Editing Nihilism (section)

== Epistemology ==
{{Anchor|Epistemological|Epistemological nihilism}}
=== Relativism ===
{{main|Relativism}}
Epistemological or epistemic nihilism is a family of views that challenge the existence or universal nature of knowledge. Some versions embrace relativism, denying that [[Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)|objectivity]] is possible. For example, [[Factual relativism|truth-relativism]] asserts that [[truth]] is relative to the [[Perspectivism|perspectives]] of specific individuals, groups, historical epochs, or cultural contexts.{{efn|Related forms of epistemological relativism target the standards of knowledge, justification, or rationality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Davis|2014}} | {{harvnb|Baghramian|Carter|2025|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>}} According to this view, statements like "the sun rises in the east" and "killing is wrong" are true in some perspectives and false in others. This theory not only claims that different people have different opinions but additionally asserts that no independent framework exists to assess which opinion is ultimately correct. As a result, there is no absolute truth on which observers from different perspectives can agree.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=18–19, 35}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Hautamäki|2022|p=534}} }}</ref>

A related form of relativistic nihilism focuses on [[Meaning (philosophy)|meaning]] rather than truth. It argues that different people rely on incompatible [[conceptual scheme]]s{{efn|A conceptual scheme is a system of categories, concepts, or beliefs through which people organize their ideas, understand their experiences, and interpret reality.<ref>{{harvnb|Blackburn|2008}}</ref>}} to make sense of the world. In the absence of a universal framework, genuine communication and [[Intersubjectivity|shared understanding]] are deemed impossible since each viewpoint has its own interpretation of reality. Without a common ground, these [[Commensurability (philosophy of science)|incommensurable]] belief systems are arbitrary constructions, limiting reason to operations within a specific system without the ability to reconcile them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=18–19, 23–26, 35}} | {{harvnb|Coady|2005|p=800}} }}</ref>

[[File:Jean-Francois Lyotard cropped.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|alt=Black-and-white photo of man wearing a white shirt with his gaze directed slightly upward|Exploring [[antifoundationalism]], [[Jean-Francois Lyotard]] challenged [[metanarratives]] that aim to provide universal frameworks of rational understanding.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gratton|2018|loc=Lead section, § 3.2 Justice in light of the Postmodern Condition}} | {{harvnb|Woodward|loc=§ 4b. The Postmodern Condition}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=88–90, 92–93}} }}</ref>]]

One argument for relativism emphasizes the diversity of human viewpoints and the frequent inability to resolve [[Disagreement (epistemology)|disagreements]] and reach a shared understanding.<ref>{{harvnb|Baghramian|Carter|2025|loc=§ 2. Why Relativism?}}</ref> Another argument asserts that theories are usually [[Underdetermination|underdetermined]] by the data supporting them. As a result, there are different equally valid interpretations without an objective standard to resolve their differences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baghramian|Carter|2025|loc=§ 2.4 Underdetermination of theory by data}} | {{harvnb|Davis|2014}} }}</ref> An influential criticism argues that relativism [[self-refuting idea|undermines itself]]: if all truths are relative to a viewpoint, then relativism itself is only true for some viewpoints and false for others.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Coady|2005|p=800}} | {{harvnb|Moruzzi|2008|pp=207–208}} }}</ref> Another objection suggests that the absence of absolute epistemic standards has odd consequences, for example, that people should not argue if they disagree or that they should generally suspend their judgments.<ref>{{harvnb|Moruzzi|2008|pp=211–212, 221–222}}</ref>

Nietzsche was an influential proponent of relativistic nihilism. He saw belief systems as expressions of the [[will to power]] with the goal to assert dominance rather than represent reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=18–21}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }}</ref> In [[postmodern philosophy]], epistemological nihilism is associated with [[antifoundationalism]], arguing that there is no ultimate rational ground of knowledge or action. It challenges universal frameworks, termed ''[[Metanarrative|grand metanarratives]]'', that claim to provide such a ground.<ref>{{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism, § 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}}</ref>

=== Skepticism ===
{{main|Philosophical skepticism#Epistemological skepticism}}
While relativist versions of epistemological nihilism allow that knowledge exists relative to a perspective, skeptic versions deny the existence of knowledge in general.{{efn|Some philosophers, such as [[Karen L. Carr]], distinguish epistemological nihilism from skepticism and relativism. According to this interpretation, skepticism and relativism imply uncertainty about the existence of knowledge and objectivity, recommending the suspension of judgment. Epistemological nihilism, by contrast, firmly asserts that knowledge or objectivity do not exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carr|1992|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_i2VZYYYp-gC&pg=PA20 20–21]}} | {{harvnb|Dowdall|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bXL6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA29 29]}} }}</ref>}} Also called ''radical skepticism'', this view argues that there is no foundation or justification of knowledge claims. Unlike more moderate forms of skepticism, it questions even the most reasonable knowledge claims grounded in basic common sense.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vwZ9wgEACAAJ&pg=PA33 33]}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671, 673}} | {{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=472}} | {{harvnb|Kyriacou|Wallbridge|2021|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> A closely related form of epistemological nihilism, sometimes called ''alethiological nihilism'', centers on truth rather than knowledge, stating that truth does not exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cuneo|2007|pp=115–116}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|p=5}} }}</ref>

One argument in favor of radical skepticism asserts that absolute certainty is required for knowledge. It attempts to show that [[doubt]] can never be fully expelled.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|loc=§ 8. Implications of Fallibilism: No Knowledge?}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }}</ref> For example, the [[dream argument]], suggested by philosophers such as [[René Descartes]], points out that, while [[dream]]ing, people usually cannot distinguish between the [[illusion]]ary dream and factual reality. Based on this observation, it argues that there is no knowledge since an individual can never be certain that they are not currently dreaming.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Windt|2021|loc=§ 1.1 Cartesian Dream Skepticism}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 8. The Epistemic Principles and Scepticism}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 4. Sceptical Doubts About Knowing}} }}</ref> A related approach, articulated by philosophers such as [[Roderick Chisholm]], assumes that [[Problem of the criterion|a criterion]] is required to validate knowledge claims. Asserting that one cannot discern this criterion without already assuming some form of knowledge, it infers that knowledge is impossible.<ref>{{harvnb|McCain|loc=§ 1. The Problem, § 2. Chisholm on the Problem of the Criterion}}</ref>{{efn|[[Agrippa's trilemma]] present a similar conundrum for the existence of knowledge.<ref>{{harvnb|Klein|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1ETRCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA484 484–485]}}</ref>}}

Despite these arguments, radical skepticism is a rare position, accepted only by few philosophers and challenged by various criticisms. Its main influence stems from attempts by non-skeptical philosophers to prove that their theories overcome the challenge of skepticism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005|p=838}} | {{harvnb|Comesaña|Klein|2024|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Kyriacou|Wallbridge|2021|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> Some objections state that radical skepticism is incoherent or self-refuting. For example, if there is no knowledge then skeptics cannot know that there is no knowledge, making it questionable why anyone should believe their theories.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671, 673}} | {{harvnb|Huemer|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ccmNDGIiJ3IC&pg=PA27 27]}} }}</ref> Another counterargument asserts that the support for the existence of knowledge provided by common sense is more convincing than the abstract reasoning leading to skepticism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 6.2 Responses to the Closure Argument}} | {{harvnb|Reed|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=geSrCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 75]}} }}</ref>

Epistemological nihilism can lead to other forms of nihilism. For instance, the inability to discern the meaning of life can lead to the conclusion that there is no such meaning, resulting in existential nihilism.<ref>{{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}}</ref> [[Moral skepticism]], the view that there is no moral knowledge, can have a similar effect: the incapacity to distinguish right from wrong behavior can lead to the rejection of moral facts. Some theorists associate epistemological nihilism primarily with moral skepticism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Olson|2006|pp=618–619}} | {{harvnb|Cuneo|2007|pp=115–116}} }}</ref>