Editing Operation Barbarossa (section)

===Axis invasion plans===
{{See also|A-A line|Ural Mountains in Nazi planning|Lossberg study}}
[[File:Marcks Plan for Operation Barbarossa.jpg|thumb|The [[Erich Marcks|Marcks Plan]] was the original German plan of attack for Operation Barbarossa, as depicted in a US Government study (March 1955).]]
Stalin's reputation as a brutal dictator contributed both to the Nazis' justification of their assault and to their expectations of success, as Stalin's [[Great Purge]] of the 1930s had executed many competent and experienced military officers, leaving Red Army leadership weaker than their German adversary. The Nazis often emphasized the Soviet regime's brutality when targeting the Slavs with propaganda.{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|pp=9–24}} They also claimed that the Red Army was [[Soviet offensive plans controversy|preparing to attack the Germans]], and their own invasion was thus presented as a [[pre-emptive war|pre-emptive]] strike.{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|pp=9–24}}

Hitler also utilised the rising tension between the Soviet Union and Germany over territories in the Balkans as one of the pretexts for the invasion.{{sfn|Ericson|1999|p=127}} While no concrete plans had yet been made, Hitler told one of his generals in June 1940 that the victories in Western Europe finally freed his hands for a "final showdown" with Bolshevism.{{sfn|Ericson|1999|pp=129–130}} With the successful end to the [[Battle of France|campaign in France]], General [[Erich Marcks]] was assigned the task of drawing up the initial invasion plans of the Soviet Union. The first battle plans were entitled ''Operation Draft East'' (colloquially known as the ''Marcks Plan'').{{sfn|Kay|2006|p=31}} His report advocated the [[A-A line]] as the operational objective of any invasion of the Soviet Union. This assault would extend from the northern city of [[Arkhangelsk]] on the [[Arctic Sea]] through [[Nizhny Novgorod|Gorky]] and [[Rostov-on-Don|Rostov]] to the port city of [[Astrakhan]] at the mouth of the [[Volga]] on the [[Caspian Sea]]. The report concluded that—once established—this military border would reduce the threat to Germany from attacks by enemy [[bombers]].{{sfn|Kay|2006|p=31}}

Although Hitler was warned by many high-ranking military officers, such as [[Friedrich Paulus]], that occupying Western Russia would create "more of a drain than a relief for Germany's economic situation," he anticipated compensatory benefits such as the [[demobilisation]] of entire divisions to relieve the acute [[labour shortage]] in German industry, the exploitation of [[Ukraine]] as a reliable and immense source of agricultural products, the use of [[forced labour]] to stimulate Germany's overall economy and the expansion of territory to improve Germany's efforts to isolate the United Kingdom.{{sfn|Roberts|2011|pp=147–148}} Hitler was further convinced that Britain would sue for peace once the Germans triumphed in the Soviet Union,{{sfn|Hildebrand|1973|p=105}} and if they did not, he would use the resources gained in the East to defeat the [[British Empire]].{{sfn|Overy|1996|p=60}}

{{quote
| quote = We only have to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.{{sfn|Hardesty|2012|p=6}}
| source = —Adolf Hitler
}}
Hitler received the final military plans for the invasion on 5 December 1940, which the [[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht|German High Command]] had been working on since July 1940, under the codename "Operation Otto." Upon reviewing the plans, Hitler formally committed Germany to the invasion when he issued [[s:Führer Directive 21|''Führer Directive 21'']] on 18 December 1940, where he outlined the precise manner in which the operation was to be carried out.{{sfn|Fritz|2011|p=51}} Hitler also renamed the operation to ''Barbarossa'' in honor of medieval Emperor Friedrich I of the Holy Roman Empire, a leader of the Third Crusade in the 12th century.{{sfn|Stackelberg|2007|p=258}} The [[Barbarossa decree|Barbarossa Decree]], issued by Hitler on 30 March 1941, supplemented the Directive by decreeing that the war against the Soviet Union would be one of annihilation and legally sanctioned the eradication of all [[Commissar|Communist political leaders]] and intellectual elites in Eastern Europe.{{sfn|Beck|2005|pp=328–330}} The invasion was tentatively set for May 1941.

According to a 1978 essay by German historian [[Andreas Hillgruber]], the invasion plans drawn up by the German military elite were substantially coloured by hubris, stemming from the rapid defeat of France at the hands of the "invincible" ''Wehrmacht'' and by traditional German stereotypes of Russia as a primitive, backward "Asiatic" country.{{Efn|It is additionally important that considerable portions of the German General Staff thought of Russia as a "colossus of clay" which was "politically unstable, filled with discontented minorities, ineffectively ruled, and militarily weak."{{sfn|Megargee|2000|p=110}} }} Red Army soldiers were considered brave and tough, but the officer corps was held in contempt. The leadership of the ''Wehrmacht'' paid little attention to politics, culture, and the considerable industrial capacity of the Soviet Union, in favour of a very narrow military view.{{sfn|Wette|2007|pp=21–22}} Hillgruber argued that because these assumptions were shared by the entire military elite, Hitler was able to push through with a "war of annihilation" that would be waged in the most inhumane fashion possible with the complicity of "several military leaders," even though it was quite clear that this would be in violation of all accepted norms of warfare.{{sfn|Wette|2007|pp=21–22}}

Even so, in autumn 1940, some high-ranking German military officials drafted a memorandum to Hitler on the dangers of an invasion of the Soviet Union. They argued that the eastern territories ([[Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic]], the [[Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic]], the [[Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic]], the [[Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic]], and the [[Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic]]) would only end up as a further economic burden for Germany.{{sfn|Gorodetsky|2001|pp=69–70}} It was further argued that the Soviets, in their current bureaucratic form, were harmless and that the occupation would not benefit Germany politically either.{{sfn|Gorodetsky|2001|pp=69–70}} Hitler, solely focused on his ultimate ideological goal of eliminating the Soviet Union and Communism, disagreed with economists about the risks and told his right-hand man [[Hermann Göring]], the chief of the ''Luftwaffe'', that he would no longer listen to misgivings about the economic dangers of a war with the USSR.{{sfn|Ericson|1999|p=162}} It is speculated that this was passed on to General [[Georg Thomas]], who had produced reports that predicted a net economic drain for Germany in the event of an invasion of the Soviet Union unless its economy was captured intact and the Caucasus oilfields seized in the first blow; Thomas revised his future report to fit Hitler's wishes.{{sfn|Ericson|1999|p=162}} The Red Army's ineptitude in the [[Winter War]] against Finland in 1939–40 also convinced Hitler of a quick victory within a few months. Neither Hitler nor the General Staff anticipated a long campaign lasting into the winter and therefore, adequate preparations such as the distribution of warm clothing and [[winterisation]] of important military equipment like tanks and artillery, were not made.{{sfn|Palmer|2010|pp=187–188}}

Further to Hitler's Directive, [[Göring's Green Folder]], issued in March 1941, laid out the agenda for the next step after the anticipated quick conquest of the Soviet Union. The [[Hunger Plan]] outlined how entire urban populations of conquered territories were to be starved to death,{{efn|This systematic plan was developed by officials within the Reich Ministry of Food, the ''Wehrwirtschaftsamt'', and the Wehrmacht's Quartermaster General's office in spring 1941.{{sfn|Quinkert|2014a|p=15}} }} thus creating an agricultural surplus to feed Germany and urban space for the German upper class.{{sfn|Patterson|2003|p=562}} This genocidal strategy aimed to redirect agricultural resources from the Soviet Union to Germany by cutting off food to vast regions—particularly central and northern Russia—resulting in the intentional starvation of millions. These policies were modified by late 1941 when the original plan proved logistically untenable. Nevertheless, the strategy of feeding only those civilians deemed economically useful continued, leading to mass deaths in urban centers like Leningrad, Kharkiv, and Kiev.{{sfn|Quinkert|2014a|pp=15–17}} 

To this end, Nazi policy aimed to destroy the Soviet Union as a political entity in accordance with the [[geopolitics|geopolitical]] {{lang|de|Lebensraum}} ideals for the benefit of future generations of the "[[Nordicism|Nordic]] [[master race]]".{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|pp=9–24}} In 1941, Nazi ideologue [[Alfred Rosenberg]]—later appointed Reich Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories—suggested that conquered Soviet territory should be administered in the following {{lang|de|[[Reichskommissar]]iate}} ('Reich Commissionerships'):

{|class="wikitable"
|-
|+Administrative subdivisions of conquered Soviet territory as envisaged, and then partially realised, by Alfred Rosenberg{{sfn|Handrack|1981|p=40}}{{sfn|Klemann|Kudryashov|2012|p=33}}
|-
! Name
! style=width:500px | Note
! Map
|-
! scope="row" |{{left|{{lang|de|[[Reichskommissariat Ostland]]}}}}
|[[Baltic countries]] and [[Belarus]]
|{{center|[[File:Reichskommissariat Ostland (1942).svg|65px]]}}
|-
! scope="row" |{{left|{{lang|de|[[Reichskommissariat Ukraine]]}}}}
|[[Ukraine]], enlarged eastwards to the [[Volga]]
|{{center|[[File:Reichskommissariat Ukraine (1942).svg|65px]]}}
|-
! scope="row" |{{left|{{lang|de|[[Reichskommissariat Kaukasien]]}}}}
|[[North Caucasus|Southern Russia]] and the [[Caucasus]] region
|{{center|Unrealised}}
|-
! scope="row" |{{left|{{lang|de|[[Reichskommissariat Moskowien]]}}}}
|[[Moscow metropolitan area]] and remaining [[European Russia]]; originally called '''Reichskommissariat Russland''', later renamed
|{{center|Unrealised}}
|-
! scope="row" |{{left|{{lang|de|[[Reichskommissariat Turkestan]]}}}}
|[[Soviet Central Asia|Central Asian republics]] and territories
|{{center|Unrealised}}
|-
|}

German military planners also researched [[French invasion of Russia|Napoleon's failed invasion of Russia]]. In their calculations, they concluded that there was little danger of a large-scale retreat of the Red Army into the Russian interior, as it could not afford to give up the Baltic countries, Ukraine, or the Moscow and Leningrad regions, all of which were vital to the Red Army for supply reasons and would thus, have to be defended.{{sfn|Rich|1973|p=212}} Hitler and his generals disagreed on where Germany should focus its energy.{{sfn|Megargee|2000|pp=131–134}}{{sfn|Seaton|1972|pp=59–63}} Hitler, in many discussions with his generals, repeated his order of "Leningrad first, the [[Donbas]] second, Moscow third;"{{sfn|Higgins|1966|pp=11–59}} but he consistently emphasized the destruction of the Red Army over the achievement of specific terrain objectives.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=18}} Hitler believed Moscow to be of "no great importance" in the defeat of the Soviet Union{{Efn|Concerning this strategic mistake, historian David Stone asserts that, "If Hitler's decision to invade Russia in 1941 was his greatest single error of judgement, then his subsequent decision not to strike hard and fast against Moscow was surely a close second."{{sfn|Stone|2011|p=195}} }} and instead believed victory would come with the destruction of the Red Army west of the capital, especially west of the [[Daugava|Western Dvina]] and [[Dnieper]] rivers, and this pervaded the plan for Barbarossa.{{sfn|Glantz|2010b|pp=19, 60}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=72}} This belief later led to disputes between Hitler and several German senior officers, including [[Heinz Guderian]], [[Gerhard Engel]], [[Fedor von Bock]] and [[Franz Halder]], who believed the decisive victory could only be delivered at Moscow.{{sfn|Glantz|2010b|pp=55–60}} They were unable to sway Hitler, who had grown overconfident in his own military judgment as a result of the rapid successes in Western Europe.{{sfn|Seaton|1972|pp=32–36}}