Editing Luftwaffe (section)

====Change of direction, 1936–37====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1984-112-13, Ernst Udet.jpg|thumb|left|upright=0.7|General [[Ernst Udet]]. Along with [[Albert Kesselring]], Udet was responsible for establishing the design trend of German aircraft. His focus was on tactical army support air forces.]]
Wever's participation in the construction of the Luftwaffe came to an abrupt end on 3 June 1936 when he was killed along with his engineer in a [[Heinkel He 70 Blitz|Heinkel He 70]] Blitz, ironically on the very day that his "Bomber A" heavy bomber design competition was announced. After Wever's death, Göring began taking more of an interest in the appointment of Luftwaffe staff officers. Göring appointed his successor [[Albert Kesselring]] as Chief of Staff and [[Ernst Udet]] to head the Reich's Air Ministry Technical Office ({{lang|de|Technisches Amt}}), although he was not a technical expert. Despite this Udet helped change the Luftwaffe's tactical direction towards fast medium bombers to destroy enemy air power in the battle zone rather than through industrial bombing of its aviation production.<ref name="Hooton 2007, ''Luftwaffe at War: Gathering Storm'', p. 34"/>

Kesselring and Udet did not get on. During Kesselring's time as CS, 1936–1937, a power struggle developed between the two as Udet attempted to extend his own power within the Luftwaffe. Kesselring also had to contend with Göring appointing "yes men" to positions of importance.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=225}}</ref> Udet realised his limitations, and his failures in the production and development of German aircraft would have serious long term consequences.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=227}}</ref>

The failure of the Luftwaffe to progress further towards attaining a strategic bombing force was attributable to several reasons. Many in the Luftwaffe command believed medium bombers to be sufficient power to launch strategic bombing operations against Germany's most likely enemies; France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.<ref>{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=10}}</ref> The United Kingdom presented greater problems. {{Lang|de|[[General der Flieger]]}} [[Hellmuth Felmy]], commander of {{lang|de|[[Luftflotte 2]]}} in 1939, was charged with devising a plan for an air war over the British Isles. Felmy was convinced that Britain could be defeated through morale bombing. Felmy noted the alleged panic that had broken out in London during the [[Munich Agreement|Munich crisis]], evidence he believed of British weakness. A second reason was technical. German designers had never solved the issues of the Heinkel He 177A's design difficulties, brought on by the requirement from its inception on 5 November 1937 to have moderate dive-bombing capabilities in a 30-meter wingspan aircraft. Moreover, Germany did not possess the economic resources to match the later British and American effort of 1943–1944, particularly in large-scale mass production of [[Bomber B#High-output aviation engines for the Luftwaffe|high power output aircraft engines]] (with output of over least 1,500 kW (2,000 hp). In addition, the OKL had not foreseen the industrial and military effort strategic bombing would require. By 1939 the Luftwaffe was not much better prepared than its enemies to conduct a strategic bombing campaign,<ref name="auto">{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=11}}</ref> with fatal results during the [[Battle of Britain]].<ref>{{harvnb|Overy|1980|p=31}}</ref>

The German rearmament programme faced difficulties acquiring raw materials. Germany imported most of its essential materials for rebuilding the Luftwaffe, in particular rubber and aluminum. Petroleum imports were particularly vulnerable to blockade. Germany pushed for synthetic fuel plants but still failed to meet demands. In 1937 Germany imported more fuel than it had at the start of the decade. By summer 1938, only 25% of the requirements could be covered. In steel materials, industry was operating at barely 83% of capacity, and by November 1938 Göring reported the economic situation was serious.<ref>{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=2}}</ref> The {{lang|de|[[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht]]}} (OKW), the overall command for all German military forces, ordered reductions in raw materials and steel used for armament production. The figures for reduction were substantial: 30% steel, 20% copper, 47% aluminum, and 14% rubber.<ref>{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=3}}</ref> Under such circumstances, it was not possible for Milch, Udet, or Kesselring to produce a formidable strategic bombing force even had they wanted to do so.<ref name="auto"/>

The development of aircraft was now confined to the production of twin-engined medium bombers that required much less material, manpower, and aviation production capacity than Wever's "Ural Bomber". German industry could build two medium bombers for one heavy bomber and the RLM would not gamble on developing a heavy bomber which would also take time. Göring remarked, "the ''Führer'' will not ask how big the bombers there are, but only how many there are."<ref>{{harvnb|Homze|1976|p=125}}</ref> The premature death of Wever, one of the Luftwaffe's finest officers, left the Luftwaffe without a strategic air force during World War II, which eventually proved fatal to the German war effort.<ref name="Hooton 2007, ''Luftwaffe at War: Gathering Storm'', p. 34"/>{{sfn|Dressel|Griehl|1994|p= 176}}<ref>{{harvnb|Bergström|2007|pp=129–130}}</ref>

The lack of strategic capability should have been apparent much earlier. The [[Occupation of Czechoslovakia (1938–1945)|Sudeten Crisis]] highlighted German unpreparedness to conduct a strategic air war (although the British and French were in a much weaker position), and Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe be expanded to five times its earlier size.{{sfn|Ketley|Rolfe|1996|p=3}} The OKL badly neglected the need for transport aircraft; even in 1943, transport units were described as {{lang|de|Kampfgeschwadern zur besonderen Verwendung}} (Bomber Units on Special Duties, KGzbV).{{sfn|Ketley|Rolfe|1996|p=7}} and only grouping them together into dedicated cargo and personnel transport wings ({{lang|de|Transportgeschwader}}) during that year. In March 1938, as the ''[[Anschluss]]'' was taking place, Göring ordered Felmy to investigate the prospect of air raids against Britain. Felmy concluded it was not possible until bases in [[Belgium]] and the [[Netherlands]] were obtained and the Luftwaffe had heavy bombers. It mattered little, as war was avoided by the Munich Agreement, and the need for long-range aircraft did not arise.<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=77}}</ref>

These failures were not exposed until wartime. In the meantime, German designs of mid-1930s origin such as the [[Messerschmitt Bf 109]], the [[Heinkel He 111]], the [[Junkers Ju 87]] Stuka, and the [[Dornier Do 17]], performed very well. All first saw active service in the [[Condor Legion]] against Soviet-supplied aircraft. The Luftwaffe also quickly realised the days of the biplane fighter were finished, the [[Heinkel He 51]] being switched to service as a trainer. Particularly impressive were the Heinkel and Dornier, which fulfilled the Luftwaffe's requirements for bombers that were faster than 1930s-era fighters, many of which were biplanes or strut-braced monoplanes.

Despite the participation of these aircraft (mainly from 1938 onward), it was the venerable [[Junkers Ju 52]] (which soon became the backbone of the {{lang|de|Transportgruppen}}) that made the main contribution. During the [[Spanish Civil War]] Hitler remarked, "Franco ought to erect a monument to the glory of the Junkers Ju 52. It is the aircraft which the Spanish revolution has to thank for its victory."<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=51}}</ref>