Editing Operation Market Garden (section)

===The plan===

The plan of action consisted of two operations:
* ''Market'': airborne forces of Lieutenant General [[Lewis H. Brereton]]'s [[First Allied Airborne Army]] to seize bridges and other terrain, under tactical command of [[I Airborne Corps (United Kingdom)|I Airborne Corps]] under Lieutenant-General [[Frederick Browning]], and
* ''Garden'': ground forces of the Second Army to move north spearheaded by [[XXX Corps (United Kingdom)|XXX Corps]] under Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks.{{sfn|Ellis|Warhurst|2004|p=29}}

==== Market ====

Market would employ four of the six divisions of the First Allied Airborne Army. The U.S. 101st Airborne Division, under Major General [[Maxwell D. Taylor]], would drop in two locations just north of XXX Corps to take the bridges north of [[Eindhoven]] at Son and Veghel. The [[U.S. 82nd Airborne Division|82nd Airborne Division]], under Brigadier General [[James M. Gavin]], would drop northeast of them to take the bridges at [[Grave (Netherlands)|Grave]] and Nijmegen and the British [[1st Airborne Division (United Kingdom)|1st Airborne Division]], under Major-General [[Roy Urquhart]], with the [[Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade]], under Major General [[Stanisław Sosabowski]], attached, would drop at the extreme north end of the route, capturing the road bridge at Arnhem and the rail bridge at [[Oosterbeek]]. The [[52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division]] would be flown to the captured [[Deelen Air Base|Deelen Airfield]] on D+5.{{sfn|Bennett|2008|p=29}}

The First Allied Airborne Army had been created on 16 August as the result of British requests for a coordinated headquarters for airborne operations, a concept approved by General Eisenhower on 20 June. The British had strongly hinted that a British officer – Browning in particular – be appointed its commander. Browning for his part decided to bring his entire staff with him on the operation to establish his field HQ using the much-needed 32 [[Airspeed Horsa]] gliders for administrative personnel, and six [[Waco CG-4]]A gliders for U.S. Signals' personnel. Since the bulk of both troops and aircraft were American, Brereton, a [[United States Army Air Forces|U.S. Army Air Forces]] officer, was named by Eisenhower on 16 July and appointed by SHAEF on 2 August. Brereton had no experience in airborne operations but had extensive command experience at the air force level in several theaters, most recently as commander of [[Ninth Air Force (World War II)|Ninth Air Force]], which gave him a working knowledge of the operations of [[IX Troop Carrier Command]].{{sfn|Warren|1956|p=81}}

{{Listen
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| filename    = US Army-The Big Picture-Airborne To Battle-Gliders.ogv
| title       = A U.S. Army film describing the use of gliders during Operation Market
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Market would be the largest airborne operation in history, delivering over 34,600 men of the 101st, 82nd and 1st Airborne Divisions and the Polish Brigade. 14,589 troops were landed by [[Military glider|glider]] and 20,011 by parachute. Gliders also brought in 1,736 vehicles and 263 artillery pieces. 3,342 tons of ammunition and other supplies were brought by glider and parachute drop.{{sfn|Warren|1956|pp=226–227}}

To deliver its 36 battalions of airborne infantry and their support troops to the continent, the First Allied Airborne Army had under its operational control the 14 groups of IX Troop Carrier Command,<ref>{{harvnb|Warren|1956|p=82}} (operational control of IXTCC to First Airborne Army) and p. 97 (size and composition of troop carrier units).</ref>{{efn|After 25 August, IX TCC was removed from Ninth Air Force and placed directly under U.S. Strategic Air Forces.{{sfn|Warren|1956|p=83}}}} and after 11 September the 16 squadrons of [[No. 38 Group RAF|38 Group]] RAF (an organization of converted bombers providing support to resistance groups) and a transport formation, [[No. 46 Group RAF|46 Group]].{{sfn|Warren|1956|p=112}}

The combined force had 1,438 [[C-47 Skytrain|C-47/Dakota]] transports (1,274 [[USAAF]] and 164 [[RAF]]) and 321 converted RAF bombers. The Allied glider force had been rebuilt after Normandy until by 16 September it numbered 2,160 CG-4A Waco gliders, 916 Airspeed Horsas (812 RAF and 104 U.S. Army) and 64 [[General Aircraft Hamilcar]]s (large cargo gliders). The U.S. had only 2,060 glider pilots available, so that none of its gliders would have a co-pilot but would instead carry an extra passenger.{{sfn|Warren|1956|p=98}}

[[File:Infantry moving up past a knocked-out German 88mm gun.jpg|thumb|right|Infantry of 50th (Northumbrian) Division moving up past a knocked-out German 88mm gun near '[[Joe's Bridge]]' over the Meuse-Escaut Canal in [[Belgium]], 16 September 1944]]

Because the C-47s served as paratrooper transports and glider tugs and because IX Troop Carrier Command would provide all the transports for both British parachute brigades, this massive force could deliver only 60 percent of the ground forces in one lift. This limit was the reason for the decision to split the troop-lift schedule into successive days. Ninety percent of the USAAF transports on the first day would drop parachute troops, with the same proportion towing gliders on the second day (the RAF transports were almost entirely used for glider operations).{{efn|655 of the 700 scheduled RAF sorties on the first two days towed gliders and the RAF only dropped 186 total troops by parachute.{{sfn|Warren|1956|p=227 Table III}}}} Brereton rejected having two airlifts on the first day, although this had been accomplished during Operation Dragoon, albeit with slightly more daylight (45 minutes) and against negligible opposition.{{sfn|D'Este|2002|pp=614, 616}}

17 September was on a [[dark moon]] and in the days following it the [[new moon]] set before dark. Allied airborne doctrine prohibited big operations in the absence of all light, so the operation would have to be carried out in daylight. The risk of ''[[Luftwaffe]]'' interception was judged small, given the crushing air superiority of Allied fighters but there were concerns about the increasing number of [[flak]] units in the Netherlands, especially around Arnhem. Brereton's experience with tactical air operations judged that flak suppression would be sufficient to permit the troop carriers to operate without prohibitive loss. The invasion of Southern France had demonstrated that large scale daylight airborne operations were feasible.{{sfn|Warren|1956|p=90}} Daylight operations, in contrast to those in [[Sicily]] and Normandy, would have much greater navigational accuracy and time-compression of succeeding waves of aircraft, tripling the number of troops that could be delivered per hour. The time required to assemble airborne units on the drop zone after landing would be reduced by two-thirds.{{sfn|Warren|1956|p=154}}

IX Troop Carrier Command's transport aircraft had to tow gliders and drop paratroopers, duties that could not be performed simultaneously. Although every division commander requested two drops on the first day, Brereton's staff scheduled only one lift based on the need to prepare for the first drop by bombarding German flak positions for half a day and a weather forecast on the afternoon of 16 September (which soon proved erroneous) that the area would have clear conditions for four days, so allowing drops during them.{{sfn|Warren|1956|p=100}}

After one week preparations were declared complete. The planning and training for the airborne drops at Sicily and Normandy had taken months. One [[United States Air Force]] historian noted that 'Market' was the only large airborne operation of the war in which the USAAF "had no training program, no rehearsals, almost no exercises, and a... low level of tactical training."{{sfn|Warren|1956|p=99}}

Gavin had doubts about the plan. In his diary he wrote, "It looks very rough. If I get through this one I will be very lucky." He was also highly critical of Browning, writing that he "... unquestionably lacks the standing, influence and judgment that comes from a proper troop experience... his staff was superficial... Why the British units fumble along... becomes more and more apparent. Their tops lack the know-how, never do they get down into the dirt and learn the hard way."{{sfn|Hastings|2005|p=36}}

==== Garden ====

Garden consisted primarily of XXX Corps and was initially spearheaded by the [[Guards Armoured Division]], with the [[43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division|43rd Wessex]] and [[50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division|50th Northumbrian Infantry Divisions]] in reserve. They were expected to arrive at the south end of the 101st Airborne Division's area on the first day, the 82nd's by the second day and the 1st's by the fourth day at the latest. The airborne divisions would then join XXX Corps in the breakout from the Arnhem bridgehead.{{sfn|Bennett|2008|p=29}}

Four days was a long time for an airborne force to fight unsupported. Even so, before Operation Market Garden started it seemed to the Allied high command that the German resistance had broken. Most of the German Fifteenth Army in the area appeared to be fleeing from the Canadians and they were known to have no ''[[Panzergruppen]]''. It was thought that XXX Corps would face limited resistance on their route up Highway 69 and little [[Armoured fighting vehicle|armour]]. Meanwhile, the German defenders would be spread out over {{convert|100|km|mi}} trying to contain the pockets of airborne forces, from the Second Army in the south to Arnhem in the north.{{sfn|Hibbert|2003|p=56}}