Editing Munich Agreement (section)

===Berchtesgaden meeting===
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1976-063-32, Bad Godesberg, Münchener Abkommen, Vorbereitung.jpg|left|thumb|Chamberlain greeted by Hitler at the beginning of the Bad Godesberg meeting on 24 September 1938]]
On 13 September, after internal violence and disruption in Czechoslovakia ensued, Chamberlain asked Hitler for a personal meeting to find a solution to avert a war.{{sfn|Bell|1986|p=239}} Chamberlain decided to do this after conferring with his advisors [[Lord Halifax]], [[Sir John Simon]], and [[Samuel Hoare, 1st Viscount Templewood|Sir Samuel Hoare]]. The meeting was announced at a special press briefing at [[10 Downing Street]], and led to a swell of optimism in British public opinion.<ref name=Reynolds>{{Cite book|last=Reynolds|first=David|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/646810103|title=Summits : six meetings that shaped the twentieth century|date=2009|publisher=Basic Books|isbn=9780786744589|location=New York|oclc=646810103}}</ref> Chamberlain arrived by a chartered [[British Airways]] [[Lockheed Model 10 Electra|Lockheed Electra]] in Germany on 15 September and then arrived at [[Obersalzberg|Hitler's residence]] in [[Berchtesgaden]] for the meeting.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 71">Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. ''Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings''. New York: Enigma Books, 2008. {{ISBN|9781929631421}}. p. 71.</ref> The flight was one of the first times a head of state or diplomatic official flew to a diplomatic meeting in an [[airplane]], as the tense situation left little time to take a [[train]] or [[boat]].<ref name=Reynolds /> Henlein flew to Germany on the same day.{{sfn|Bell|1986|p=239}} That day, Hitler and Chamberlain held discussions in which Hitler insisted that the Sudeten Germans must be allowed to exercise the right of national self-determination and be able to join Sudetenland with Germany. Hitler repeatedly falsely claimed that the Czechoslovak government had killed 300 Sudeten Germans.<ref name=Reynolds /> Hitler also expressed concern to Chamberlain about what he perceived as British "threats."<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 71" /> Chamberlain responded that he had not issued "threats" and in frustration asked Hitler "Why did I come over here to waste my time?"<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 71" /> Hitler responded that if Chamberlain was willing to accept the self-determination of the Sudeten Germans, he would be willing to discuss the matter.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 71" /> Hitler also convinced Chamberlain that he did not truly wish to destroy Czechoslovakia, but that he believed that upon a German annexation of the Sudetenland the country's [[minorities]] would each secede and cause the country to collapse.<ref name=Reynolds /> Chamberlain and Hitler held discussions for three hours, and the meeting adjourned. Chamberlain flew back to Britain and met with his cabinet to discuss the issue.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 71" />

After the meeting, Daladier flew to London on 16 September to meet with British officials to discuss a course of action.<ref>Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. ''Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings''. New York: Enigma Books, 2008. {{ISBN|9781929631421}}. pp. 71–72.</ref> The situation in Czechoslovakia became tenser that day, with the Czechoslovak government issuing an arrest warrant for Henlein, who had arrived in Germany a day earlier to take part in the negotiations.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72">Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. ''Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings''. New York: Enigma Books, 2008. {{ISBN|9781929631421}}. p. 72.</ref> The French proposals ranged from waging war against Germany to supporting the Sudetenland being ceded to Germany.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> The discussions ended with a firm British-French plan in place.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Britain and France demanded that Czechoslovakia cede to Germany all territories in which the German population represented over 50% of the Sudetenland's total population.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> In exchange for that concession, Britain and France would guarantee the independence of Czechoslovakia.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Czechoslovakia rejected the proposed solution.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" />

[[File:Čs. vojáci v Krásné Lípě.gif|thumb|Czechoslovak Army soldiers on patrol in the Sudetenland in September 1938]]

On 17 September 1938 Hitler ordered the establishment of ''[[Sudetendeutsches Freikorps]]'', a [[paramilitary organization]] that took over the structure of Ordnersgruppe, an organization of ethnic [[Germans in Czechoslovakia (1918–1938)|Germans in Czechoslovakia]] that had been dissolved by the Czechoslovak authorities the previous day due to its implication in a large number of [[terrorist]] activities. The organization was sheltered, trained and equipped by German authorities and conducted cross-border terrorist operations into Czechoslovak territory. Relying on the [[War of aggression#The Convention for the Definition of Aggression|Convention for the Definition of Aggression]], Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš<ref>President Beneš' declaration made on 16 December 1941</ref> and the [[Czechoslovak government-in-exile|government-in-exile]]<ref>Note of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile dated 22 February 1944</ref> later regarded 17 September 1938 as the beginning of the undeclared German-Czechoslovak war. This understanding has been assumed also by the contemporary [[Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic|Czech Constitutional court]].<ref name="Con Court ruling">{{Citation
| last       = Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic
| year       = 1997
| title      = Ruling No. II. ÚS 307/97
| location = Brno
| language   = cs
}} ''Stran interpretace "kdy země vede válku", obsažené v čl. I Úmluvy o naturalizaci mezi Československem a Spojenými státy, publikované pod č. 169/1929 Sb. za účelem zjištění, zda je splněna podmínka státního občanství dle restitučních předpisů, Ústavní soud vychází z již v roce 1933 vypracované definice agrese Společnosti národů, která byla převzata do londýnské Úmluvy o agresi (CONVENITION DE DEFINITION DE L'AGRESSION), uzavřené dne 4. 7. 1933 Československem, dle které není třeba válku vyhlašovat (čl. II bod 2) a dle které je třeba za útočníka považovat ten stát, který první poskytne podporu ozbrojeným tlupám, jež se utvoří na jeho území a jež vpadnou na území druhého státu (čl. II bod 5). V souladu s nótou londýnské vlády ze dne 22. 2. 1944, navazující na prohlášení prezidenta republiky ze dne 16. 12. 1941 dle § 64 odst. 1 bod 3 tehdejší Ústavy, a v souladu s citovaným čl. II bod 5 má Ústavní soud za to, že dnem, kdy nastal stav války, a to s Německem, je den 17. 9. 1938, neboť tento den na pokyn Hitlera došlo k utvoření "Sudetoněmeckého svobodného sboru" (Freikorps) z uprchnuvších vůdců Henleinovy strany a několik málo hodin poté už tito vpadli na československé území ozbrojeni německými zbraněmi.''</ref> In the following days, Czechoslovak forces suffered over 100 personnel killed in action, hundreds wounded and over 2,000 abducted to Germany.

On 18 September, Italy's ''[[Duce]]'' [[Benito Mussolini]] made a speech in [[Trieste]], Italy, where he declared "If there are two camps, for and against Prague, let it be known that Italy has chosen its side", with the clear implication being that Mussolini supported Germany in the crisis.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 71" />

On 20 September, [[German resistance to Nazism|German opponents]] within the military met to discuss the final plans of a plot they had developed to overthrow the Nazi regime. The meeting was led by General [[Hans Oster]], the deputy head of the ''[[Abwehr]]'' (Germany's [[counter-espionage]] agency). Other members included Captain {{ill|Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz|de}}, and other military officers leading the planned [[coup d'etat]] met at the meeting.<ref name="Nigel Jones Pp. 73-74">Nigel Jones. ''Countdown to Valkyrie: The July Plot to Assassinate Hitler''. pp. 73–74.</ref> On 22 September, Chamberlain, about to board his plane to go to Germany for further talks at [[Bad Godesberg]], told the press who met him there that "My objective is peace in Europe, I trust this trip is the way to that peace."<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Chamberlain arrived in [[Cologne]], where he received a lavish grand welcome with a German band playing "[[God Save the King]]" and Germans giving Chamberlain flowers and gifts.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Chamberlain had calculated that fully accepting German annexation of all of the Sudetenland with no reductions would force Hitler to accept the agreement.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Upon being told of this, Hitler responded "Does this mean that the Allies have agreed with Prague's approval to the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany?", Chamberlain responded "Precisely", to which Hitler responded by shaking his head, saying that the Allied offer was insufficient. He told Chamberlain that he wanted Czechoslovakia to be completely dissolved and its territories redistributed to Germany, Poland, and Hungary, and told Chamberlain to take it or leave it.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Chamberlain was shaken by this statement.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Hitler went on to tell Chamberlain that since their last meeting on the 15th, Czechoslovakia's actions, which Hitler claimed included killings of Germans, had made the situation unbearable for Germany.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" />

Later in the meeting, a deception was undertaken to influence and put pressure on Chamberlain: one of Hitler's aides entered the room to inform Hitler of more Germans being killed in Czechoslovakia, to which Hitler screamed in response "I will avenge every one of them. The Czechs must be destroyed."<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> The meeting ended with Hitler refusing to make any concessions to the Allies' demands.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Later that evening, Hitler grew worried that he had gone too far in pressuring Chamberlain, and telephoned Chamberlain's hotel suite, saying that he would accept annexing only the Sudetenland, with no designs on other territories, provided that Czechoslovakia begin the evacuation of ethnic Czechs from the German majority territories by 26 September at 8:00am. After being pressed by Chamberlain, Hitler agreed to have the ultimatum set for 1 October (the same date that Operation Green was set to begin).<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73">Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. ''Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings''. New York: Enigma Books, 2008. {{ISBN|9781929631421}}. p. 73.</ref> Hitler then said to Chamberlain that this was one concession that he was willing to make to the Prime Minister as a "gift" out of respect for the fact that Chamberlain had been willing to back down somewhat on his earlier position.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> Hitler went on to say that upon annexing the Sudetenland, Germany would hold no further territorial claims upon Czechoslovakia and would enter into a collective agreement to guarantee the borders of Germany and Czechoslovakia.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/>

A new Czechoslovak cabinet, under General [[Jan Syrový]], was installed and on 23 September a decree of general mobilization was issued which was accepted by the public with a strong enthusiasm – within 24 hours, one million men joined the army to defend the country. The [[Czechoslovak Army]], modern, experienced and possessing an excellent [[Czechoslovak border fortifications|system of frontier fortifications]], was prepared to fight. The [[Soviet Union]] announced its willingness to come to Czechoslovakia's assistance, provided that the [[Red Army]] would be able to cross Polish and Romanian territory. Both countries refused to allow the Soviet army to use their territories.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930–33. The Impact of the Depression|last=Haslam|first=Jonathan|publisher=St. Martin's Press|year=1983|location=New York}}</ref>

In the early hours of 24 September, Hitler issued the [[Godesberg Memorandum]], which demanded that Czechoslovakia cede the Sudetenland to Germany no later than 28 September, with plebiscites to be held in unspecified areas under the supervision of German and Czechoslovak forces. The memorandum also stated that if Czechoslovakia did not agree to the German demands by 2&nbsp;pm on 28 September, Germany would take the Sudetenland by force. On the same day, Chamberlain returned to Britain and announced that Hitler demanded the annexation of the Sudetenland without delay.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> The announcement enraged those in Britain and France who wanted to confront Hitler once and for all, even if it meant war, and its supporters gained strength.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> The Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United Kingdom, [[Jan Masaryk]], was elated upon hearing of the support for Czechoslovakia from British and French opponents of Hitler's plans, saying "The nation of [[Saint Wenceslas]] will never be a nation of slaves."<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/>

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-R99301, Münchener Abkommen, Chamberlain, Mussolini, Ciano.jpg|left|thumb|Chamberlain with Benito Mussolini, September 1938]]
On 25 September, Czechoslovakia agreed to the conditions previously agreed upon by Britain, France, and Germany. The next day, however, Hitler added new demands, insisting that the claims of ethnic [[Germans in Poland]] and [[Germans in Hungary|Hungary]] also be satisfied.

On 26 September, Chamberlain sent [[Sir Horace Wilson]] to carry a personal letter to Hitler declaring that the Allies wanted a peaceful resolution to the Sudeten crisis.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> Later that evening, Hitler made his response in a speech at the [[Berlin Sportpalast]]; he claimed that the Sudetenland was "the last territorial demand I have to make in Europe"<ref name=sudetenland1>{{cite book|last1=Domarus|first1=Max|last2=Hitler|first2=Adolf|title=Hitler: speeches and proclamations, 1932–1945 : the chronicle of a dictatorship|year=1990|page=1393}}</ref> and gave Czechoslovakia a deadline of 28 September at 2:00&nbsp;pm to cede the Sudetenland to Germany or face war.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> At this point the British government began to make war preparations, and the [[House of Commons of the United Kingdom|House of Commons]] was reconvened from a parliamentary recess.<ref name=Reynolds />

On 27 September 1938, when negotiations between Hitler and Chamberlain were strained, Chamberlain addressed the British people, saying, in particular: "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing."<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.historyguide.org/europe/munich.html|title=Neville Chamberlin on 'Appeasement' (1939)|website=www.historyguide.org}}</ref>

On 28 September at 10:00&nbsp;am, four hours before the deadline and with no agreement to Hitler's demand by Czechoslovakia, the British ambassador to Italy, [[Eric Drummond, 7th Earl of Perth|Lord Perth]], called Italy's Foreign Minister [[Galeazzo Ciano]] to request an urgent meeting.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> Perth informed Ciano that Chamberlain had instructed him to request that Mussolini enter the negotiations and urge Hitler to delay the ultimatum.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> At 11:00&nbsp;am, Ciano met Mussolini and informed him of Chamberlain's proposition; Mussolini agreed with it and responded by telephoning Italy's ambassador to Germany and told him "Go to the Fuhrer at once, and tell him that whatever happens, I will be at his side, but that I request a twenty-four-hour delay before hostilities begin. In the meantime, I will study what can be done to solve the problem."<ref>Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. ''Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings''. New York: Enigma Books, 2008. {{ISBN|9781929631421}}. pp. 73–74.</ref> Hitler received Mussolini's message while in discussions with the French ambassador. Hitler responded "My good friend, Benito Mussolini, has asked me to delay for twenty-four hours the marching orders of the German army, and I agreed." Of course, this was no concession, as the invasion date was set for 1 October 1938.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 74">Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. ''Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings''. New York: Enigma Books, 2008. {{ISBN|9781929631421}}. p. 74.</ref> Upon speaking with Chamberlain, Lord Perth gave Chamberlain's thanks to Mussolini as well as Chamberlain's request that Mussolini attend a four-power conference of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Munich on 29 September to settle the Sudeten problem prior to the deadline of 2:00&nbsp;pm. Mussolini agreed.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 74"/> Hitler's only request was to make sure that Mussolini be involved in the negotiations at the conference.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 74"/> [[Nevile Henderson]], [[Alexander Cadogan]], and Chamberlain's personal secretary [[Alec Douglas-Home|Lord Dunglass]] passed the news of the conference to Chamberlain while he was addressing Parliament, and Chamberlain suddenly announced the conference and his acceptance to attend at the end of the speech to cheers.<ref name=Reynolds /> When United States President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] learned the conference had been scheduled, he telegraphed Chamberlain, "Good man."<ref name="dallek roosevelt">{{cite book |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=xTKvo-cXv3EC&q=roosevelt+chamberlain+%22good+man%22&pg=PA166 |title=Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945: With a New Afterword |publisher=Oxford University Press |last=Dallek |first=Robert |author-link=Robert Dallek |year=1995 |pages=166 |isbn=9780199826667}}</ref>