Editing Plea bargain (section)

=== Misalignment of goals and incentives ===
[[Agency problem]]s may arise in plea bargaining as, although the prosecutor represents the people and the defense attorney represents the defendant, these agents' goals may not be congruent with those of their principles. For example, prosecutors and defense attorneys may seek to maintain good relations with one another, creating a potential conflict with the parties they represent. A defense attorney may receive a flat fee for representing a client, or may not receive additional money for taking a case to trial, creating an incentive for the defense attorney to settle a case to increase profits or to avoid a financial loss.

A prosecutor may want to maintain a high [[conviction rate]] or avoid a losing high-profile trials, creating the potential that they will enter into a plea bargain that furthers their interests but reduces the potential of the prosecution and sentence to deter crime.<ref>{{cite journal|author-link1=Stephen Schulhofer|last1=Schulhofer|first1=Stephen J.|title=Plea Bargaining as Disaster|journal=The Yale Law Journal|date=June 1992|volume=101|issue=8|pages=1979–2009|jstor=796954|doi=10.2307/796954|url=https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7446&context=ylj}}</ref> Prosecutors may also make charging decisions that significantly affect a defendant's sentence, and may file charges or offer plea deals that cause even an innocent defendant to consider or accept a plea bargain.