Editing Philosophical methodology (section)

=== Phenomenological method ===
[[Phenomenology (philosophy)|Phenomenology]] is the science of [[Appearance (philosophy)|appearances]] - broadly speaking, the science of phenomenon, given that almost all phenomena are perceived.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Smith |first1=David Woodruff |title=Phenomenology: 1. What is Phenomenology? |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/#WhatPhen |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=20 September 2021 |date=2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Smith |first1=Joel |title=Phenomenology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/phenom/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=10 October 2021}}</ref> The phenomenological method aims to study the appearances themselves and the relations found between them. This is achieved through the so-called [[phenomenological reduction]], also known as epoché or bracketing: the researcher suspends their judgments about the natural external world in order to focus exclusively on the [[experience]] of how things appear to be, independent of whether these appearances are true or false.<ref name="IEPReduction">{{cite web |last1=Cogan |first1=John |title=Phenomenological Reduction, The |url=https://iep.utm.edu/phen-red/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=27 February 2022}}</ref><ref name="MeinerMethode"/> One idea behind this approach is that our [[presupposition]]s of what things are like can get in the way of studying how they appear to be and thereby mislead the researcher into thinking they know the answer instead of looking for themselves. The phenomenological method can also be seen as a reaction to methodological skepticism since its defenders traditionally claimed that it could lead to absolute certainty and thereby help philosophy achieve the status of a rigorous science.<ref name="IEPReduction"/><ref name="Martin">{{cite book |last1=Martin |first1=Wayne M. |title=A Companion to Descartes |date=20 November 2007 |pages=496–512 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470696439.ch29 |chapter=29. Descartes and the Phenomenological Tradition|doi=10.1002/9780470696439.ch29 |isbn=9781405121545 }}</ref> But phenomenology has been heavily criticized because of this overly optimistic outlook concerning the certainty of its insights.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Noë |first1=Alva |title=The Critique of Pure Phenomenology |journal=Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences |date=2007 |volume=6 |issue=1–2 |pages=231–245 |doi=10.1007/s11097-006-9043-x |s2cid=24597361 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/NOTCO |access-date=5 March 2022}}</ref> A different objection to the method of phenomenological reduction holds that it involves an artificial stance that gives too much emphasis on the theoretical attitude at the expense of feeling and practical concerns.<ref>{{cite web |last1=MacAvoy |first1=Leslie |title=Robert C. Scharff: Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological: Interpreting Husserl Through Dilthey, 1916-1925 |url=https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/heidegger-becoming-phenomenological-interpreting-husserl-through-dilthey-1916-1925/ |website=Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews |access-date=5 March 2022 |language=en}}</ref>

Another phenomenological method is called "[[eidetic variation]]".<ref name="Drummond">{{cite book |last1=Drummond |first1=John J. |title=Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy |date=2009 |publisher=Scarecrow Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DRUHDO |chapter=Eidetic variation}}</ref> It is used to study the [[essence]]s of things. This is done by [[imagining]] an object of the kind under investigation. The features of this object are then varied in order to see whether the resulting object still belongs to the investigated kind. If the object can survive the change of a certain feature then this feature is inessential to this kind. Otherwise, it belongs to the kind's ''essence''. For example, when imagining a triangle, one can vary its features, like the length of its sides or its color. These features are inessential since the changed object is still a triangle, but it ceases to be a triangle if a fourth side is added.<ref name="Drummond"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Spear |first1=Andrew D. |title=Husserl, Edmund: Intentionality and Intentional Content |url=https://iep.utm.edu/huss-int/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=22 December 2020}}</ref><ref name="Gander">{{cite book |last1=Gander |first1=Hans-Helmuth |title=Husserl Lexikon |publisher=Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GANHL |chapter=Ontologie|year=2009 }}</ref>