Editing My Lai massacre (section)

==Aftermath==
[[File:MyLai Haeberle P33 BodiesNearBurningHouse.jpg|thumb|Dead bodies outside a burning home]]

After returning to base at about 11:00, Thompson reported the massacre to his superiors.<ref name="BiltonSim1992pp176-179">Bilton, Michael & Kevin Sim. ''Four Hours in My Lai''. New York: Viking, 1992.<!-- ISSN/ISBN needed --></ref>{{rp|176–179}} His allegations of civilian killings quickly reached LTC Barker, the operation's overall commander. Barker radioed his executive officer to find out from Medina what was happening on the ground. Medina then gave the cease-fire order to Charlie Company to "cut [the killing] out – knock it off".<ref>[https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=MGxkAAAAIBAJ&sjid=Dn0NAAAAIBAJ&pg=2313,475102&dq=my+lai+medina+knock+off+the+killing&hl=en Medina said to have "encouraged" murder], ''The Calgary Herald'', 17 August 1971.</ref>

Since Thompson made an official report of the civilian killings, he was interviewed by Colonel Oran Henderson, the commander of the 11th Infantry Brigade.<ref>[http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/Henderson.html The Omissions and Commissions of Colonel Oran K. Henderson]. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100624031103/http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/Henderson.html|date=24 June 2010}}; An extract from the official U.S. Army ''Peers Report'' into My Lai Massacre. University of Missouri-Kansas City Law school website.</ref> Concerned, senior American officers canceled similar planned operations by Task Force Barker against other villages (My Lai 5, My Lai 1, etc.) in [[Quảng Ngãi Province]].<ref name="Angers1999pp219-220">Angers (1999), pp. 219–20.</ref> Despite Thompson's revealing information, Henderson issued a Letter of Commendation to Medina on 27 March 1968.

The following day, 28 March, the commander of Task Force Barker submitted a combat action report for the 16 March operation, in which he stated that the operation in Mỹ Lai was a success, with 128 VC combatants killed. The Americal Division commander, General Koster, sent a congratulatory message to Charlie Company.

General [[William C. Westmoreland]], the head of MACV, also congratulated Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry for "outstanding action", saying that they had "dealt [the] enemy [a] heavy blow".<ref>{{cite book |last=Bourke |first=Joanna |title=An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare |location=New York |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hbfuAAAAMAAJ&focus=searchwithinvolume&q=heavy%20blow.%20Congratulations |publisher=Basic Books |year=1999 |page=196 |isbn=978-0465007370}}</ref> Later, he changed his stance, writing in his memoir that it was "the conscious massacre of defenseless babies, children, mothers, and old men in a kind of diabolical slow-motion nightmare that went on for the better part of a day, with a cold-blooded break for lunch".<ref>Westmoreland, William C. ''A Soldier Reports''. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976, p. 378. {{ISBN|978-0385004343}}</ref>

Owing to the chaotic circumstances of the war and the U.S. Army's decision not to undertake a definitive body count of noncombatants in Vietnam, the number of civilians killed at Mỹ Lai cannot be stated with certainty. Estimates vary from source to source, with 347 and 504 being the most commonly cited figures. The memorial at the site of the massacre lists 504&nbsp;names, with ages ranging from one to 82. A later investigation by the U.S.&nbsp;Army arrived at a lower figure of 347&nbsp;deaths,{{citation needed|date=August 2022}} the official U.S. estimate. The official estimate by the local government remains 504.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/my-lai-massacre-1|title=My Lai Massacre|work=HISTORY|access-date=26 September 2018 |language=en}}</ref>

=== Investigation and cover-up ===

Initial reports claimed "128 Viet Cong and 22 civilians" had been killed in the village during a "fierce fire fight". Westmoreland congratulated the unit on the "outstanding job". As relayed at the time by ''[[Stars and Stripes (newspaper)|Stars and Stripes]]'' magazine, "U.S.&nbsp;infantrymen had killed 128&nbsp;Communists in a bloody day-long battle."<ref>[http://www.stripes.com/news/clemency-is-last-hope-for-a-more-normal-life-1.91416 "Clemency is last hope for a more normal life"], ''Stars and Stripes'', 12 May 2009; retrieved 21 July 2012.</ref>

On 16 March 1968, in the official press briefing known as the [[United States news media and the Vietnam War#Escalation, 1965–1967|"Five&nbsp;O'Clock Follies"]], a mimeographed release included this passage: "In an action today, Americal Division forces killed 128&nbsp;enemy near Quang Ngai City. Helicopter gunships and artillery missions supported the ground elements throughout the day."<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20080122121653/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,903831,00.html#ixzz1VizJJ8eo "The Press: Farewell to the Follies"], ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'', 12 February 1973. {{subscription required}}</ref>

Initial investigations of the Mỹ Lai operation were undertaken by Colonel Henderson, under orders from the Americal Division's executive officer, Brigadier General George H. Young. Henderson interviewed several soldiers involved in the incident, then issued a written report in late April claiming that some 20 civilians were inadvertently killed during the operation. According to Henderson's report, the civilian casualties that occurred were accidental and mainly attributed to long-range artillery fire.<ref name="Oliver 2003 247–268">{{Cite journal |last=Oliver |first=Kendrick |date=2003| title=Atrocity, Authenticity and American Exceptionalism: (Ir)rationalising the Massacre at My Lai |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27557330|journal=Journal of American Studies|volume=37|issue=2|pages=247–268 |doi=10.1017/S0021875803007102 |jstor=27557330 |s2cid=145094745|issn=0021-8758}}</ref> The Army at this time was still describing the event as a military victory that had resulted in the deaths of 128 enemy combatants.<ref name="Hersh"/>

Six months later, Tom Glen, a 21-year-old soldier of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade, wrote a letter to General [[Creighton Abrams]], the new MACV commander.<ref>Kurlansky, Mark. ''1968: The Year That Rocked the World''. New York: Ballantine, 2004, p. 106.<!-- ISSN/ISBN needed --></ref> He described an ongoing and routine brutality against Vietnamese civilians on the part of American forces in Vietnam that he had personally witnessed, and then concluded,

{{quote|It would indeed be terrible to find it necessary to believe that an American soldier that harbors such racial intolerance and disregard for justice and human feeling is a prototype of all American national character; yet the frequency of such soldiers lends credulity to such beliefs. ... What has been outlined here I have seen not only in my own unit, but also in others we have worked with, and I fear it is universal. If this is indeed the case, it is a problem which cannot be overlooked, but can through a more firm implementation of the codes of MACV (Military Assistance Command Vietnam) and the Geneva Conventions, perhaps be eradicated.<ref name=PowellLegend/>}}

[[Colin Powell]], then a 31-year-old Army major serving as an assistant chief of staff of operations for the Americal Division, was charged with investigating the letter, which did not specifically refer to Mỹ Lai, as Glen had limited knowledge of the events there. In his report, Powell wrote, "In direct refutation of this portrayal is the fact that relations between Americal Division soldiers and the Vietnamese people are excellent." A 2018 U.S. Army case study of the massacre noted that Powell "investigated the allegations described in the [Glen] letter. He proved unable to uncover either widespread unnecessary killings, war crimes, or any facts related to My Lai".<ref name="CAPL">{{cite web |url=https://capl.army.mil/case-studies/wcs-single.php?id=76&title=my-lai-at-50 |title=My Lai at 50: Written Case Study |author=<!--Not stated--> |date=2021 |website=Center for the Army Profession and Leadership |publisher=US Army |access-date=19 October 2021 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211019035946/https://capl.army.mil/case-studies/wcs-single.php?id=76&title=my-lai-at-50 |archive-date=19 October 2021}}</ref> Powell's handling of the assignment was later characterized by some observers as "whitewashing" the atrocities of Mỹ Lai.<ref name="PowellLegend">{{Cite web |title=The Consortium |url=http://www.consortiumnews.com/archive/colin3.html |access-date=2024-12-29 |website=www.consortiumnews.com}}</ref>

In May 2004, Powell, then [[United States Secretary of State]], told [[CNN]]'s [[Larry King]], "I mean, I was in a unit that was responsible for Mỹ Lai. I got there after Mỹ Lai happened. So, in war, these sorts of horrible things happen every now and again, but they are still to be deplored."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/32160.htm|title=Interview on CNN's Larry King Live with Secretary Colin L. Powell|date=4 May 2004|access-date=16 March 2006}}</ref>

Seven months prior to the massacre at Mỹ Lai, on [[Robert McNamara]]'s orders, the Inspector General of the U.S. Defense Department investigated press coverage of alleged atrocities committed in South Vietnam. In August 1967, the 200-page report "Alleged Atrocities by U.S. Military Forces in South Vietnam" was completed.<ref name=omens/>

Independently of Glen, Specialist 5 [[Ronald Ridenhour|Ronald L. Ridenhour]], a former door gunner from the Aviation Section, Headquarters Company, 11th Infantry Brigade, sent a letter in March 1969 to thirty members of [[United States Congress|Congress]] imploring them to investigate the circumstances surrounding the "Pinkville" incident.<ref name="Ron"/><ref name="hero">{{cite web|url=http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/Myl_hero.html#RON|title=The Heroes of My Lai|publisher=University of Missouri Kansas City Law School|date=December 1994|access-date=21 July 2012}}</ref> He and his pilot, Warrant Officer Gilbert Honda, flew over Mỹ Lai several days after the operation and observed a scene of complete destruction. At one point, they hovered over a dead Vietnamese woman with a patch of the 11th Brigade on her body.<ref>[https://archive.today/20130912065206/http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=FEUyAAAAIBAJ&sjid=2bUFAAAAIBAJ&pg=979,32153&dq=michael+terry+my+lai&hl=en "The Men Talked of the Killing"], ''The Palm Beach Post'', 1 June 1970.</ref>

Ridenhour himself had not been present when the massacre occurred, but his account was compiled from detailed conversations with soldiers of Charlie Company who had witnessed and, in some cases, participated in the killing.<ref name="Oliver 2003 247–268"/> He became convinced that something "rather dark and bloody did indeed occur" at Mỹ Lai, and was so disturbed by the tales he heard that within three months of being discharged from the Army he penned his concerns to Congress<ref name="Ron">{{cite web |url=http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/ridenhour_ltr.html|title=Text of Ron Ridenhour's 1969 letter|publisher=University of Missouri Kansas City Law School|date=29 March 1969|access-date=21 July 2012|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110209113219/http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/ridenhour_ltr.html|archive-date=9 February 2011}}</ref> as well as the Chairman of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], and the President.<ref name="Oliver 2003 247–268"/> He included the name of Michael Bernhardt, an eyewitness who agreed to testify, in the letter.<ref>[http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/Myl_hero.html#RON "The Heroes of My Lai: Ron Ridenhour's Story"]. Ridenhour's own account during the conference on Mỹ Lai at [[Tulane University]] in [[New Orleans]], Louisiana, in December 1994.</ref>

Most recipients of Ridenhour's letter ignored it, with the exception of Congressman [[Mo Udall]]<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.udall.gov/AboutMKUdall/EducationOfACongressman.aspx|title=Mo Udall, The Education of a Congressman |publisher=Udall.gov|access-date=18 June 2011}}</ref> and Senators [[Barry Goldwater]] and [[Edward Brooke]].<ref name="brooke2007">{{cite book|title=Bridging the Divide: My Life|publisher=Rutgers University Press|url=https://archive.org/details/bridgingdividemy00broo|url-access=registration|last=Brooke |first=Edward William|year=2007|page=[https://archive.org/details/bridgingdividemy00broo/page/166 166]|isbn=978-0-8135-3905-8}}</ref> Udall urged the [[United States House Committee on Armed Services|House Armed Services Committee]] to call on [[The Pentagon|Pentagon]] officials to conduct an investigation.<ref name="hero"/>

=== Public revelation and reaction ===

Under mounting pressure caused by Ridenhour's letter, on 9 September 1969, the Army quietly charged Calley with six specifications of [[Murder#Degrees of murder|premeditated murder]] for the deaths of 109 South Vietnamese civilians near the village of Sơn Mỹ, at a [[hamlet (place)|hamlet]] called simply "My Lai".<ref name=Miscue_article /><ref>{{Cite book|last=Oliver|first=Kendrick|title=The My Lai Massacre in American History and Memory|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1wisoI-wP5MC&pg=PA44|year=2006|publisher=Manchester University Press|isbn=978-0719068904|pages=43–44}}</ref> Calley's court martial was not released to the press and did not commence until over a year later in November 1970. However, word of Calley's prosecution found its way to American investigative reporter and freelance journalist [[Seymour Hersh]].<ref>Oliver, Kendrick. "Coming to Terms with the Past: My Lai", ''History Today'', 00182753, February 2006, Vol. 56, Issue 2.</ref>

My Lai was first revealed to the public on 13 November 1969—more than a year and a half after the incident—when Hersh published a story through the [[Dispatch News Service]]. After extensive interviews with Calley, Hersh broke the Mỹ Lai story in 35 newspapers; additionally, the ''[[Alabama Journal]]'' in Montgomery and ''[[the New York Times]]'' ran separate stories on the allegations against Calley on 12 and 13 November, respectively.<ref name=Miscue_article>{{cite magazine |date=5 December 1969|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901651,00.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081214144136/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901651,00.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=December 14, 2008|title=The Press: Miscue on the Massacre |magazine=Time |access-date=18 June 2011}}</ref> On 20 November, explicit color photographs and eye-witness testimony of the massacre taken by U.S. Army combat photographer [[Ronald L. Haeberle]] were published in ''[[The Plain Dealer|The Cleveland Plain Dealer]]''. The same day, ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'', ''[[Life (magazine)|Life]]'' and ''[[Newsweek]]'' all covered the story, and [[CBS]] televised an interview with Paul Meadlo, a soldier in Calley's unit during the massacre.<ref>{{cite news|date=21 September 2017|url=http://www.cleveland.com/plain-dealer-library/index.ssf/2009/11/plain_dealer_exclusive_my_lai_massacre_photos_by_ronald_haeberle.html|title=Plain Dealer exclusive in 1969: My Lai massacre photos by Ronald Haeberle|newspaper=The Plain Dealer|access-date=25 February 2018}}</ref> From the U.S. Government and Army's point of view, Haeberle's photos transformed the massacre from potentially manageable to a very serious problem. The day after their publication, [[Melvin Laird]] the [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] discussed them with [[Henry Kissinger]] who was at the time [[National Security Advisor (United States)|National Security Advisor]] to President [[Richard Nixon]]. Laird was recorded as saying that while he would like "to sweep it under the rug", the photographs prevented it. "They're pretty terrible", he said. "There are so many kids just laying there; these pictures are authentic".<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/27/us/kissinger-tapes-describe-crises-war-and-stark-photos-of-abuse.html|title=Kissinger Tapes Describe Crises, War and Stark Photos of Abuse|last=Becker|first=Elizabeth|date=2004-05-27|work=The New York Times|access-date=2019-10-16|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|quote=In their conversation on Nov. 21, 1969, about the My Lai massacre, Mr. Laird told Mr. Kissinger that while he would like 'to sweep it under the rug,' the photographs prevented it. 'There are so many kids just laying there; these pictures are authentic,' Mr. Laird said.}}</ref> Within the Army, the reaction was similar. Chief Warrant Officer André Feher, with the [[United States Army Criminal Investigation Division|U.S. Army's Criminal Investigation Division]] (CID), was assigned the case in early August 1969. After he interviewed Haeberle, and was shown the photographs which he described as "evidence that something real bad had happened", he and the Pentagon officials he reported to realized "that news of the massacre could not be contained".<ref>{{harvnb|Oliver|2006|pp=36,39}} "Feher himself recalled that he did not obtain 'hard evidence that something real bad had happened' until he interviewed Ronald Haeberle on 25 August and was shown Haeberle's photographs of the massacre victims.&nbsp;... the interview indicated to Pentagon officials that news of the massacre could not be contained."</ref>

The story threatened to undermine the U.S. war effort and severely damage the Nixon presidency. Inside the White House, officials privately discussed how to contain the scandal. On November 21, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger emphasized that the White House needed to develop a "game plan", to establish a "press policy", and maintain a "unified line" in its public response. The White House established a "My Lai Task Force" whose mission was to "figure out how best to control the problem", to make sure administration officials "all don't go in different directions" when discussing the incident, and to "engage in dirty tricks". These included discrediting key witnesses and questioning Hersh's motives for releasing the story. What soon followed was a public relations offensive by the administration designed to shape how My Lai would be portrayed in the press and understood among the American public.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Rowling|first1=Charles|last2=Sheets|first2=Penelope|last3=Jones|first3=Timothy|date=2015|title=American Atrocity Revisited: National Identity, Cascading Frames, and the My Lai Massacre|journal=Political Communication|volume=32|issue=2|pages=311|doi=10.1080/10584609.2014.944323|s2cid=143846178}}</ref>

As members of Congress called for an inquiry and news correspondents abroad expressed their horror at the massacre, the [[General Counsel of the Army]] [[Robert E. Jordan III|Robert Jordan]] was tasked with speaking to the press. He refused to confirm allegations against Calley. Noting the significance that the statement was given at all, [[Bill Downs]] of [[ABC News (United States)|ABC News]] said it amounted to the first public expression of concern by a "high defense official" that American troops "might have committed genocide".{{sfn|Oliver|2006|p=48}}

On 24 November 1969, Lieutenant General [[William R. Peers]] was appointed by the [[Secretary of the Army]] and the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|Army Chief of Staff]] to conduct a thorough review of the My Lai incident, 16–19 March 1968, and its investigation by the Army.<ref>{{cite news |title=The Judgement of Peers |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/entertainment/books/1979/07/01/the-judgement-of-peers/a84c96dd-ffc4-4165-90d5-fbf6f02c6fc6/}}</ref> Peers's final report,<ref name="summaryreport"/> presented to higher-ups on 17 March 1970, was highly critical of top officers at brigade and divisional levels for participating in the cover-up, and the Charlie Company officers for their actions at Mỹ Lai.<ref>{{cite web|author=Linder, Douglas|url=http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/myl_bpeers.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/19990427192242/http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/myl_bpeers.htm|url-status=dead|archive-date=27 April 1999|title=Biography of General William R. Peers|publisher=Law.umkc.edu|year=1999|access-date=18 June 2011}}</ref>

According to Peers' findings:

{{quote|
[The 1st Battalion] members had killed at least 175–200 Vietnamese men, women, and children. The evidence indicates that only 3 or 4 were confirmed as Viet Cong although there were undoubtedly several unarmed VC (men, women, and children) among them and many more active supporters and sympathizers. One man from the company was reported as wounded from the accidental discharge of his weapon. ... a tragedy of major proportions had occurred at Son My.<ref name=summaryreport/>}}

In 2003 Hugh Thompson, the pilot who had intervened during the massacre, said of the Peers report:

{{blockquote|The Army had Lieutenant General William R. Peers conduct the investigation. He conducted a very thorough investigation. Congress did not like his investigation at all, because he pulled no punches, and he recommended court-martial for I think 34 people, not necessarily for the murder but for the cover-up. Really the cover-up phase was probably as bad as the massacre itself, because he recommended court-martial for some very high-ranking individuals.<ref name=HThompson-2003>{{cite speech |title=Moral Courage In Combat: The My Lai Story |first=Hugh |last=Thompson |author-link=Hugh Thompson Jr. |event=William C. Stutt Ethics Lecture |location=Annapolis, MD |date=2003 |url=https://www.usna.edu/Ethics/publications/ThompsonPg1-28_Final.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070221172507/https://www.usna.edu/Ethics/publications/ThompsonPg1-28_Final.pdf |archive-date=21 February 2007 |access-date=March 7, 2022}}</ref>{{rp|28}}}}

In 1968, an American journalist, [[Jonathan Schell]], wrote that in the Vietnamese province of Quang Ngai, where the Mỹ Lai massacre occurred, up to 70% of all villages were destroyed by the air strikes and artillery bombardments, including the use of napalm; 40 percent of the population were refugees, and the overall civilian casualties were close to 50,000 a year.<ref>Schell, Jonathan. ''The Military Half: An Account of Destruction in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin''. New York: Knopf, 1968.<!-- ISSN/ISBN needed --></ref> Regarding the massacre at Mỹ Lai, he stated, "There can be no doubt that such an atrocity was possible only because a number of other methods of killing civilians and destroying their villages had come to be the rule, and not the exception, in our conduct of the war".<ref>''The New Yorker'', Volume 45, Issues 41–45, 1969, p. 27.<!-- ISSN/ISBN needed --></ref>

In May 1970, a sergeant who participated in [[Operation Speedy Express]] wrote a confidential letter to then Army Chief of Staff Westmoreland describing civilian killings he said were on the scale of the massacre occurring as "a My Lai each month for over a year" during 1968–69. Two other letters to this effect from enlisted soldiers to military leaders in 1971, all signed "Concerned Sergeant", were uncovered within declassified National Archive documents. The letters describe common occurrences of civilian killings during population pacification operations. Army policy also stressed very high body counts and this resulted in dead civilians being marked down as combatants. Alluding to indiscriminate killings described as unavoidable, the commander of the 9th Infantry Division, then Major General [[Julian Ewell]], in September 1969, submitted a confidential report to Westmoreland and other generals describing the countryside in some areas of Vietnam as resembling the [[Battle of Verdun|battlefields of Verdun]].<ref name="Turse">{{cite magazine|last=Turse|first=Nick|author-link=Nick Turse|title=A My Lai a Month|magazine=The Nation|year=2008|url=http://www.thenation.com/article/my-lai-month}}</ref><ref name="Nelson">{{cite book|last=Nelson|first=Deborah|title=The War Behind Me: Vietnam Veterans Confront the Truth about U.S. War Crimes|publisher=Basic Books|date=2008|location=New York|isbn=978-0-465-00527-7|url=https://archive.org/details/warbehindmevietn00nels_0}}</ref>

In July 1969, the [[United States Army Provost Marshal General|Office of Provost Marshal General of the Army]] began to examine the evidence regarding possible criminal charges. Eventually, Calley was charged with several counts of premeditated murder in September 1969, and 25 other officers and enlisted men were later charged with related crimes.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/calley-charged-for-my-lai-massacre|title=Lt. William Calley charged for My Lai massacre|date=5 September 1969|publisher=History|access-date=19 January 2020}}</ref>

In April 1972, Congressman [[Les Aspin]] sued the [[Department of Defense]] in District Court to reveal the Peers Commission. <ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.nytimes.com/1972/04/04/archives/pentagon-is-sued-on-mylai-report-rep-aspin-seeks-release-of-peers.html | title=Pentagon is Sued on Mylai Report | work=The New York Times | date=4 April 1972 }}</ref> Following the massacre a [[The Pentagon|Pentagon]] task force called the [[Vietnam War Crimes Working Group]] (VWCWG) investigated alleged atrocities which were committed against South Vietnamese civilians by U.S. troops and created a secret archive of some 9,000 pages which documents 320 alleged incidents from 1967 to 1971 including 7 massacres in which at least 137 civilians died; 78 additional attacks targeting noncombatants in which at least 57 were killed, 56 were wounded and 15 were sexually assaulted; and 141 incidents of U.S. soldiers torturing civilian detainees or prisoners of war. 203 U.S. personnel were charged with crimes, 57 of them were court-martialed and 23 of them were convicted. The VWCWG also investigated over 500 additional alleged atrocities but it could not verify them.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.latimes.com/news/la-na-vietnam6aug06-story.html|title=Civilian Killings Went Unpunished|work=Los Angeles Times|first1=Nick|last1=Turse|first2=Deborah|last2=Nelson|date=6 August 2006|access-date=28 October 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.latimes.com/la-na-vietnam20aug20-sg-storygallery.html|title=Vietnam, The War Crimes Files|work=Los Angeles Times|first=Deborah|last=Nelson|date=14 August 2006|access-date=1 November 2019}}</ref>

===Court martial===
On 17 November 1970, a [[courts-martial in the United States|court-martial in the United States]] charged 14 officers, including Major General Koster, the Americal Division's commanding officer, with suppressing information related to the incident. Most of the charges were later dropped. Brigade commander Colonel Henderson was the only high ranking commanding officer who stood trial on charges relating to the cover-up of the Mỹ Lai massacre; he was acquitted on 17 December 1971.<ref>{{cite web|author=Linder, Douglas|url=http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/myl_bhender.html|title=Biographies of Key Figures in the My Lai Courts-Martial: Oran Henderson|publisher=UMKC School of Law|year=1999|access-date=18 June 2011|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101106193533/http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/myl_bhender.html|archive-date=6 November 2010}}</ref>

During the four-month-long trial, Calley consistently claimed that he was [[Superior orders|following orders]] from his commanding officer, Captain Medina. Despite that, he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison on 29 March 1971, after being found guilty of premeditated murder of not fewer than 20 people. Two days later, President [[Richard Nixon]] made the controversial decision to have Calley released from armed custody at [[Fort Benning]], Georgia, and put under [[house arrest]] pending appeal of his sentence. Calley's conviction was upheld by the Army Court of Military Review in 1973 and by the U.S. Court of Military Appeals in 1974.<ref name="45 years later">McCarty, Mary. [https://web.archive.org/web/20130317111155/http://www.stripes.com/news/veterans/45-years-later-impact-from-my-lai-case-is-still-felt-1.212088 45 years later, impact from My Lai case is still felt], ''Dayton Daily News'', 16 March 2013.</ref>

In August 1971, Calley's sentence was reduced by the [[Convening authority (court-martial)|convening authority]] from life to twenty years. Calley would eventually serve three and one-half years under house arrest at Fort Benning including three months in the [[United States Disciplinary Barracks|disciplinary barracks]] at [[Fort Leavenworth]], [[Kansas]]. In September 1974, he was paroled by the [[United States Secretary of the Army|Secretary of the Army]], [[Howard Callaway]].<ref name="45 years later"/><ref>Neier, Aryeh. ''War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice'', New York: Times Books, 1998.<!-- ISSN/ISBN needed --></ref>

In a separate trial, Medina denied giving the orders that led to the massacre, and was acquitted of all charges, effectively negating the prosecution's theory of "[[command responsibility]]", now referred to as the "Medina standard". Several months after his acquittal, however, Medina admitted he had suppressed evidence and had lied to Henderson about the number of civilian deaths.<ref>{{cite web|last=Linder|first=Douglas|url=http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/Myl_intro.html|title=An Introduction to the My Lai Courts-Martial|publisher=Law.umkc.edu|year=1999|access-date= 18 June 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101224205146/http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/myl_intro.html |archive-date=24 December 2010}}</ref>

Captain Kotouc, an intelligence officer from 11th Brigade, was also court-martialed and found not guilty. Koster was demoted to brigadier general and lost his position as the [[Superintendent of the United States Military Academy|Superintendent of West Point]]. His deputy, Brigadier General Young, received a letter of censure. Both were stripped of [[Distinguished Service Medal (US Army)|Distinguished Service Medals]] which had been awarded for service in Vietnam.<ref name="Cover-Up"/>

Of the 26 men initially charged, Calley was the only one convicted.<ref>{{Cite magazine|url=https://time.com/3739572/american-atrocity-remembering-my-lai/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150316143120/http://time.com/3739572/american-atrocity-remembering-my-lai/|url-status=live|archive-date=March 16, 2015|title=American Atrocity: Remembering My Lai|last=Cosgrove|first=Ben|magazine=Time|language=en-us|access-date=30 March 2018}}</ref> Some have argued that the outcome of the Mỹ Lai courts-martial failed to uphold the laws of war established in the [[Nuremberg Trials|Nuremberg]] and [[International Military Tribunal for the Far East|Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals]].<ref name=Marshall>{{Cite news|last=Marshall|first=Burke|author2=Goldstein, Joseph|title=Learning From My Lai: A Proposal on War Crimes|work=The New York Times|date=2 April 1976|page=26}}</ref> 

===Classification as a war crime===
[[Telford Taylor]], a senior American prosecutor at Nuremberg, wrote that legal principles established at the war crimes trials could have been used to prosecute senior American military commanders for failing to prevent atrocities such as the one at Mỹ Lai.<ref>Taylor, Telford. ''Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy'', Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970, p. 139. Cited in Oliver, Kendrick. ''The My Lai Massacre in American History and Memory''. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006, p. 112. {{ISBN|978-0719068904}}</ref>

[[Howard Callaway]], Secretary of the Army, was quoted in ''The New York Times'' in 1976 as stating that Calley's sentence was reduced because Calley honestly believed that what he did was a part of his orders—a rationale that contradicts the standards set at Nuremberg and Tokyo, where following orders was not a defense for committing war crimes.<ref name=Marshall/> On the whole, aside from the Mỹ Lai courts-martial, there were 36 military trials held by the U.S. Army from January 1965 to August 1973 for crimes against civilians in Vietnam.<ref>{{harvnb|Bourke|1999|p=196.}} [https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/hbfuAAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&bsq=%22Excluding%20the%20My%20Lai%20trials%22 A count of other courts-martial for war crimes]</ref>

Some authors<ref name=":1"/> have argued that the light punishments of the low-level personnel present at Mỹ Lai and unwillingness to hold higher officials responsible was part of a pattern in which the body-count strategy and the so-called "[[Mere Gook Rule]]" encouraged U.S. soldiers to err on the side of killing suspected Vietnamese enemies even if there was a very good chance that they were civilians. This in turn, [[Nick Turse]] argues, made lesser known massacres similar to Mỹ Lai and a pattern of [[war crime]]s common in Vietnam.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6q3vpJ3ePH4C&q=kill+anything+that+moves|title=Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam|last=Turse|first=Nick|date=2013|publisher=Macmillan|isbn=978-0805086911}}</ref>