Editing Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (section)

====Khrushchev and a moratorium: 1958–1961====
In the summer of 1957, Khrushchev was at acute risk of losing power, as the [[Anti-Party Group]] composed of former [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]] allies [[Lazar Kaganovich]], [[Georgy Malenkov]], and [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] launched an attempt to replace Khrushchev as [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary of the Communist Party]] (effectively the leader of the Soviet Union) with [[Nikolai Bulganin]], then the [[Premier of the Soviet Union]]. The attempted ouster, which was foiled in June, was followed by a series of actions by Khrushchev to consolidate power. In October 1957, still feeling vulnerable from Anti-Party Group's ploy, Khrushchev forced out defense minister [[Georgy Zhukov]], cited as "the nation's most powerful military man." On 27 March 1958, Khrushchev forced Bulganin to resign and succeeded him as Premier. Between 1957 and 1960, Khrushchev had his firmest grip on power, with little real opposition.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=361–362, 364–365}}

Khrushchev was personally troubled by the power of nuclear weapons and would later recount that he believed the weapons could never be used. In the mid-1950s, Khrushchev took a keen interest in defense policy and sought to inaugurate an era of [[détente]] with the West. Initial efforts to reach accords, such as on disarmament at the 1955 [[Geneva Summit (1955)|Geneva Summit]], proved fruitless, and Khrushchev saw test-ban negotiations as an opportunity to present the Soviet Union as "both powerful and responsible."{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=347–348, 350, 352}}{{sfn|Strode|1990|p=6}} At the [[20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|20th Communist Party Congress]] in 1956, Khrushchev declared that nuclear war should no longer be seen as "fatalistically inevitable." Simultaneously, however, Khrushchev expanded and advanced the Soviet nuclear arsenal at a cost to conventional Soviet forces (e.g., in early 1960, Khrushchev announced demobilization of 1.2&nbsp;million troops).{{sfn|Strode|1990|pp=5–6}}

On 31 March 1958, the [[Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union]] approved a decision to halt nuclear testing, conditional on other nuclear powers doing the same. Khrushchev then called on Eisenhower and Macmillan to join the moratorium. Despite the action being met with widespread praise and an argument from Dulles that the US should reciprocate,{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=64}} Eisenhower dismissed the plan as a "gimmick"; the Soviet Union had just completed a testing series and the US was about to begin [[Operation Hardtack I]], a series of atmospheric, surface-level, and underwater nuclear tests. Eisenhower instead insisted that any moratorium be linked to reduced production of nuclear weapons. In April 1958, the US began Operation Hardtack I as planned.{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|pp=457–458}}<ref name="hardtack">{{cite web|url=https://www.dtra.mil/Portals/61/Documents/NTPR/1-Fact_Sheets/20_HARDTACK_I.pdf|title=Operation Hardtack I|date=May 2015|publisher=[[Defense Threat Reduction Agency]]|access-date=6 August 2016|archive-date=19 October 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161019011547/http://www.dtra.mil/Portals/61/Documents/NTPR/1-Fact_Sheets/20_HARDTACK_I.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=11}} The Soviet declaration concerned the British government, which feared that the moratorium might lead to a test ban before its own testing program was completed.{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|p=114}} Following the Soviet declaration, Eisenhower called for an international meeting of experts to determine proper control and verification measures—an idea first proposed by British [[Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (UK)|Foreign Secretary]] [[Selwyn Lloyd]].<ref name=statedept/>{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|p=114}}

The advocacy of PSAC, including that of its chairmen [[James Rhyne Killian]] and [[George Kistiakowsky]], was a key factor in Eisenhower's eventual decision to initiate test-ban negotiations in 1958.{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|pp=249, 305}}{{sfn|Greene|2006|pp=6–8}} In the spring of 1958, chairman Killian and the PSAC staff (namely [[Hans Bethe]] and [[Isidor Isaac Rabi]]) undertook a review of US test-ban policy, determining that a successful system for detecting underground tests could be created. At the recommendation of Dulles (who had recently come to support a test ban),{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=9}} the review prompted Eisenhower to propose technical negotiations with the Soviet Union, effectively detaching test-ban negotiations from negotiations over a halt to nuclear weapons production (the one-time US demand). In explaining the policy shift, Eisenhower privately said that continued resistance to a test ban would leave the US in a state of "moral isolation."{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|pp=458–459}}

On 8 April 1958, still resisting Khrushchev's call for a moratorium, Eisenhower invited the Soviet Union to join these technical negotiations in the form of a conference on the technical aspects of a test-ban, specifically the technical details of ensuring compliance with a ban. The proposal was, to a degree, a concession to the Soviet Union, as a test ban would be explored independent of the previously demanded cutoff in fissionable-material production. Khrushchev initially declined the invitation, but eventually agreed "in spite of the serious doubts" he had after Eisenhower suggested a technical agreement on verification would be a precursor to a test ban.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=11–12}}

On 1 July 1958, responding to Eisenhower's call, the nuclear powers convened the Conference of Experts in [[Geneva]], aimed at studying means of detecting nuclear tests.<ref name=nsarchive/>{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=12}} The conference included scientists from the US, Britain, the Soviet Union, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Poland, and Romania.<ref name=faschron/> The US delegation was led by James Fisk, a member of PSAC, the Soviets by Evgenii Fedorov,{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|p=78}} and the British delegation by [[William Penney, Baron Penney|William Penney]], who had led the British delegation to the Manhattan Project. Whereas the US approached the conference solely from a technical perspective, Penney was specifically instructed by Macmillan to attempt to achieve a political agreement.{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|p=115}} This difference in approach was reflected in the broader composition of the US and UK teams. US experts were primarily drawn from academia and industry. Fisk was a vice president at [[Bell Telephone Company|Bell Telephone]] Laboratories and was joined by [[Robert Bacher]] and Ernest Lawrence, both physicists who had worked on the Manhattan Project.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=12}} Conversely, British delegates largely held government positions. The Soviet delegation was composed primarily of academics, though virtually all of them had some link to the Soviet government. The Soviets shared the British goal of achieving an agreement at the conference.{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|pp=60–61}}

At particular issue was the ability of sensors to differentiate an underground test from an earthquake. There were four techniques examined: measurement of [[acoustic wave]]s, seismic signals, [[radio wave]]s, and inspection of radioactive debris. The Soviet delegation expressed confidence in each method, while Western experts argued that a more comprehensive compliance system would be necessary.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=12}}

The Conference of Experts was characterized as "highly professional" and productive.{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|p=115}}{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|p=61}} By the end of August 1958, the experts devised an extensive control program, known as the "Geneva System," involving 160–170 land-based monitoring posts, plus 10 additional sea-based monitors and occasional flights over land following a suspicious event (with the inspection plane being provided and controlled by the state under inspection). The experts determined that such a scheme would be able to detect 90% of underground detonations, accurate to 5 kilotons, and atmospheric tests with a minimum yield of 1 kiloton.<ref name=nsarchive/>{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=249}}{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=12}} The US had initially advocated for 650 posts, versus a Soviet proposal of 100–110. The final recommendation was a compromise forged by the British delegation.{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|p=62}} In a widely publicized and well-received communiqué dated 21 August 1958, the conference declared that it "reached the conclusion that it is technically feasible to set up&nbsp;... a workable and effective control system for the detection of violations of a possible agreement on the worldwide cessation of nuclear weapons tests."{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=12}}

[[File:Hardtack De Baca 001.jpg|thumb|US test detonation (part of [[Operation Hardtack II]]) conducted shortly before the start of the moratorium in 1958]]
The technical findings, released on 30 August 1958 in a report drafted by the Soviet delegation,{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=12}}{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|p=61}} were endorsed by the US and UK, which proposed that they serve as the basis for test-ban and international-control negotiations. However, the experts' report failed to address precisely who would do the monitoring and when on-site inspections—a US demand and Soviet concern—would be permitted. The experts also deemed detection of outer-space tests (tests more than {{Convert|50|km|mi|sp=us}} above the earth's surface) to be impractical. Additionally, the size of the Geneva System may have rendered it too expensive to be put into effect. The 30 August report, which contained details on these limitations, received significantly less public attention than the 21 August communiqué.<ref name=nsarchive/>{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=249}}{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=12}}<ref name="faschron"/>

Nevertheless, pleased by the findings, the Eisenhower administration proposed negotiations on a permanent test ban{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=14}} and announced it would self-impose a year-long testing moratorium if Britain and the Soviet Union did the same. This decision amounted to a victory for John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles (then the [[Director of Central Intelligence]]), and PSAC, who had argued within the Eisenhower administration for separating a test ban from larger disarmament efforts, and a defeat for the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] and AEC, which had argued to the contrary.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=65}}

In May 1958, Britain had informed the US that it would be willing to join a testing moratorium on 31 October 1958, by which point it would have finished its hydrogen-bomb testing, conditional on the US providing Britain with nuclear information following amendment of the McMahon Act. The US Congress approved amendments permitting greater collaboration in late June.{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|pp=114–115, 119}} Following Soviet assent on 30 August 1958 to the one-year moratorium, the three countries conducted a series of tests in September and October. At least 54 tests were conducted by the US and 14 by the Soviet Union in this period. On 31 October 1958 the three countries initiated test-ban negotiations (the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests) and agreed to a temporary moratorium (the Soviet Union joined the moratorium shortly after this date).<ref name=nsarchive/><ref name=macdonald>{{cite journal |title=Eisenhower's Scientists: Policy Entrepreneurs and the Test-Ban Debate 1954–1958 |last=MacDonald |first=Julia M. |journal=[[Foreign Policy Analysis (journal)|Foreign Policy Analysis]] |volume=11 |pages=1–21 |date=2015|doi=10.1111/fpa.12018}}</ref><ref name=faschron>{{cite web |title=Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Chronology |publisher=Federation of American Scientists |url=https://fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/chron1.htm |access-date=7 August 2016}}</ref><ref name="nti">{{cite news|url=https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-banning-nuclear-test-atmosphere-outer-space-and-under-water-partial-test-ban-treaty-ptbt/|title=Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty) (PTBT)|date=26 October 2011|newspaper=[[Nuclear Threat Initiative]]|access-date=31 July 2016}}</ref> The moratorium would last for close to three years.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=15}}

The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests convened in Geneva at Moscow's request (the Western participants had proposed [[New York City]]). The US delegation was led by [[James Jeremiah Wadsworth]], an envoy to the UN, the British by [[David Ormsby-Gore, 5th Baron Harlech|David Ormsby-Gore]], the [[Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (United Kingdom)|Minister of State for Foreign Affairs]], and the Soviets by [[Semyon K. Tsarapkin]], a disarmament expert with experience dating back to the 1946 Baruch Plan. The Geneva Conference began with a Soviet draft treaty grounded in the Geneva System. The three nuclear weapons states (the "original parties") would abide by a test ban, verified by the Geneva System, and work to prevent testing by potential nuclear states (such as France). This was rejected by Anglo-American negotiators due to fears that the verification provisions were too vague and the Geneva System too weak.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=15–16}}

Shortly after the Geneva Conference began in the fall of 1958, Eisenhower faced renewed domestic opposition to a comprehensive test ban as Senator [[Albert Gore Sr.]] argued in a widely circulated letter that a partial ban would be preferable due to Soviet opposition to strong verification measures.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=15}}

The Gore letter did spur some progress in negotiations, as the Soviet Union allowed in late November 1958 for explicit control measures to be included in the text of the drafted treaty. By March 1959, the negotiators had agreed upon seven treaty articles, but they primarily concerned uncontroversial issues and a number of disputes over verification persisted. First, the Soviet verification proposal was deemed by the West to be too reliant on self-inspection, with control posts primarily staffed by citizens of the country housing the posts and a minimal role for officials from the international supervisory body. The West insisted that half of a control post staff be drawn from another nuclear state and half from neutral parties. Second, the Soviet Union required that the international supervisory body, the Control Commission, require unanimity before acting; the West rejected the idea of giving Moscow a veto over the commission's proceedings. Finally, the Soviet Union preferred temporary inspection teams drawn from citizens of the country under inspection, while the West insisted on permanent teams composed of inspectors from the Control Commission.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=15–16}}

Additionally, despite the initial positive response to the Geneva experts' report, data gathered from Hardtack operations of 1958 (namely the underground ''Rainier'' shot) would further complication verification provisions as US scientists, including Hans Bethe (who backed a ban), became convinced that the Geneva findings were too optimistic regarding detection of underground tests, though Macmillan warned that using the data to block progress on a test ban might be perceived in the public as a political ploy.{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|pp=118–119}} In early 1959, Wadsworth told Tsarapkin of new US skepticism towards the Geneva System. While the Geneva experts believed the system could detect underground tests down to five kilotons, the US now believed that it could only detect tests down to 20 kilotons (in comparison, the [[Little Boy]] bomb dropped on [[Hiroshima]] had an official yield of 13 kilotons).<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://permalink.lanl.gov/object/tr?what=info:lanl-repo/lareport/LA-08819|title=The Yields of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Nuclear Explosions|last=Malik|first=John|date=September 1985|publisher=Los Alamos National Laboratory|access-date=12 August 2016}}</ref> As a result, the Geneva detection regime and the number of control posts would have to be significantly expanded, including new posts within the Soviet Union. The Soviets dismissed the US argument as a ruse, suggesting that the Hardtack data had been falsified.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=17}}

In early 1959, a roadblock to an agreement was removed as Macmillan and Eisenhower, over opposition from the Department of Defense, agreed to consider a test ban separately from broader disarmament endeavors.<ref name=statedept/>{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|p=118}}

On 13 April 1959, facing Soviet opposition to on-site detection systems for underground tests, Eisenhower proposed moving from a single, comprehensive test ban to a graduated agreement where atmospheric tests—those up to 50&nbsp;km (31&nbsp;mi) high, a limit Eisenhower would revise upward in May 1959—would be banned first, with negotiations on underground and outer-space tests continuing. This proposal was turned down on 23 April 1959 by Khrushchev, calling it a "dishonest deal."{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=17}} On 26 August 1959, the US announced it would extend its year-long testing moratorium to the end of 1959, and would not conduct tests after that point without prior warning. The Soviet Union reaffirmed that it would not conduct tests if the US and UK continued to observe a moratorium.<ref name=faschron/>

To break the deadlock over verification, Macmillan proposed a compromise in February 1959 whereby each of the original parties would be subject to a set number of on-site inspections each year. In May 1959, Khrushchev and Eisenhower agreed to explore Macmillan's quota proposal, though Eisenhower made further test-ban negotiations conditional on the Soviet Union dropping its Control Commission veto demand and participating in technical discussions on identification of [[high-altitude nuclear explosion]]s. Khrushchev agreed to the latter and was noncommittal on the former.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=17–18}} A working group in Geneva would eventually devise a costly system of 5–6 satellites orbiting at least {{convert|18,000|mi|km|sp=us}} above the earth, though it could not say with certainty that such a system would be able to determine the origin of a high-altitude test. US negotiators also questioned whether high-altitude tests could evade detection via [[radiation shielding]]. Concerning Macmillan's compromise, the Soviet Union privately suggested it would accept a quota of three inspections per year. The US argued that the quota should be set according to scientific necessity (i.e., be set according to the frequency of seismic events).{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=19–20}}

In June 1959, a report of a panel headed by [[Lloyd Berkner]], a physicist, was introduced into discussions by Wadsworth. The report specifically concerned whether the Geneva System could be improved without increasing the number of control posts. Berkner's proposed measures were seen as highly costly and the technical findings themselves were accompanied by a caveat about the panel's high degree of uncertainty given limited data. Around the same time, analysis conducted by the Livermore National Laboratory and [[RAND Corporation]] at Teller's instruction found that the seismic effect of an underground test could be artificially dampened (referred to as "decoupling") to the point that a 300-kiloton detonation would appear in seismic readings as a one-kiloton detonation. These findings were largely affirmed by pro-ban scientists, including Bethe. The third blow to the verification negotiations was provided by a panel chaired by Robert Bacher, which found that even on-site inspections would have serious difficulty determining whether an underground test had been conducted.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=17–19}}

In September 1959, Khrushchev visited the US While the test ban was not a focus on conversations, a positive meeting with Eisenhower at [[Camp David]] eventually led Tsarapkin to propose a technical working group in November 1959 that would consider the issues of on-site inspections and seismic decoupling in the "spirit of Camp David." Within the working group, Soviet delegates allowed for the timing of on-site inspections to be grounded in seismic data, but insisted on conditions that were seen as excessively strict. The Soviets also recognized the theory behind decoupling, but dismissed its practical applications. The working group closed in December with no progress and significant hostility. Eisenhower issued a statement blaming "the recent unwillingness of the politically guided Soviet experts to give serious scientific consideration to the effectiveness of seismic techniques for the detection of underground nuclear explosions." Eisenhower simultaneously declared that the US would not be held to its testing moratorium when it expired on 31 December 1959, though pledged to not test if Geneva talks progressed. The Soviet Union followed by reiterating its decision to not test as long as Western states did not test.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=20–21}}

In early 1960, Eisenhower indicated his support for a comprehensive test ban conditional on proper monitoring of underground tests.{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|pp=504–505}} On 11 February 1960, Wadsworth announced a new US proposal by which only tests deemed verifiable by the Geneva System would be banned, including all atmospheric, underwater, and outer-space tests within detection range. Underground tests measuring more than 4.75 on the [[Richter scale]] would also be barred, subject to revision as research on detection continued. Adopting Macmillan's quota compromise, the US proposed each nuclear state be subject to roughly 20 on-site inspections per year (the precise figure based on the frequency of seismic events).{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=22}}

Tsarapkin responded positively to the US proposal, though was wary of the prospect of allowing underground tests registering below magnitude 4.75. In its own proposal offered 19 March 1960 the Soviet Union accepted most US provisions, with certain amendments. First, the Soviet Union asked that underground tests under magnitude 4.75 be banned for a period of four-to-five years, subject to extension. Second, it sought to prohibit all outer-space tests, whether within detection range or not. Finally, the Soviet Union insisted that the inspection quota be determined on a political basis, not a scientific one. The Soviet offer faced a mixed reception. In the US, Senator Hubert Humphrey and the [[Federation of American Scientists]] (which was typically seen as supportive of a test ban) saw it as a clear step towards an agreement. Conversely, AEC chairman [[John A. McCone]] and Senator [[Clinton Presba Anderson]], chair of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, argued that the Soviet system would be unable to prevent secret tests. That year, the AEC published a report arguing that the continuing testing moratorium risked "free world supremacy in nuclear weapons," and that renewed testing was critical for further weapons development. The joint committee also held hearings in April which cast doubt on the technical feasibility and cost of the proposed verification measures.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=22–23, 33}} Additionally, Teller continued to warn of the dangerous consequences of a test ban and the Department of Defense (including [[Neil H. McElroy]] and [[Donald A. Quarles]], until recently its top two officials) pushed to continue testing and expand missile stockpiles.{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|pp=504–505}}

Shortly after the Soviet proposal, Macmillan met with Eisenhower at Camp David to devise a response. The Anglo-American counterproposal agreed to ban small underground tests (those under magnitude 4.75) on a temporary basis (a duration of roughly 1 year, versus the Soviet proposal of 4–5 years), but this could only happen after verifiable tests had been banned and a seismic research group (the Seismic Research Program Advisory Group) convened. The Soviet Union responded positively to the counterproposal and the research group convened on 11 May 1960. The Soviet Union also offered to keep an underground ban out of the treaty under negotiation. In May 1960, there were high hopes that an agreement would be reached at an upcoming summit of Eisenhower, Khrushchev, Macmillan, and [[Charles de Gaulle]] of France in Paris.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=22–24}}{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=69}}

A test ban seemed particularly close in 1960, with Britain and France in accord with the US (though France conducted its [[Gerboise Bleue|first nuclear test]] in February) and the Soviet Union having largely accepted the Macmillan–Eisenhower proposal. But US-Soviet relations soured after an American [[Lockheed U-2|U-2 spy plane]] was [[1960 U-2 incident|shot down]] in Soviet airspace in May 1960.<ref name=faschron/> The Paris summit was abruptly cancelled and the Soviet Union withdrew from the seismic research group, which subsequently dissolved. Meetings of the Geneva Conference continued until December, but little progress was made as Western-Soviet relations continued to grow more antagonistic through the summer, punctuated by the [[Congo Crisis]] in July and angry exchanges at the UN in September.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=24}} Macmillan would later claim to President [[John F. Kennedy]] that the failure to achieve a test ban in 1960 "was all the fault of the American 'big hole' obsession and the consequent insistence on a wantonly large number of on-site inspections."{{sfn|Jacobson|Stein|1966|p=345}}{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=452}}

Eisenhower would leave office with an agreement out of reach, as Eisenhower's technical advisors, upon whom he relied heavily, became mired in the complex technical questions of a test ban, driven in part by a strong interest among American experts to lower the error rate of seismic test detection technology.{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|pp=249, 305}}{{sfn|Greene|2006|pp=6–8}} Some, including Kistiakowsky, would eventually raise concerns about the ability of inspections and monitors to successfully detect tests.<ref name=fas>{{cite web|title=National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament – Foreign Relations of the United States 1958–1960, Volume III |publisher=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |url=https://fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/ike/index.html |access-date=1 August 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160305075241/https://fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/ike/index.html |archive-date=5 March 2016}}</ref> The primary product of negotiations under Eisenhower was the testing moratorium without any enforcement mechanism.{{sfn|Gaddis|1982|p=193}} Ultimately, the goal of a comprehensive test ban would be abandoned in favor of a partial ban due to questions over seismic detection of underground tests.{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|pp=249, 305}}

Political scientist [[Robert Gilpin]] later argued that Eisenhower faced three camps in the push for a test ban.{{sfn|Gilpin|1962}} The first was the "control" camp, led by figures like Linus Pauling and astronomer [[Harlow Shapley]], which believed that both testing and possession of nuclear weapons was dangerous. Second, there was the "finite containment" camp, populated by scientists like Hans Bethe, which was concerned by perceived Soviet aggression but still believed that a test ban would be workable with adequate verification measures. Third, the "infinite containment" camp, of which Strauss, Teller, and members of the defense establishment were members, believed that any test ban would grant the Soviet Union the ability to conduct secret tests and move ahead in the arms race.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|pp=61–63}}

The degree of Eisenhower's interest in a test ban is a matter of some historical dispute.{{sfn|Greene|2006|p=1}} [[Stephen E. Ambrose]] writes that by early 1960, a test ban had become "the major goal of his Presidency, indeed of his entire career," and would be "his final and most lasting gift to his country."{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|p=504}} Conversely, [[John Lewis Gaddis]] characterizes negotiations of the 1950s as "an embarrassing series of American reversals," suggesting a lack of real US commitment to arms control efforts.{{sfn|Gaddis|1982|pp=192–193}} The historian Robert Divine also attributed the failure to achieve a deal to Eisenhower's "lack of leadership," evidenced by his inability to overcome paralyzing differences among US diplomats, military leaders, national security experts, and scientists on the subject. [[Paul Nitze]] would similarly suggest that Eisenhower never formulated a cohesive test ban policy, noting his ability to "believe in two mutually contradictory and inconsistent propositions at the same time."{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=250}}