Editing Paradigm (section)

==Incommensurability==

Kuhn pointed out that it could be difficult to assess whether a particular paradigm shift had actually led to progress, in the sense of explaining more facts, explaining more important facts, or providing better explanations, because the understanding of "more important", "better", etc. changed with the paradigm. The two versions of reality are thus ''incommensurable''. Kuhn's version of [[commensurability (philosophy of science)|incommensurability]] has an important psychological dimension. This is apparent from his analogy between a paradigm shift and the flip-over involved in some optical illusions.<ref name="Kuhn, T S 1970 Page 85" /> However, he subsequently diluted his commitment to incommensurability considerably, partly in the light of other studies of scientific development that did not involve revolutionary change.<ref>Haack, S (2003) ''Defending Science – within reason: between scientism and cynicism.'' Prometheus Books. {{ISBN|978-1-59102-458-3}}.</ref> One of the examples of incommensurability that Kuhn used was the change in the style of chemical investigations that followed the work of [[Lavoisier]] on atomic theory in the late 18th century.<ref name="Kuhn, T S 1970 Page 85" /> In this change, the focus had shifted from the bulk properties of matter (such as hardness, colour, reactivity, etc.) to studies of atomic weights and quantitative studies of reactions. He suggested that it was impossible to make the comparison needed to judge which body of knowledge was better or more advanced. However, this change in research style (and paradigm) eventually (after more than a century) led to a theory of atomic structure that accounts well for the bulk properties of matter; see, for example, Brady's ''General Chemistry''.<ref>Brady, J E (1990). ''General Chemistry: Principles and Structure.'' (5th Edition.) John Wiley and Sons.</ref> According to P J Smith, this ability of science to back off, move sideways, and then advance is characteristic of the natural sciences,<ref>Smith, P J (2011) ''The Reform of Economics''. Taw Books. {{ISBN|978-0-9570697-0-1}}. Page 129.</ref> but contrasts with the position in some social sciences, notably economics.<ref>Smith, P J (2011) ''The Reform of Economics.'' Taw Books. Chapter 7.</ref>

This apparent ability does not guarantee that the account is veridical at any one time, of course, and most modern philosophers of science are [[Fallibilism|fallibilists]]. However, members of other disciplines do see the issue of incommensurability as a much greater obstacle to evaluations of "progress"; see, for example, Martin Slattery's ''Key Ideas in Sociology''.<ref name=incommensurable>{{Cite book
  | last =Slattery
  | first =Martin
  | title =Key ideas in sociology
  | publisher =Cheltenham : Nelson Thornes
  | year =2003
  | pages =151, 152, 153, 155
  | url =https://books.google.com/books?id=c4BwHtKcitwC&q=Kuhn+paradigms&pg=PA151
  | oclc = 52531237
  | isbn =978-0-7487-6565-2}}</ref><ref name=Nickles>
{{Cite book
  | last =Nickles
  | first =Thomas
  | title =Thomas Kuhn
  | publisher =Cambridge University Press
  | date =December 2002
  | pages =1, 2, 3, 4
  | url =https://books.google.com/books?id=QJ5z5MfrCn0C&q=Kuhn+paradigms&pg=PA65
  | quote = Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996), the author of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, is probably the best-known and most influential historian and philosopher of science of the last 25 years, and has become something of a cultural icon. His concepts of paradigm, paradigm change and incommensurability have changed the way we think about science.
  | isbn =978-0-521-79206-6}}</ref>