Editing Mens rea (section)

=== Model Penal Code ===
Because the landscape of criminal law varied from state to state, the [[American Law Institute]] (which issues "restatements" of American legal jurisprudence) declined to issue a restatement of criminal law in favor of a "model" code for states to issue new, standardized criminal law.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last1=Robinson |first1=Paul |last2=Dubber |first2=Markus |date=2007-07-27 |title=The American Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview |url=https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/131 |journal=New Criminal Law Review|volume=10 |issue=3 |pages=319–341 |doi=10.1525/nclr.2007.10.3.319 |hdl=1807/87911 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> This [[Model Penal Code]] ("MPC") was completed in 1962, and received praise from legal scholars for its reformulation of criminal law.<ref name=":2">American Law Institute. Model Penal Code. "Forward."</ref><ref>"As all criminal law scholars understand, the Model Penal Code is one of the great intellectual accomplishments of American legal scholarship of the mid-twentieth century." Gerard E. Lynch, ''Revising the Model Penal Code: Keeping It Real'', 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 219 (2003)</ref> Although not all states follow the criminal law as constructed within the MPC, over 34 states had adopted part or substantially all of the MPC as law by 1983.<ref name=":2" /> The federal government has not adopted the MPC, although it has attempted to do so for many decades.<ref name=":1" />

The formulation of ''mens rea'' set forth in the [[Model Penal Code]] has been highly influential throughout the United States in clarifying the discussion of the different modes of culpability since its publication.{{sfn|Dubber (2002)|pages=60-80}}<ref name=":1" /> The following levels of ''mens rea'' are found in the MPC §2.02(2),<ref>Blond, N. C., [https://books.google.com/books?id=ANO2Pp6TGToC ''Criminal Law''] ([[Alphen aan den Rijn]]: [[Wolters Kluwer]], 2007), pp. 60–62.</ref><ref name=":32"/>{{rp|60–62}} and are considered by the United States Supreme Court to be the four states of mind that give rise to criminal liability:<ref>"We begin by setting out four states of mind, as described in modern statutes and cases, that may give rise to criminal liability. Those mental states are, in descending order of culpability: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence." ''Borden v. United States'', 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1823, 210 L. Ed. 2d 63 (2021)</ref>

* ''[[Criminal negligence|Negligently]]'': a "reasonable person" ought to be aware of a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" that is a "gross deviation" from a normal standard of care.<ref name=":4">''Borden v. United States'', 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (2021).</ref>
* ''[[Recklessness (law)|Recklessly]]'': the actor "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk" in "gross deviation" from a normal standard of care.<ref name=":4" />
* ''Knowingly'': the actor is "practically certain" that his conduct will lead to the result,<ref name=":5">''Borden v. United States'', 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1823 (2021).</ref> or is aware to a high probability that his conduct is of a prohibited nature, or is aware to a high probability that the attendant circumstances exist.
* ''Purposefully'': the actor ''consciously'' engages in conduct and "desires" the result. The Supreme Court has not found a large difference between purposeful and knowing conduct, not only in theory but also in application.<ref name=":5" />

The above mental states also work in a hierarchy, with ''negligence'' as the lowest mental state and ''purposefully'' as the highest: a finding of purposefully/intentional establishes a state of knowingness, recklessness, and negligence; a finding of knowingness establishes a finding of recklessness and negligence, and a finding of recklessness establishes a state of negligence.<ref name=":32" /><sup>(5)</sup><ref>[https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/PE/htm/PE.6.htm#6.02 ''See e.g.'', Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.02(e)]</ref>

The MPC also recognizes culpability not because of a mental state, but for crimes that are legislatively proscribed due to the imposition of "absolute liability."<ref>Model Penal Code § 2.05</ref> Strict liability crimes will require evidence of such legislative intent, and courts seriously examine such evidence before assuming a crime permits strict liability rather than a mens rea.<ref>"Absent statutory language expressly imposing absolute liability, the states of mind denominated in HRS § 702–204 will generally apply because we will not lightly discern a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability." State v. Eastman, 913 P.2d 57, 66, 81 Hawai'i 131, 140 (Hawai i,1996)</ref>

* ''[[Strict liability]]'': the actor engaged in conduct and his mental state is irrelevant.<ref>"The only proof required to convict an individual of an absolute liability offense is that an individual engaged in the prohibited conduct." 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 127</ref> This ''mens rea'' may only be applied where the forbidden conduct is a mere violation, i.e. a [[civil infraction]].