Editing Logrolling (section)

=== Logrolling to reach the optimal decision ===
Decisions reach an optimum only when they are unanimous, when votes are not coerced and everyone has veto power (Buchanan and Tullock 1962<ref name="BuchananJames" />). Unanimous votes, however, are not required for the American voting process. This is why some logrolling advocates argue that logrolling must be allowed within a democracy—sometimes there may not be a "best" or "most efficient" option on a vote.

Logrolling creates a market within which votes are exchanged as a sort of currency, and thus, facilitates the political process that produces the highest valued outcomes (Holcombe 2006<ref name="HolcombeRandall" />). If individual participants recognize the value of their own vote, they are motivated to trade. When methods of trade do not conflict with given standards or ethical procedures, individuals naturally seek mutually advantageous vote trades. An individual may effectually, but imperfectly, "sell" his vote on a particular issue to, in return, secure votes from other individuals on behalf of legislation he prefers (Buchanan and Tullock 1962<ref name="BuchananJames" />).

Logrolling has one necessary condition: benefits from the public activity must be significantly more concentrated or localized than the costs. In economics, decisions are made at the margin. Logrolling depends on the reality that the marginal benefit (or utility) of at least some elected officials, or the citizenry, will increase when the legislation is passed (Buchanan and Tullock 1962<ref name="BuchananJames" />). Any economist will consider the immediate [[opportunity cost]] of the logrolling procedure within the legislative body, as well as the external cost of the vote (the cost to enact and see the bill through to fruition).

When transaction costs are low and parties involved are perfectly informed, a mutually beneficial agreement will occur: [[Coase theorem|whoever values the property the highest will end up with it]]. This is what [[Ronald H. Coase]] proposed in his ''Theory of Property Rights'' in 1960. [[Coase theorem|This theory]] holds true within the world of economics. In the American system of government, legislators have the incentive to logroll because transaction costs are low. When transaction costs are low, the [[Coase theorem]] says that the political marketplace (the decisions of the legislatures) will allocate resources to the highest valued point (Coase 1960<ref>{{cite journal|last=Coase|first=Ronald H.|title=The Problem of Social Cost|journal=The Journal of Law and Economics|year=1960|volume=3|pages=1–44|doi=10.1086/466560 |s2cid=222331226|url=https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/9932210/becker%2cbergstresser%2csubramanian-Does_Shareholder_Proxy.pdf?sequence=1}}</ref>).

Typically, logrolling is a mechanism used to gain support for special interest and minority groups. However, because of the ideological mix that already exists within the legislature itself, minority views are often represented, even if only marginally. With low [[transaction cost]]s, the Coase theorem will come into play. The highest valued outcome is chosen by the legislature, regardless the member's ideological stance or political affiliation (Holcombe 2006<ref name="HolcombeRandall" />).

The problem of cyclical majorities may arise with the absence of logrolling. The cyclical majority problem occurs when voters are faced with multiple voting options but cannot choose the option they most prefer, since it is not available. Voters must consider whether the alternative option is closer to their original preference (Bara and Weale 2006<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Bara |first1=Judith |last2=Weale |first2=Albert |year=2006 |title=Democratic Politics and Party Competition: Essays in Honor of Ian Budge |location=New York |publisher=Routledge}}</ref>). However, when logrolling is allowed, the highest valued outcome is secure without the threat of a cyclical majority. For example, suppose a country road in [[West Virginia]] is in disrepair. The local congressman proposes a bill to have the main road in his community resurfaced and paved. The road leads to a town of merely 600 residents. Thus, the other legislators will vote against the measure because the funding is not worthwhile to their constituents. In a logrolling system, the local legislator can use his vote to bargain with his fellow legislators. He will exchange his vote for his fellow legislators' bills to promote, for instance, the construction of new hospitals and the increase of veteran's benefits, in return for their votes to repair the road (Buchanan and Tullock 1962<ref name="BuchananJames" />).