Editing Minot Air Force Base (section)

===Post-Cold War===
[[File:B-52H Minot AFB.jpg|alt=A B-52H Stratofortress taxis during an alert exercise at Minot Air Force Base during March 2006.|thumb|A [[Boeing B-52 Stratofortress|B-52H Stratofortress]] taxis during an alert exercise at Minot Air Force Base during March 2006.]]
On June 1, 1992, [[Air Combat Command]] (ACC) was formed, following the inactivation of the Strategic Air Command. ACC absorbed the former assets of SAC, along with command responsibilities for the [[Eighth Air Force]], and through it, the 5th Bomb Wing and host command of Minot AFB.

In 1993 control of the ICBM force was transferred by ACC to [[Air Force Space Command]]; the 91st Missile Wing was assigned to AFSPC on July 1, 1993.

====Global Strike Command====
The 91st Missile Wing was transferred to the new [[Air Force Global Strike Command]] ([[AFGSC]]) on December 1, 2009, and the 5th Bomb Wing officially transferred to AFGSC on February 1, 2010.

====Nuclear weapons incident====
{{Main|2007 United States Air Force nuclear weapons incident}}
On August 30, 2007, a B-52 took off from Minot AFB carrying six [[cruise missiles]] with [[W80 (nuclear warhead)|W-80 nuclear warheads]] to [[Barksdale Air Force Base|Barksdale AFB]] in northwest [[Louisiana]]. No base personnel nor the crew knew the nuclear weapons were aboard. This incident received international attention.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6980204.stm|title=US B-52 in nuclear cargo blunder|work=[[BBC News]]|date=September 5, 2007|access-date=March 7, 2010}}</ref> An investigation found that this was an isolated incident and that only a few people had information on the whereabouts of the missiles.

While U.S. policy is to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons, Air Force officials acknowledged the presence of nuclear weapons on the base, including the W80-1 warhead.<ref>{{cite report |first=Maj-Gen. Douglas L. |last=Raaberg |date=October 19, 2007 |title=Report of Investigation Concerning an Unauthorized Transfer of Nuclear Warheads Between Minot AFB, North Dakota and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana on August 30, 2007 |url=http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jvaynman/files/minot_afb_report.pdf |publisher=U.S. Air Force}}</ref>

====Nuclear inspection and consequences====
On July 12, 2008, three Air Force officers fell asleep while in control of an electronic component that contained old launch codes for nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles, a violation of procedure, Air Force officials said.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Starr|first1=Barbara|last2=Shaughnessy|first2=Larry|title=Air Force says officers fell asleep with nuke code|url=http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/07/24/missile.error/|access-date=October 25, 2016|website=CNN Pentagon|date=July 24, 2008}}</ref> The Air Force said the launch codes were outdated and had been deactivated before the incident, but it was still a violation of protocol, prompting an investigation. It was the fourth incident within a year involving problems with secure handling of components of America's nuclear weapons. The incident occurred during the changing out of components used to facilitate secure communications between an underground missile-control facility and missile silos near Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, according to Col. Dewey Ford, a spokesman for the Air Force Space Command in Colorado. One of the parts, a code component, is for storage and processing. It is considered classified by the Air Force. A code component was removed from the equipment at the remote missile-control facility and replaced with a new code component. That made the old component inoperable, but an Air Force source said old launch codes were still contained in the part.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/9f/Minot_Launch_Code_Incident.pdf |title=741 MS Code Change Incident |website=91st Operations Group |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170602104522/https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/9f/Minot_Launch_Code_Incident.pdf |archive-date=June 2, 2017}}</ref>

Under standard procedure, the four-officer crew of the facility is supposed to keep the component secure until it is returned to the base. Ford said the crew took the component to a building above the facility and locked the component in a lockbox. Then, three of the four crew members fell asleep.<ref>{{cite news|agency=Associated Press |title=Missile Crew Discharged After Falling Asleep|url=http://www.wibw.com/home/headlines/50839532.html|access-date=October 25, 2016|website=WIBW 13|date=July 15, 2009}}</ref> This violated Air Force procedure, which calls for at least two of the crew members to remain awake while in control of the component. At the time they were asleep, the crew and the component were in a locked building that is guarded by at least one armed airman at all times. The airmen were asleep for two to three hours, Ford said. The component was later returned to the Minot base, and the investigations of procedural violations were started by Air Force Space Command, the 20th Air Force and the National Security Agency. The investigation revealed the codes were not compromised, according to the Air Force. The codes had remained secured, and the crew was inside an area protected by Air Force security at all times, the investigation concluded. The incident, which was first made public by the Project on Government Oversight, was the fourth misstep involving the handling of America's nuclear weapons in one year. The three officers were given [[Nonjudicial punishment|non-judicial punishment]] and subsequently discharged from the Air Force.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://militarytimes.com/news/2009/07/ap_officers_discharged_minot_071409/ |title=Missile crew discharged after falling asleep |first=James |last=MacPherson |date=15 July 2009 |website=Military Times |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110727002820/http://militarytimes.com/news/2009/07/ap_officers_discharged_minot_071409/ |archive-date=July 27, 2011}}</ref>

In fall 2009, Minot suffered another embarrassment when the newly formed 69th Bomb Squadron failed its Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI). As a result, both the 5th Bomb Wing and 5th Operations Support Squadron Commanders were relieved of command by the 8th Air Force Commander<ref>{{cite web |url=http://militarytimes.com/news/2009/10/airforce_westa_fired_minot_103009w/ |title=5th Bomb Wing CO relieved of command |first=Bruce |last=Rolfsen |date=1 November 2009 |website=Military Times |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120321044630/http://militarytimes.com/news/2009/10/airforce_westa_fired_minot_103009w/ |archive-date=March 21, 2012}}</ref> under the later discredited "perfection is the standard" philosophy.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/04/09/14558/malmstrom-air-force-base-icbm-test-compromise-investigation |title=Investigation Concerning ICBM Test Compromise at Malmstrom AFB, Montana, & Assessment of ICBM Training, Evaluation, and Testing Culture |first=Lt-Gen. James |last=Holmes |date=February 26, 2014 |website=U.S. Air Force |via=[[Center for Public Integrity]] |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180321063515/https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/04/09/14558/malmstrom-air-force-base-icbm-test-compromise-investigation |archive-date=March 21, 2018 }}</ref> Subsequently, it was determined the 8th Air Force Commander had acted vindictively, outside his authority and used the firings to deflect attention away from institutional, organizational and leadership failings at both 8th Air Force and Air Combat Command.

Another incident first reported in May 2013 by the Associated Press revealed that 17 officers in charge of maintaining the base's [[Minuteman III]] nuclear missiles were "sidelined" for numerous violations of safety procedures. The deputy commander of the base complained of "rot" in the staff's discipline and command structure. The Associated Press obtained an internal email from the deputy commander and the news of the incident had garnered the attention of then Defense Secretary [[Chuck Hagel]], who "demanded details" of the incident. The unit in charge of maintaining the nuclear missiles performed poorly during an inspection that took place in March 2013.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/08/us/nuclear-launch-officers/index.html |work=CNN | title=17 Air Force officers stripped of authority to launch nuclear missiles |date=May 9, 2013}}</ref> Following the release of the Deputy Commander's strongly worded internal email, the Air Force began investigating the incident further.