Editing Mind–body dualism (section)

===Property dualism===
{{Main|Property dualism}}

Property dualism asserts that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter, and that consciousness may be ontologically irreducible to [[neurobiology]] and physics. It asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e., in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge. Hence, it is a sub-branch of [[emergent materialism]]. What views properly fall under the ''property dualism'' rubric is itself a matter of dispute. There are different versions of property dualism, some of which claim independent categorisation.<ref name="ist-socrates.berkeley.edu">[[John Searle|Searle, John]]. [1983] 2002. "[https://web.archive.org/web/20061210160023/http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/132/PropertydualismFNL.doc Why I Am Not a Property Dualist]." Archived from the [http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/132/PropertydualismFNL.doc original] on 10 December 2006.</ref>

Non-reductive physicalism is a form of property dualism in which it is asserted that all mental states are causally reducible to physical states. One argument for this has been made in the form of [[anomalous monism]] expressed by [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]], where it is argued that mental events are identical to physical events, however, strict law-governed causal relationships cannot describe relations of mental events. Another argument for this has been expressed by [[John Searle]], who is the advocate of a distinctive form of physicalism he calls [[biological naturalism]]. His view is that although mental states are ontologically irreducible to physical states, they are [[Causality|causally reducible]]. He has acknowledged that "to many people" his views and those of property dualists look a lot alike, but he thinks the comparison is misleading.<ref name="ist-socrates.berkeley.edu" />