

Aristotle denies to embrace bivalence for such future contingents;<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Jones|first=Russell E.|date=2010|title=Truth and Contradiction in Aristotle's De Interpretatione 6–9|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20720827|journal=Phronesis|volume=55|issue=1|pages=26–67|doi=10.1163/003188610X12589452898804|jstor=20720827|s2cid=53398648 }}</ref> [[Chrysippus]], the [[Stoicism|Stoic]] logician, did embrace bivalence for this and all other propositions.  The controversy continues to be of central importance in both the [[philosophy of time]] and the [[philosophy of logic]].{{citation needed|date=March 2016}}

One of the early motivations for the study of [[many-valued logic]]s has been precisely this issue. In the early 20th century, the Polish formal logician [[Jan Łukasiewicz]] proposed three truth-values: the true, the false and the ''as-yet-undetermined''. This approach was later developed by [[Arend Heyting]] and [[L. E. J. Brouwer]];<ref name="Tomassi1999"/> see [[Łukasiewicz logic]].

Issues such as this have also been addressed in various [[temporal logic]]s, where one can assert that "''Eventually'', either there will be a sea battle tomorrow, or there won't be." (Which is true if "tomorrow" eventually occurs.)