Editing Noumenon (section)

=== Noumenon and the thing-in-itself ===
Many accounts of Kant's philosophy treat "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" as synonymous, and there is textual evidence for this relationship.<ref>Immanuel Kant (1781) ''Critique of Pure Reason,'' for example in A254/B310, p. 362 (Guyer and Wood), "The concept of a '''noumenon''', i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of as an object of the senses but rather as a thing-in-itself [...]"; But note that the terms are not used interchangeably throughout. The first reference to ''thing-in-itself'' comes many pages (A30) before the first reference to '''noumenon''' (A250). For a secondary or tertiary source, see: [http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9056357/noumenon "Noumenon"] in the ''Encyclopædia Britannica''</ref> However, [[Stephen Palmquist]] holds that "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" are only ''loosely'' synonymous, inasmuch as they represent the same concept viewed from two different perspectives,<ref>"Noumenon: the name given to a thing when it is viewed as a transcendent object. The term 'negative noumenon' refers only to the recognition of something which is not an object of sensible intuition, while 'positive noumenon' refers to the (quite mistaken) attempt to know such a thing as an empirical object. These two terms are sometimes used loosely as synonyms for 'transcendental object' and 'thing-in-itself', respectively. (Cf. phenomenon.)"&nbsp;– [http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/ksp1/KSPglos.html Glossary of Kant's Technical Terms]</ref><ref>Thing-in-itself: an object considered transcendentally apart from all the conditions under which a subject can gain knowledge of it via the physical senses. Hence the thing-in-itself is, by definition, unknowable via the physical senses. Sometimes used loosely as a synonym of noumenon. (Cf. appearance.)"&nbsp;– [http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/ksp1/KSPglos.html Glossary of Kant's Technical Terms]. Palmquist defends his definitions of these terms in his article, "Six Perspectives on the Object in Kant's Theory of Knowledge", ''Dialectica'' 40:2 (1986), pp.121–151; revised and reprinted as Chapter VI in Palmquist's book, ''Kant's System of Perspectives'' (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993).</ref> and other scholars also argue that they are not identical.<ref>[[Teodor Oizerman|Oizerman, T. I.]], "Kant's Doctrine of the "Things in Themselves" and Noumena", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 41, No. 3, Mar., 1981, 333–350; Karin de Boer, "Kant's Multi-Layered Conception of Things in Themselves, Transcendental Objects, and Monads", Kant-Studien 105/2, 2014, 221-260.</ref>  [[Schopenhauer's criticism of the Kantian philosophy|Schopenhauer criticised Kant]] for changing the meaning of "noumenon". However, this opinion is far from unanimous.<ref>"Other interpreters have introduced an almost unending stream of varying suggestions as to how these terms ought to be used. A handful of examples will be sufficient to make this point clear, without any claim to represent an exhaustive overview. Perhaps the most commonly accepted view is expressed by Paulsen, who equates 'thing-in-itself' and 'noumenon', equates 'appearance' and 'phenomenon', distinguishes 'positive noumenon' and 'negative noumenon', and treats 'negative noumenon' as equivalent to 'transcendental object' [pp. 4:148-50, 154-5, 192]. Al-Azm and Wolff also seem satisfied to equate 'phenomenon' and 'appearance', though they both carefully distinguish 'thing-in-itself' from 'negative noumenon' and 'positive noumenon' [A4:520; W21:165, 313–5; s.a. W9:162]. Gotterbarn similarly equates the former pair, as well as 'thing-in-itself' and 'positive noumenon', but distinguishes between 'transcendental object', 'negative noumenon' and 'thing-in-itself' [G11: 201]. By contrast, Bird and George both distinguish between 'appearance' and 'phenomenon', but not between 'thing-in-itself' and 'noumenon' [B20:18,19, 53–7; G7:513-4n]; and Bird sometimes blurs the distinction between 'thing-in-itself' and 'transcendental object' as well.[2] Gram equates 'thing-in-itself' not with 'noumenon', but with 'phenomenon' [G13:1,5-6]! Allison cites different official meanings for each term, yet he tends to equate 'thing-in-itself' at times with 'negative noumenon' and at times with 'transcendental-object', usually ignoring the role of the 'positive noumenon' [A7:94; A10:58,69]. And Buchdahl responds to the fact that the thing-in-itself seems to be connected with each of the other object-terms by regarding it as 'Kant's umbrella term'.[3]" [http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/ksp1/KSP6A.html Stephen Palmquist on Kant's object terms]</ref>  Kant's writings show points of difference between noumena and things-in-themselves. For instance, he regards things-in-themselves as existing:

<blockquote>
...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.{{sfn|Kant|1999|loc=Bxxvi-xxvii}}
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He is much more doubtful about noumena:
<blockquote>
But in that case a noumenon is not for our understanding a special [kind of] object, namely, an intelligible object; the [sort of] understanding to which it might belong is itself a problem. For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition.{{sfn|Kant|1999|loc=A256, B312|p=273}}
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A crucial difference between the noumenon and the thing-in-itself is that to call something a noumenon is to claim a kind of knowledge, whereas Kant insisted that the thing-in-itself is unknowable. Interpreters have debated whether the latter claim makes sense: it seems to imply that we know at least one thing about the thing-in-itself (i.e., that it is unknowable). But Stephen Palmquist explains that this is part of Kant's definition of the term, to the extent that anyone who claims to have found a way of making the thing-in-itself knowable must be adopting a non-Kantian position.<ref>"The Radical Unknowability of Kant's 'Thing in Itself'", Cogito 3:2 (March 1985), pp.101–115; revised and reprinted as Appendix V in Stephen Palmquist, [http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/ksp1 Kant's System of Perspectives] (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993).</ref>