Editing Mohammad Najibullah (section)

==Leader: 1986–1992==

===National Reconciliation===
{{main|National Reconciliation (Afghanistan)}}
[[File:Najib Belgrade.png|thumb|200px|Najibullah at the [[Belgrade]] Conference in 1989]]
In September 1986, the National Compromise Commission (NCC) was established on the orders of Najibullah. The NCC's goal was to contact [[counter-revolutionaries]] "in order to complete the Saur Revolution in its new phase." Allegedly, an estimated 40,000 rebels were contacted by the government. At the end of 1986, Najibullah called for a six-months ceasefire and talks between the various opposition forces, this was part of his policy of National Reconciliation. The discussions, if fruitful, would lead to the establishment of a coalition government and be the end of the PDPA's monopoly of power. The programme failed, but the government was able to recruit disillusioned mujahideen fighters as government militias. A number of prominent Mujahideen commanders defected to the government, such as [[Ismatullah Muslim]] in [[Kandahar]], Fazal Ahmad in [[Herat]], and Juma Khan in Andarab with a large number of their followers in exchange for cash. Many more Mujahideen joined the government’s tribal militias, some of them being incorporated into the [[Afghan Army]] as divisions.<ref name="MNPP"/><ref>{{Cite book |last=Urban |first=Mark |url=https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/War_in_Afghanistan.html?id=3jVuAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y |title=War in Afghanistan |date=1990 |publisher=Macmillan |isbn=978-0-333-51478-8 |language=en}}</ref> In many ways, the National Reconciliation led to an increasing number of urban dwellers to support his rule, and the stabilisation of the [[Afghan Armed Forces]].<ref>{{cite book | author = Amtstutz, J. Bruce | title = Afghanistan: Past and Present | publisher = DIANE Publishing | year = 1994 | isbn = 0-7881-1111-6 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=a0Mp1AHpp0gC&pg=PA153 153] }}</ref>

In September 1986, a new constitution was written, which was adopted on 29 November 1987.<ref name="IslamicState">{{cite book | author = Otto, Jan Michiel | title = Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present | publisher = [[Amsterdam University Press]] | year = 2010 | isbn = 978-90-8728-057-4 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=8ep7cX3ma0sC&pg=PA289 289] }}</ref> The constitution weakened the powers of the head of state by cancelling his absolute veto. The reason for this move, according to Najibullah, was the need for real-power sharing. On 13 July 1987, the official name of Afghanistan was changed from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to Republic of Afghanistan, and in June 1988 the Revolutionary Council, whose members were elected by the party leadership, was replaced by a National Assembly, an organ in which members were to be elected by the people. The PDPA's socialist stance was denied even more than previously, in 1989 the [[Ministry of Higher Education (Afghanistan)|Minister of Higher Education]] began to work on the "de-Sovietisation" of universities, and in 1990 it was even announced by a party member that all PDPA members were [[Muslim]]s and that the party had abandoned [[Marxism]]. Many parts of the Afghan government's economic monopoly was also broken, this had more to do with the tight situation than any ideological conviction. [[Abdul Hakim Misaq]], the [[Mayor of Kabul]], even stated that traffickers of stolen goods would not be prosecuted by law as long as their goods were given to the market. [[Yuli Mikhailovich Vorontsov|Yuli Vorontsov]], on Gorbachev's orders, was able to get an agreement with the PDPA leadership to offer the posts of Gossoviet chairman (the state planning organ), the [[Council of Ministers (Afghanistan)|Council of Ministers]] chairmanship (head of government), ministries of defence, state security, communications, [[Ministry of Finance (Afghanistan)|finance]], presidencies of banks and the [[Supreme Court (Afghanistan)|Supreme Court]]. The PDPA still demanded it held on to all deputy ministers, retained its majority in the state bureaucracy and that it retained all its provincial governors.<ref>{{cite book | author = Giustozzi, Antonio | title = War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978–1992 | publisher = [[C. Hurst & Co.|C. Hurst & Co. Publishers]] | year = 2000 | isbn = 978-1-85065-396-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=Hz5NzJtg48kC&pg=PA155 155] }}</ref> The government was not willing to concede all of these positions, and when the offer was broadcast, the ministries of defence and state security.<ref>{{cite book | author = Giustozzi, Antonio | title = War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978–1992 | publisher = [[C. Hurst & Co.|C. Hurst & Co. Publishers]] | year = 2000 | isbn = 978-1-85065-396-7 | pages = [https://books.google.com/books?id=Hz5NzJtg48kC&pg=PA156 155–156] }}</ref>

====Elections: 1987 and 1988====
Local elections were held in 1987. It began when the government introduced a law permitting the formation of other political parties, announced that it would be prepared to share power with representatives of opposition groups in the event of a coalition government, and issued a new constitution providing for a new [[bicameral]] National Assembly (Meli Shura), consisting of a Senate (Sena) and a House of Representatives ([[Wolesi Jirga]]), and a president to be indirectly elected to a 7-year term.<ref>{{cite book | title = Regional Surveys of the World: Far East and Australasia 2003 | publisher = [[Routledge]] | year = 2002 | isbn = 978-1-85743-133-9 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=e5Az1lGCJwQC&pg=PA65 65] }}</ref> The new political parties had to oppose [[colonialism]], [[imperialism]], [[neo-colonialism]], [[Zionism]], racial discrimination, [[apartheid]] and [[fascism]]. Najibullah stated that only the extremist part of the opposition could not join the planned coalition government. No parties had to share the PDPA's policy or ideology, but they could not oppose the bond between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. A [[1988 Afghan parliamentary election|parliamentary election was held in 1988]]. The PDPA won 46 seats in the House of Representatives and controlled the government with support from the [[National Front (Afghanistan)|National Front]], which won 45 seats, and from various newly recognized left-wing parties, which had won a total of 24 seats. Although the election was boycotted by the Mujahideen, the government left 50 of the 234 seats in the House of Representatives, as well as a small number of seats in the Senate, vacant in the hope that the guerrillas would end their armed struggle and participate in the government. The only armed opposition party to make peace with the government was [[Hizbollah (Afghanistan)|Hizbollah]], a small [[Shi'a]] party not to be confused with the bigger party in Iran or the [[Hezbollah (Lebanon)|Lebanese organization]].<ref>{{cite book | author = Giustozzi, Antonio | title = War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978–1992 | publisher = [[C. Hurst & Co.|C. Hurst & Co. Publishers]] | year = 2000 | isbn = 978-1-85065-396-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=Hz5NzJtg48kC&pg=PA161 161] }}</ref>

===Emergency===
Several figures of the [[intelligentsia]] took Najibullah's offer seriously, even if they sympathised or were against the regime. Their hopes were dampened when the Najibullah government introduced the [[state of emergency]] on 18 February 1989, four days after the Soviet withdrawal due to a mujahideen offensive starting to take shape in [[Nangarhar Province]], later leading to the [[Battle of Jalalabad (1989)|Battle of Jalalabad]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Fleiss |first=Alex |date=1 May 2024 |title=What happened in the battle of Jalalabad? |url=https://www.rebellionresearch.com/what-happened-in-the-battle-of-jalalabad |access-date=5 February 2025 |website=Rebellion Research |language=en-US}}</ref> 1,700 intellectuals were arrested in February alone, and until November 1991 the government still supervised and restricted [[freedom of speech]]. Another problem was that party members took his policy seriously too, Najibullah recanted that most party members felt "panic and pessimism". At the Second Conference of the party, the majority of members, maybe up to 60 percent, were radical socialists. According to Soviet advisors (in 1987), a bitter debate within the party had broken out between those who advocated the [[Islamisation]] of the party and those who wanted to defend the gains of the Saur Revolution. Opposition to his policy of National Reconciliation was met party-wide, but especially from Karmalists. Many people did not support the handing out of the already small state resources the Afghan state had at its disposal. On the other side, several members were proclaiming anti-Soviet slogans as they accused the National Reconciliation programme to be supported and developed by the Soviet Union.<ref>{{cite book | author = Giustozzi, Antonio | title = War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978–1992 | publisher = [[C. Hurst & Co.|C. Hurst & Co. Publishers]] | year = 2000 | isbn = 978-1-85065-396-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=Hz5NzJtg48kC&pg=PA156 156] }}</ref> Najibullah reassured the inter-party opposition that he would not give up the gains of the Saur Revolution, but to the contrary, preserve them, not give up the PDPA's monopoly on power, or to collaborate with reactionary [[Mullah]]s.<ref>{{cite book | author = Giustozzi, Antonio | title = War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978–1992 | publisher = [[C. Hurst & Co.|C. Hurst & Co. Publishers]] | year = 2000 | isbn = 978-1-85065-396-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=Hz5NzJtg48kC&pg=PA157 157] }}</ref>

====An Islamic state====
During [[Babrak Karmal]]'s later years, and during Najibullah's tenure, the PDPA tried to improve their standing with Muslims by moving, or appearing to move, to the political centre. They wanted to create a new image for the party and state. Communist symbols were either replaced or removed. These measures did not contribute to any notable increase in support for the government, because the mujahideen had a stronger legitimacy to protect Islam than the government; they had rebelled against what they saw as an anti-Islamic government, that government was the PDPA.<ref>{{cite book |last = Riaz | first = Ali | author-link = Ali Riaz | title = Religion and politics in South Asia | publisher = [[Taylor & Francis]] | year = 2010 | isbn = 978-0-415-77800-8 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=vzI8e-zJf5YC&pg=PA34 34] }}</ref> Islamic principles were embedded in the 1987 constitution, for instance, Article 2 of the constitution stated that [[Islam]] was the state religion, and Article 73 stated that the head of state had to be born into a Muslim Afghan family. The 1990 constitution stated that Afghanistan was an [[Islamic state]], and the last references to [[communism]] were removed.<ref>{{cite book | author = Yassari, Nadjma | title = The Sharīʻa in the Constitutions of Afghanistan, Iran, and Egypt: Implications for Private Law | publisher = Mohr Siebeck | year = 2005 | isbn = 978-3-16-148787-3 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=CMGfLzYWeW4C&pg=PA15 15] }}</ref> Article 1 of the 1990 Constitution said that Afghanistan was an "independent, unitary and Islamic state."<ref name="IslamicState"/> In 1990, Najibullah abolished the [[Democratic Women's Organisation of Afghanistan]], eradicating their Marxist rhetoric as early as 1986, and replaced it with the apolitical [[Afghan Women's Council]], which is still in existence.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Moghadam |first=Valentine |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iKsSEulnPTsC&dq=Firuza+Wardak&pg=PA70 |title=From Patriarchy to Empowerment: Women’s Participation, Movements, and Rights in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia |date=2007-06-18 |publisher=Syracuse University Press |isbn=978-0-8156-3111-8 |language=en}}</ref>

In 1992, Najibullah appealed to the [[United States]] to help Afghanistan become a bulwark against the spread of [[Islamic fundamentalism]]. He said: “If fundamentalism comes to Afghanistan, war will continue for many more years. Afghanistan will turn into a centre of world smuggling for narcotic drugs. Afghanistan will be turned into a centre for terrorism”.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Najibullah |first=Muska |date=27 September 2021 |title=My father was brutally killed by the Taliban. The US ignored his pleas for help |url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/sep/27/father-killed-taliban-us-ignored-pleas-daughter-afghan-president |access-date=29 January 2025 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref>

===Economic policies===
Najibullah continued Karmal's economic policies. The augmenting of links with the [[Eastern Bloc]] and the Soviet Union continued, and so did bilateral trade. He encouraged the development of the private sector in industry. The Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan which was introduced in January 1986 continued until March 1992, one month before the government's fall. According to the plan, the economy, which had grown less than 2 percent annually until 1985, would grow 25 percent in the plan. Industry would grow 28 percent, agriculture 14–16 percent, domestic trade by 150 percent and foreign trade with 15 percent. As expected, none of these targets were met, and 2 percent growth annually which had been the norm before the plan continued under Najibullah.<ref>{{cite book | title = Regional Surveys of the World: Far East and Australasia 2003 | publisher = [[Routledge]] | year = 2002 | isbn = 978-1-85743-133-9 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=e5Az1lGCJwQC&pg=PA83 83] }}</ref> The 1990 constitution gave due attention to the [[private sector]]. Article 20 was about the establishment of private firms, and Article 25 encouraged [[foreign direct investment|foreign investments]] in the private sector.<ref name="IslamicState"/>

===Afghan–Soviet relations===

====Soviet withdrawal====
{{Main|Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan}}
While he may have been the ''[[de jure]]'' leader of Afghanistan, Soviet advisers still did the majority of work when Najibullah took power. As Gorbachev remarked "We're still doing everything ourselves [...]. That's all our people know how to do. They've tied Najibullah hand and foot."<ref name="MNAS" /> [[Fikryat Tabeev]], the [[Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan]], was accused of acting like a governor general by Gorbachev. Tabeev was recalled from Afghanistan in July 1986, but while Gorbachev called for the end of Soviet management of Afghanistan, he could not help but to do some managing himself. At a Soviet Politburo meeting, Gorbachev said "It's difficult to build a new building out of old material [...] I hope to God that we haven't made a mistake with Najibullah."<ref name="MNAS">{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA276 276] }}</ref> As time would prove, the problem was that Najibullah's aims were the opposite of the Soviet Union's; Najibullah was opposed to a Soviet withdrawal, the Soviet Union wanted a Soviet withdrawal. This was logical, considering the fact that the Afghan military was on the brink of dissolution. The only means of survival seemed to Najibullah was to retain the Soviet presence.<ref name="MNAS" /> In July 1986 six regiments, which consisted up to 15,000 troops, were withdrawn from Afghanistan. The aim of this early withdrawal was, according to Gorbachev, to show the world that the Soviet leadership was serious about leaving Afghanistan.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA277 277] }}</ref> The Soviets told the United States Government that they were planning to withdraw, but the United States Government did not believe them. When Gorbachev met with [[Ronald Reagan]] during his visit the United States, Reagan called for the dissolution of the Afghan army.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA280 280] }}</ref>
[[File:RIAN archive 12070 Najibullah giving decorations.jpg|thumb|Najibullah giving a decoration to a Soviet serviceman in 1986]]
On 14 April 1988, the Afghan and Pakistani governments signed the [[Geneva Accords (1988)|Geneva Accords]], and the Soviet Union and the United States signed as guarantors; the treaty specifically stated that the Soviet military had to withdraw from Afghanistan by 15 February 1989. Gorbachev later confided to [[Anatoly Chernyaev]], a personal advisor to Gorbachev, that the Soviet withdrawal would be criticised for creating a bloodbath which could have been averted if the Soviets stayed.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA281 281] }}</ref> During a Politburo meeting [[Eduard Shevardnadze]] said "We will leave the country in a deplorable situation",<ref name="Karmal" /> and further talked about the economic collapse, and the need to keep at least 10 to 15,000 troops in Afghanistan. In this [[Vladimir Kryuchkov]], the [[KGB Chairman]], supported him. This stance, if implemented, would be a betrayal of the Geneva Accords just signed.<ref name="Karmal">{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA282 282] }}</ref> During the second phase of the Soviet withdrawal, in 1989, Najibullah told [[Valentin Varennikov]] openly that he would do everything to slow down the Soviet departure. Varennikov in turn replied that such a move would not help, and would only lead to an international outcry against the war. Najibullah would repeat his position later that year, to a group of senior Soviet representatives in Kabul. This time Najibullah stated that [[Ahmad Shah Massoud]] was the main problem, and that he needed to be killed. In this, the Soviets agreed,<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA285 285] }}</ref> but repeated that such a move would be a breach of the Geneva Accords; to hunt for Ahmad Shah Massoud so early on would disrupt the withdrawal, and would mean that the Soviet Union would fail to meet its deadline for withdrawal.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA286 286] }}</ref>

During his January 1989 visit to Shevardnadze, Najibullah wanted to retain a small presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and called for moving Soviet bombers to military bases close to the Afghan–Soviet border and place them on permanent alert.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA287 287] }}</ref> Najibullah also repeated his claims that his government could not survive if Ahmad Shah Massoud remained alive. Shevardnadze again repeated that troops could not stay, since it would lead to international outcry, but said he would look into the matter. Shevardnadze demanded that the Soviet embassy created a plan in which at least 12,000 Soviet troops would remain in Afghanistan either under direct control of the [[United Nations]] or remain as "volunteers".<ref name="volunteers">{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA288 288] }}</ref> The Soviet military leadership, when hearing of Shevardnadze's plan, became furious. But they followed orders, and named the operation ''Typhoon'', maybe ironic considering that [[Operation Typhoon]] was the German military operation against the city of Moscow during [[World War II]]. Shevardnadze contacted the Soviet leadership about moving a unit to break the siege of [[Kandahar]], and to protect convoys from and to the city. The Soviet leadership were against Shevardnadze's plan, and Chernyaev even believed it was part of Najibullah's plan to keep Soviet troops in the country. To which Shevardnadze replied angrily "You've not been there, [...] You've no idea all the things we have done there in the past ten years."<ref name="volunteers" /> At a Politburo meeting on 24 January, Shevardnadze argued that the Soviet leadership could not be indifferent to Najibullah and his government; again, Shevardnadze received support from Kryuchkov. In the end Shevardnadze lost the debate, and the Politburo reaffirmed their commitment to withdraw from Afghanistan.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA289 289] }}</ref> There was still a small presence of Soviet troops after the Soviet withdrawal; for instance, parachutists who protected the Soviet embassy staff, military advisors and [[special forces]] and reconnaissance troops still operated in the "outlying provinces", especially along the Afghan–Soviet border.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA294 294] }}</ref>

====Aid====
Soviet military aid continued after their withdrawal, and massive quantities of food, fuel, ammunition and military equipment was given to the government. Varennikov visited Afghanistan in May 1989 to discuss ways and means to deliver the aid to the government. In 1990, Soviet aid amounted to an estimated 3 billion [[United States dollar]]s. As it turned out, the Afghan military was entirely dependent on Soviet aid to function.<ref name="NotMN">{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA296 296] }}</ref> When the Soviet Union was dissolved on 26 December 1991, Najibullah turned to former [[Soviet Central Asia]] for aid. These newly independent states had no wish to see Afghanistan being taken over by religious fundamentalists, and supplied Afghanistan with 6 million barrels of oil and 500,000 tons of [[wheat]] to survive the winter.<ref>{{cite book | author = Hiro, Dilip | title = War Without End: The Rise of Islamist terrorism and Global Response | publisher = [[Routledge]] | year = 2002 | isbn = 978-0-415-28802-6 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=JsFVOiXbad0C&pg=PA230 230] }}</ref>

===After the Soviets===
{{further|Afghan Civil War (1989–92)}}
With the Soviets' withdrawal in 1989, the Afghan army was left on its own to battle the insurgents. The most effective, and largest, assaults on the mujahideen were undertaken during the 1985–86 period. These offensives had forced the mujahideen on the defensive near [[Herat]] and Kandahar.<ref>{{cite book | author = Amtstutz, J. Bruce | title = Afghanistan: Past and Present | publisher = DIANE Publishing | year = 1994 | isbn = 0-7881-1111-6 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=a0Mp1AHpp0gC&pg=PA151 151] }}</ref> The Soviets ensued a bomb and negotiate during 1986, and a major offensive that year included 10,000 Soviet troops and 8,000 Afghan troops.<ref>{{cite book | author = Hilali, A. Z. | title = US–Pakistan relationship: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan | publisher = [[Ashgate Publishing]] | year = 2005 | isbn = 978-0-7546-4220-6 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=nhqRa0glD9oC&pg=PA86 86] }}</ref>

The Pakistani people and establishment continued to support the Afghan mujahideen even if it was in contravention of the Geneva Accords. At the beginning, most observers expected the Najibullah government to collapse immediately, and to be replaced with an Islamic fundamentalist government. The [[Central Intelligence Agency]] stated in a report that the new government would be ambivalent, or even hostile towards the United States.{{citation needed|date=November 2020}} Almost immediately after the Soviet withdrawal, the [[Civil war in Afghanistan (1989–92)#Battle of Jalalabad|Battle of Jalalabad]] broke out between Afghan government forces and the mujahideen, in cooperation with Pakistan's [[Inter-Service Intelligence]] (ISI). The offensive against the city began when the mujahideen bribed several government military officers, from there, they tried to take the airport, but were repulsed with heavy casualties. The willingness of the common Afghan government soldier to fight increased when the mujahideen began to execute people during the battle. [[Hamid Gul]], leader of the ISI, hoped that the battle would topple Najibullah's government and create a mujahideen government seated in Jalalabad.<ref name="indianexpress.com">{{Cite web|url=https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/najibullah-grave-death-afghanistan-hamdullah-mohib-6433076/|title=Explained: Why a top Afghan official visited the grave of ex-President Najibullah|date=30 May 2020}}</ref> During the battle, Najibullah called for Soviet assistance. Gorbachev called an emergency session of the Politburo to discuss his proposal, but Najibullah's request was rejected. Other attacks against the city failed, and by April the government forces were on the offensive.<ref name="NotMN"/> During the battle over four hundred [[Scud missile]]s were shot, which were fired by a Soviet crew, which had stayed behind, in joint cooperation with the Afghan [[99th Missile Brigade]].<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | pages = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA296 296–297] }}</ref> When the battle ended in July, the mujahideen had lost an estimated 3,000 troops. One mujahideen commander lamented "the battle of Jalalabad lost us credit won in ten years of fighting."<ref name="MNJAL">{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA297 297] }}</ref> After the mujahideen's defeat in Jalalabad, Gul blamed the administration of Pakistani Prime Minister [[Benazir Bhutto]] for the defeat. Bhutto eventually sacked Gul.<ref name="indianexpress.com"/>
[[File:Watan Party Remastered.png|thumb|In 1990, Najibullah formed the "Watan Party" which consisted mostly of [[People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan|PDPA]] Members and members of Daoud Khan's [[National Revolutionary Party of Afghanistan]]]]
Hardline [[Khalq]]ist [[Shahnawaz Tanai]] attempted to overthrow Najibullah in a [[1990 Afghan coup attempt|failed coup attempt]] in March 1990, the coup was stopped however by the [[Khalq]]ist General [[Mohammad Aslam Watanjar|Aslam Watanjar]]. Although Tanai and his forces failed and fled to Pakistan, the coup attempt still managed to show weaknesses in Najibullah's government.

From 1989 to 1990, the Najibullah government was partially successful in building up the Afghan defence forces. The [[Khad|Ministry of State Security]] had established a local militia force which stood at an estimated 100,000 men. The 17th Division in Herat, which had begun the [[1979 Herat uprising]] against PDPA-rule, stood at 3,400 regular troops and 14,000 tribal men. In 1988, the total number of security forces available to the government stood at 300,000.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA298 298] }}</ref> This trend did not continue, and by the summer of 1990, the Afghan government forces were on the defensive again. By the beginning of 1991, the government controlled only 10 percent of Afghanistan, the eleven-year [[Siege of Khost]] had ended in a mujahideen victory and the morale of the Afghan military finally collapsed. In the Soviet Union, Kryuchkov and Shevardnadze had both supported continuing aid to the Najibullah government, but Kryuchkov had been arrested following the failed [[1991 Soviet coup d'état attempt]] and Shevardnadze had resigned from his posts in the Soviet government in December 1990 – there were no longer any pro-Najibullah people in the Soviet leadership and the Soviet Union was in the middle of an economic and political crisis, which would lead directly to the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] on 26 December 1991. At the same time, [[Boris Yeltsin]] became Russia's new leader, and he had no wish to continue to aid Najibullah's government, which he considered a relic of the past. In the autumn of 1991, Najibullah wrote to Shevardnadze "I didn't want to be president, you talked me into it, insisted on it, and promised support. Now you are throwing me and the Republic of Afghanistan to its fate."<ref name="lastdays">{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA299 299] }}</ref>

====Fall from power====
By January 1992, Najibullah had become internationally isolated, with the loss of his biggest supporter he decided to consolidate his power over the non [[Pashtuns]] who were considered less loyal to the [[Democratic Republic of Afghanistan|regime]].<ref name=":5">{{Cite book |last=Nadiri |first=Khalid |title=Brokers, Bureaucrats, and the Quality of Government: Understanding Development and Decay in Afghanistan and Beyond |publisher=[[Johns Hopkins University]] |year=2017 |pages=155–156}}</ref> This came after complaints from his fellow [[Pashtuns|Pashtun]] [[Kochi people|Kochis]] of harassment from an ethnic [[Tajiks|Tajik]] general, Abdul Momin.<ref name=":5" /> Momin had developed secret ties with the [[Tajiks|Tajik]] warlord [[Ahmad Shah Massoud]] and was passing on secret information to Massoud which led to Najibullah ordering the sacking of Momin which was carried out by Juma Achak, an [[Achakzai]] [[Pashtuns|Pashtun]] who served as Commander of the Northern Zone and was known to hold [[Pashtun nationalism|Pashtun chauvinist]] views.<ref name=":5" />  

General Momin was replaced with General Rasul, an ethnic [[Pashtuns|Pashtun]] [[Khalq]]ist known for his brutal reputation of commander of [[Pul-e-Charkhi prison|Pul-e Charkhi Prison]].<ref name=":5" /> This move offended many of the non Pashtun militias in the North and led to the defection of most  [[Uzbeks|Uzbek]], [[Tajiks]], [[Turkmens|Turkmen]], [[Hazaras|Hazara]] and [[Ismaili Shia]]s militias including ethnic [[Uzbeks|Uzbek]], General [[Abdul Rashid Dostum]] and his 40,000 Uzbek soldiers. The defectors would form an anti-Pashtun coalition known as the Movement of the North (Harakat-e Shamal) and ally with the [[Tajiks|Tajik]] [[Jamiat-e Islami]] and [[Hazaras|Hazara]] [[Hezbe Wahdat]] in taking on the mostly [[Pashtuns|Pashtun]], [[Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan|Afghan Military]]. 

Many [[Tajiks|Tajik]] [[Parcham]]ites loyal to [[Babrak Karmal]] would defect en masse during the capture of [[Mazar-i-Sharif]] including General [[Mohammad Nabi Azimi]] with the [[Pashtuns|Pashtun]] [[Khalq]]ist and [[Watan Party of Afghanistan|Pro-Najibullah]] army and paramilitaries defending the city. On 18 March 1992 Najibullah offered to resign, leading to many [[Pashtuns|Pashtun]] [[Khalq]]ist and [[Watan Party of Afghanistan|Najibullah loyalists]] to ally with [[Gulbuddin Hekmatyar|Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's]] [[Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin]] in order to prevent non [[Pashtuns]] from seizing [[Kabul]].<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Halim Tanwir |first1=Dr. M. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oyQDAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA471 |title=AFGHANISTAN: History, Diplomacy and Journalism Volume 1 |date=February 2013 |publisher=Xlibris Corporation |isbn=9781479760909}}</ref> The [[Peshawar Accord]] would be signed on 26 April 1992 between various [[Mujahideen|Mujahadeen]] factions, leading to the creation of the new [[Islamic State of Afghanistan]]. However, [[Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin]] and the [[Khalq]] would continue to fight this new government in the [[Afghan Civil War (1992–1996)|Third Afghan Civil War]].<ref name=":5" />

===Role of Ismailis in the overthrow of Dr. Najibullah===
During the tumultuous period leading to the fall of Dr. Najibullah's government in Afghanistan, the Ismaili community, under the leadership of [[Sayed Mansur Naderi]] and his son [[Sayed Jafar Naderi]], played a significant role in orchestrating the political and military maneuvers that culminated in Najibullah's ousting. The strategic mutiny led by these Ismaili leaders, in collaboration with other non-Pashtun factions, effectively disrupted Najibullah's main supply route from the former Soviet Union, directly contributing to the collapse of his regime. This pivotal action not only marked a turning point in Afghanistan's history but also highlighted the critical influence of the Ismaili community in shaping the nation's political landscape during a period of profound change and instability.<ref>Publisher: Parliament of Australia. Published Date: 31 September 1992. Accessed Date: 4 April 2024. Title: Afghanistan: the politics of disintegration. URL: https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22library%2Fprspub%2FWMH10%22;src1=sm1</ref>