Editing Nominalism (section)

===Indian philosophy===
{{See also|Difference (philosophy)}}
[[Indian philosophy]] encompasses various realist and nominalist traditions. Certain orthodox Hindu schools defend the realist position, notably [[Purva Mimamsa]], [[Nyaya]] and [[Vaisheshika]], maintaining that the referent of the word is both the individual object perceived by the subject of knowledge and the universal class to which the thing belongs. According to Indian realism, both the individual and the universal exist objectively, with the second underlying the former.

Buddhists take the nominalist position, especially those of the [[Sautrāntika]]<ref>{{cite web|author=Sonam Thakchoe|editor=Edward N. Zalta|title=The Theory of Two Truths in India|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-india/|website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|date=2022 }}</ref> and [[Yogācāra]] schools;<ref>{{cite book |last1=Chatterjee |first1=A. K. |title=The Yogācāra Idealism |date=1975 |publisher=Motilal Banarsidass |location=Delhi |isbn=8120803159 |edition=2d, rev.}}</ref><ref name="Bruno" /> they were of the opinion that words have as referent not true objects, but only concepts produced in the intellect. These concepts are not real since they do not have efficient existence, that is, causal powers. Words, as linguistic conventions, are useful to thought and discourse, but even so, it should not be accepted that words apprehend reality as it is.

[[Dignāga]] formulated a nominalist theory of meaning called ''apohavada'', or ''theory of exclusions''. The theory seeks to explain how it is possible for words to refer to classes of objects even if no such class has an objective existence. Dignāga's thesis is that classes do not refer to positive qualities that their members share in common. On the contrary, universal classes are exclusions (''[[apoha]]''). As such, the "cow" class, for example, is composed of all exclusions common to individual cows: they are all non-horse, non-elephant, etc.