Editing Mutual assured destruction (section)

===Early Cold War===
[[File:Hiroshima aftermath.jpg|thumb|right|270px|Aftermath of the atomic bomb explosion over [[Hiroshima]] (August 6, 1945), to date one of the only two times a nuclear strike has been performed as an act of war]]
In August 1945, the United States became the first nuclear power after the [[Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki]]. Four years later, on August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union [[RDS-1|detonated its own nuclear device]]. At the time, both sides lacked the means to effectively use nuclear devices against each other. However, with the development of aircraft like the American [[Convair B-36]] and the Soviet [[Tupolev Tu-95]], both sides were gaining a greater ability to deliver nuclear weapons into the interior of the opposing country. The official policy of the United States became one of "Instant Retaliation", as coined by Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]], which called for massive atomic attack against the Soviet Union if they were to invade Europe, regardless of whether it was a conventional or a nuclear attack.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Abel |first1=Elie |title=DULLES SAYS PACTS GIVE TO PRESIDENT RETALIATION RIGHT; Declares Congress Need Not Be Consulted First if Foe Strikes U. S. or Allies |url=https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1954/03/17/92820904.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0 |access-date=22 September 2022 |agency=The New York TImes Archives |work=The New York TImes |date=March 17, 1954}}</ref>

By the time of the 1962 [[Cuban Missile Crisis]], both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed the capability of launching a nuclear-tipped missile from a submerged submarine, which completed the "third leg" of the [[nuclear triad]] weapons strategy necessary to fully implement the MAD doctrine. Having a three-branched nuclear capability eliminated the possibility that an enemy could destroy all of a nation's nuclear forces in a [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike|first-strike]] attack; this, in turn, ensured the credible threat of a devastating [[second strike|retaliatory strike]] against the aggressor, increasing a nation's [[nuclear deterrence]].<ref name="NW">{{cite magazine |author=John Barry |url=http://www.newsweek.com/id/226494 |title=Do We Still Need a Nuclear 'Triad'? |magazine=[[Newsweek]] |date=2009-12-12 |access-date=2010-10-08}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/USNuclearDeterrence.html |title=Nuclear Stockpile |publisher=US Department of Defense |author=Office for the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters |access-date=2010-10-08 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100510015329/http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/USNuclearDeterrence.html |archive-date=2010-05-10 }}</ref><ref name="Time">{{cite magazine|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,959948,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080307080808/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,959948,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=March 7, 2008 |title=Toning Up the Nuclear Triad |magazine=Time |date=1985-09-23 |access-date=2010-10-08}}</ref>

Campbell Craig and [[Sergey Radchenko]] argue that [[Nikita Khrushchev]] (Soviet leader 1953 to 1964) decided that policies that facilitated nuclear war were too dangerous to the Soviet Union. His approach did not greatly change his foreign policy or military doctrine but is apparent in his determination to choose options that minimized the risk of war.<ref>Campbell Craig and [[Sergey Radchenko]], "MAD, not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' (2018) 41#1/2:208-233.</ref>