Editing Phenomenology (philosophy) (section)

====''Logical Investigations'' (1900/1901)====
<!--'Mental act' and 'Pre-reflective self-consciousness' redirect here-->

In the first edition of the ''[[Logical Investigations (Husserl)|Logical Investigations]]'', under the influence of Brentano, Husserl describes his position as "[[Descriptive psychology (Brentano)|descriptive psychology]]." Husserl analyzes the intentional structures of '''mental acts'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> and how they are directed at both real and ideal objects. The first volume of the ''Logical Investigations'', the ''Prolegomena to Pure Logic'', begins with a critique of [[psychologism]], that is, the attempt to subsume the ''a priori'' validity of the laws of logic under psychology. Husserl establishes a separate field for research in logic, philosophy, and phenomenology, independently from the empirical sciences.{{sfn|Zahavi|Stjernfelt|2002}}{{sfn|Mohanty|1977}}{{sfn|Smith|2023|loc=§1}}

"'''Pre-reflective self-consciousness'''"<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> is [[Shaun Gallagher]] and [[Dan Zahavi]]'s term for Husserl's (1900/1901) idea that [[self-consciousness]] always involves a self-appearance or self-manifestation prior to [[self-reflection]].{{sfn|Gallagher|Zahavi|2023}} This is one point of nearly unanimous agreement among phenomenologists: "a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as ''my'' experience."{{sfn|Gallagher|Zahavi|2021|page=50}}