Editing On War (section)

== Influence and Conflicting Interpretations ==
Modern perceptions of war are based on the concepts that Clausewitz put forth in ''On War'', but they have been diversely interpreted by various leaders (such as [[Moltke the Elder|Moltke]], [[Vladimir Lenin]], [[Dwight Eisenhower]], and [[Mao Zedong]]), thinkers, armies, and peoples. Modern military doctrine, organization, and norms are all still based on Napoleonic premises, but whether the premises are necessarily also "Clausewitzian" is debatable.<ref name="Meilinger2020">{{Cite book |last =Phillip S. Meilinger |url =https://books.google.com/books?id=2pnJDwAAQBAJ |title =Thoughts on War |date =29 January 2020 |publisher =University Press of Kentucky |isbn =978-0-8131-7891-2}}</ref>

Some prominent critics have interpreted ''On War'' as an argument for "[[total war]]".{{Ref label|A|a|none}} The book has been blamed for the level of destruction involved in the First and the Second World Wars, but it seems rather that Clausewitz (who did not actually use the term "total war") had merely foreseen the inevitable developments that started with the huge, patriotically motivated armies of the Napoleonic era.{{Citation needed|date=December 2022}} These developments resulted (though the evolution of war has not yet ended) in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with all the forces and capabilities of the state devoted to destroying forces and capabilities of the enemy state (thus "total war"). Conversely, Clausewitz  has also been seen as "The preeminent military and political strategist of limited war in modern times".<ref>Robert Osgood, 1979.</ref>

The "dualism" of Clausewitz's view of war (that wars can vary a great deal between the two "poles" that he proposed, based on the political objectives of the opposing sides and the context) seems to be simple enough, but few commentators have been willing to accept that crucial variability{{Citation needed|date=December 2022}}. They insist that Clausewitz "really" argued for one end of the scale or the other. Clausewitz's use of a dialectical method to construct his argument, led to frequent modern misinterpretation because he allegedly explores various often-opposed ideas before he came to conclusions.

However, according to Gat, the opposing interpretations of Clausewitz are rooted in Clausewitz’s own conceptual journey.<ref name=":0" /> The centerpiece of Clausewitz’s theory of war throughout his life was his concept of all-out fighting and energetic conduct leading to the great battle of annihilation. He believed such conduct expressed the very “nature”, or “lasting spirit” of war. Accordingly, Clausewitz disparaged the significance of the [[Maneuver warfare|maneuver]], surprise, and cunning in war, as distracting from the centrality of [[battle]],<ref>''On War'', IV, 3, pp. 228-229; III, 9, p. 198; III, 10, p. 202.</ref> and argued that defense was legitimate only if and as long as one was weaker than the enemy.<ref>''On War'', VI, 1, 2, pp. 358-359; VI, 8, p. 380, and VII, 2, p. 524.</ref> Nevertheless, in the last years of his life, after the first six out of the eight books of ''On War'' had already been drafted, Clausewitz came to recognize that this concept was not universal and did not even apply to the [[Napoleonic Wars]], the supreme model of his theory of war. This was demonstrated by the [[Peninsular War|Spanish]] and [[French invasion of Russia|Russian]] campaigns and by [[guerrilla warfare]], in all of which battle was systematically avoided. Consequently, from 1827 on, Clausewitz recognized the legitimacy of [[limited war]] and explained it by the influence of politics that harnessed the unlimited nature of war to serve its objectives. Clausewitz died in 1831 before he completed the revision he planned along these lines. He incorporated his new ideas only into the end of Book VI, Book VIII and the beginning of Book I of ''On War''. As a result, when published, ''On War'' encompassed both his old and new ideas, at odds with each other.

Thus, against common interpretations of ''On War'', Gat points out that Clausewitz’s transformed views regarding the relationship between politics and war and the admission of limited war into his theory constituted a U-turn against his own life-long fundamental view of the nature of war. Gat further argues the readers’ miscomprehension of the theory in ''On War'' as complete and dialectical, rather than a draft undergoing a radical change of mind, has thus generated a range of reactions. People of each age have found in ''On War'' the Clausewitz who suited their own views on war and its conduct. Between 1870 and 1914, he was celebrated mainly for his insistence on the clash of forces and the decisive battle, and his emphasis on moral forces. By contrast, after 1945, during the [[Atomic Age|nuclear age]], his reputation has reached a second pinnacle for his later acceptance of the primacy of politics and the concept of limited war.