Editing Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (section)

===Shoot-down===
[[File:Su-15 Flagon.jpg|thumb|A Soviet [[Sukhoi Su-15]] [[interceptor aircraft|interceptor]]]]
{{Location map+|Russia Sakhalin |width=120|caption=[[Sakhalin Island]]|float=right|places=
{{Location map~|Russia Sakhalin|lon_dir=E|lat_dir=N|lat_deg=52|lat_min=11|lon_deg=141|lon_min=37|position=right|label=[[Strait of Tartary]]}}
{{Location map~|Russia Sakhalin|lon_dir=E|lat_dir=N|lat_deg=46.15|lat_min=0|lon_deg=141.24|lon_min=0|position=right|label=[[Moneron Island|Moneron Is]]}}
{{Location map~|Russia Sakhalin |lon_dir=E|lat_dir=N|lat_deg=46|lat_min=46|lat_sec=27|lon_deg=141|lon_min=32|lon_sec=48|position=right|label=Missile&nbsp;attack}}
{{Location map~|Russia Sakhalin |lon_dir=E|lat_dir=N|lat_deg=51|lat_min=0|lon_deg=143|lon_min=0|position=bottom|label=[[Sakhalin|Sakhalin&nbsp;Island]]}}
{{Location map~|Russia Sakhalin |lon_dir=E|lat_dir=N|lat_deg=47|lat_min=15|lon_deg=142|lon_min=46|position=right|label=[[Dolinsk-Sokol]]}}
{{Location map~|Russia Sakhalin |lon_dir=E|lat_dir=N|lat_deg=45|lat_min=25|lon_deg=141|lon_min=40|position=right|label=[[Wakkanai, Hokkaidō|Wakkanai,&nbsp;Japan]]}}
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In 1983, [[Cold War]] tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union had escalated to a level not seen since the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] because of several factors. These included the United States' [[Strategic Defense Initiative]], its planned deployment of the [[Pershing II]] weapon system in Europe in March and April, and [[FleetEx '83-1]], the largest naval exercise held to date in the North Pacific.<ref name="Johnson-55">Johnson, p. 55</ref> The military hierarchy of the Soviet Union (particularly the old guard led by [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet General Secretary]] [[Yuri Andropov]] and [[Minister of Defence (Soviet Union)|Minister of Defence]] [[Dmitry Ustinov]]) viewed these actions as bellicose and destabilizing; they were deeply suspicious of U.S. President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s intentions and openly fearful he was planning a [[pre-emptive nuclear strike]] against the Soviet Union. These fears culminated in [[RYAN]], the code name for a secret intelligence-gathering program initiated by Andropov to detect a potential nuclear sneak attack which he believed Reagan was plotting.<ref name="Richelson-385" />

Aircraft from {{USS|Midway|CV-41|6}} and {{USS|Enterprise|CVN-65|6}} repeatedly overflew Soviet military installations in the [[Kuril Islands dispute|Kuril Islands]] during FleetEx '83 naval exercise (29{{spaces}}March to 17{{spaces}}April 1983),<ref name="Pry20">Pry, p. 20</ref> resulting in the dismissal or reprimanding of Soviet military officials who had been unable to shoot them down.<ref name="Fischer" /> On the Soviet side, RYAN was expanded.<ref name="Fischer">Fischer, ''A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare''</ref> Lastly, there was a heightened [[Alert state|alert]] around the [[Kamchatka Peninsula]] at the time that KAL&nbsp;007 was in the vicinity, because of a Soviet missile test at the [[Kura Missile Test Range]] that was scheduled for the same day. A [[United States Air Force]] [[Boeing RC-135]] reconnaissance aircraft flying in the area was monitoring the missile test off the peninsula.<ref name="Schultz367">Schultz, p. 367</ref>

At 15:51 UTC, according to Soviet sources,<ref name="Pearson" /> KAL&nbsp;007 entered the [[restricted airspace]] of the Kamchatka Peninsula. The buffer zone extended {{convert|200|km|mi nmi}} from Kamchatka's coast and is known as a [[flight information region]] (FIR). The {{convert|100|km|mi nmi|adj=on}} radius of the buffer zone nearest to Soviet territory had the additional designation of [[prohibited airspace]]. When KAL&nbsp;007 was about {{convert|130|km|mi nmi}} from the Kamchatka coast, four [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23|MiG-23]] fighters were scrambled to intercept the Boeing 747.<ref name="NASA">Degani, 2001</ref>

Significant command and control problems were experienced trying to vector the fast military jets onto the 747 before they ran out of fuel. In addition, the pursuit was made more difficult, according to Soviet Air Force Captain [[Aleksandr Zuyev (pilot)|Aleksandr Zuyev]], who [[Defection|defected]] to the West in 1989, because, ten days before, Arctic [[gale]]s had knocked out the key warning radar on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Furthermore, he stated that local officials responsible for repairing the radar lied to Moscow, falsely reporting that they had successfully fixed the radar. Had this radar been operational, it would have enabled an intercept of the stray airliner roughly two hours earlier with plenty of time for proper identification as a civilian aircraft. Instead, the unidentified jetliner crossed over the Kamchatka Peninsula back into international airspace over the [[Sea of Okhotsk]] without being intercepted.<ref>[https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-01-02-mn-2610-story.html Radar Outage Cited in KAL Tragedy, Los Angeles Times (from Reuters) January 02, 1993]</ref> In his explanation to ''[[60 Minutes]]'', Zuyev stated: "Some people lied to Moscow, trying to save their ass."<ref>{{Cite web |date=2015-05-09 |title=Defection of Soviet Pilot Cpt. Alexander Zuyev to the West in 1989 |url=https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2pn4w3 |access-date=2023-10-28 |website=Dailymotion}}</ref>

The Commander of the Soviet Far East District Air Defense Forces, General Valeri Kamensky,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.rescue007.org/kaminski.htm |title=Kamenski Interview |publisher=Rescue 007 |access-date=April 5, 2010}}</ref> was adamant that KAL&nbsp;007 was to be destroyed even over neutral waters but only after positive identification showed it not to be a passenger plane. His subordinate, General [[Anatoly Kornukov]], commander of Sokol Air Base and later to become commander of the Russian Air Force, insisted that there was no need to make positive identification as the intruder aircraft had already flown over the Kamchatka Peninsula.

{{poemquote|
'''General Kornukov''' (to Military District Headquarters-Gen. Kamensky): (5:47) "...simply destroy [it] even if it is over neutral waters? Are the orders to destroy it over neutral waters? Oh, well."
'''Kamensky''': "We must find out, maybe it is some civilian craft or God knows who."
'''Kornukov''': "What civilian? [It] has flown over Kamchatka! It [came] from the ocean without identification. I am giving the order to attack if it crosses the State border."}}

Units of the [[Soviet Air Defence Forces]] that had been tracking the South Korean aircraft for more than an hour while it entered and left Soviet airspace now classified the aircraft as a military target when it re-entered their airspace over Sakhalin.<ref name="NASA" /> After a protracted [[ground-controlled interception]], the three [[Sukhoi Su-15|Su-15 fighters]] (from nearby [[Dolinsk-Sokol]] airbase) and the MiG-23<ref>{{cite news |page=15 |title=Jean Kirkpatrick's Address to the United Nations |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=September 7, 1983}}</ref> (from [[Smirnykh (air base)|Smirnykh Air Base]]) managed to make visual contact with the Boeing, but, owing to the black of night, failed to make critical identification of the aircraft which [[:Wikisource:Korean Air Lines Flight 007 transcripts|<span style="color:#0645AD;">Russian communications</span>]] reveal. The pilot of the lead Su-15 fighter fired [[warning shot]]s with its cannon, but recalled later in 1991, "I fired four bursts, more than 200 rounds. For all the good it did. After all, I was loaded with armor-piercing shells, not incendiary shells. It's doubtful whether anyone could see them."<ref name="Illesh-Eng">Illesh, ''The Mystery of the KAL-007''</ref>

At this point, KAL&nbsp;007 contacted [[Tokyo Area Control Center]], requesting clearance to ascend to a higher [[flight level]] for reasons of fuel economy; the request was granted, so the Boeing started to climb, gradually slowing as it exchanged speed for altitude. The decrease in speed caused the pursuing fighter to overshoot the Boeing and was interpreted by the Soviet pilot as an evasive maneuver. The order to shoot KAL&nbsp;007 down was given as it was about to leave Soviet airspace for the second time. At around 18:26&nbsp;UTC, under pressure from General Kornukov and ground controllers not to let the aircraft escape into international airspace, the lead fighter was able to move back into a position where it could fire two [[K-8 (missile)|K-8]] ([[NATO reporting name]]: AA-3 "Anab") [[air-to-air missile]]s at the plane.<ref name="Maier">Maier, ''KAL&nbsp;007 Mystery''</ref>

====Soviet pilot's recollection of shoot-down====
In a 1991 interview with ''[[Izvestia]]'', Major Gennadiy Osipovich, pilot of the Su-15 interceptor that shot the aircraft down, spoke about his recollections of the events leading up to the shoot-down. Contrary to official Soviet statements at the time, he recalled telling ground controllers that there were "blinking lights".<ref name="nytimes-Osipovich" /> He continued, saying of the [[Boeing 747#747-200|747-230B]], "I saw two rows of windows and knew that this was a Boeing. I knew this was a civilian plane. But for me this meant nothing. It is easy to turn a civilian type of plane into one for military use."<ref name="nytimes-Osipovich" /> Osipovich stated, "I did not tell the ground that it was a Boeing-type plane; they did not ask me."<ref name="Illesh-Eng" /><ref name="nytimes-Osipovich">Gordon, ''Ex-Soviet Pilot Still Insists KAL&nbsp;007 Was Spying''</ref>

[[File:Sukhoi SU-15TM 2008 G2.jpg|thumb|right|[[K-8 (missile)|K-8 missile]] (the type fired at KAL 007) mounted on the wing of a [[Sukhoi Su-15]]]]
Commenting on the moment that KAL&nbsp;007 slowed as it ascended from [[flight level]] 330 to flight level 350, and then on his maneuvering for a missile launch, Osipovich said:

{{blockquote|They [KAL&nbsp;007] quickly lowered their speed. They were flying at {{convert|400|km/h|0|abbr=on}}. My speed was more than 400. I was simply unable to fly slower. In my opinion, the intruder's intentions were plain. If I did not want to go into a stall, I would be forced to overshoot them. That's exactly what happened. We had already flown over the island [Sakhalin]. It is narrow at that point, the target was about to get away... Then the ground [controller] gave the command: "Destroy the target...!" That was easy to say. But how? With shells? I had already expended 243 rounds. Ram it? I had always thought of that as poor taste. [[Aerial ramming|Ramming]] is the last resort. Just in case, I had already completed my turn and was coming down on top of him. Then, I had an idea. I dropped below him about {{convert|2,000|m|spell=in}}... afterburners. Switched on the missiles and brought the nose up sharply. Success! I have a lock on.

We shot down the plane legally&nbsp;... Later we began to lie about small details: the plane was supposedly flying without running lights or strobe lights, that tracer bullets were fired, or that I had radio contact with them on the emergency frequency of [[Aircraft emergency frequency|121.5 megahertz]].<ref name="Daniloff">''Izvestia'' 1991 interview with Gennadi Osipovich, as quoted in: {{cite book |last=Daniloff |first=Nicholas |author-link=Nicholas Daniloff |title=Of Spies and Spokesmen: My Life as a Cold War Correspondent |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5h4kuotImbgC&pg=PA305 |year=2008 |publisher=University of Missouri Press |isbn=978-0826266309 |page=301}}</ref>}}

Osipovich died on September 23, 2015, after a protracted illness.<ref>{{cite web |date=October 20, 2015 |script-title=ru:Тайна сбитого боинга: признание русского лётчика |trans-title=The mystery of the downed Boeing: the confession of a Russian pilot |url=https://newsomsk.ru/oreol/news/32973-tayna_sbitogo_boinga_priznanie_russkogo_lyotchika/ |access-date=February 23, 2020 |publisher=News Omsk |language=ru}}</ref>

====Soviet command hierarchy of shoot-down====
The Soviet real-time military communication transcripts of the shoot-down suggest the chain of command from the top general to Major Osipovich, the Su-15 interceptor pilot who shot down KAL&nbsp;007.<ref>{{Cite news |newspaper=The New York Times |title=Interview |first=Gennady |last=Osipovich |date=September 9, 1996}}</ref><ref name="ICAO93-190">ICAO '93, Information Paper No. 1, p. 190</ref> In reverse order, they are:

* Major Gennadiy Nikolayevich Osipovich,
* Captain Titovnin, Combat Control Center – Fighter Division
* Lt. Colonel Maistrenko, Smirnykh Air Base Fighter Division Acting Chief of Staff, confirmed the shoot-down order to Titovnin.{{blockquote|Titovnin: "You confirm the task?"<br />Maistrenko: "Yes."}}
* Lt. Colonel Gerasimenko, Acting Commander, 41st Fighter Regiment.{{blockquote|Gerasimenko: (to Kornukov) "Task received. Destroy target 60–65 with missile fire. Accept control of fighter from Smirnikh.}}
* General Anatoly Kornukov, Commander of Sokol Air Base – Sakhalin.{{blockquote|Kornukov: (to Gerasimenko) "I repeat the task, Fire the missiles, Fire on target 60–65. Destroy target 60–65&nbsp;... Take control of the MiG 23 from Smirnikh, call sign 163, call sign 163. He is behind the target at the moment. Destroy the target!... Carry out the task! Destroy it!"}}
* General Valery Kamensky, Commander of Far East Military District Air Defense Forces.{{blockquote|Kornukov: (To Kamensky) "... simply destroy [it] even if it is over neutral waters? Are the orders to destroy it over neutral waters? Oh, well."}}
* Army General [[Ivan Tretyak|Ivan Moiseevich Tretyak]], Commander of the Far East Military District.{{blockquote|"Weapons were used, weapons authorized at the highest level. Ivan Moiseevich authorized it. Hello, hello.", "Say again.", "I cannot hear you clearly now.", "He gave the order. Hello, hello, hello.", "Yes, yes.", "Ivan Moiseevich gave the order, Tretyak.", "Roger, roger.", "Weapons were used at his order."<ref name="ICAO93-60 61">ICAO '93, Information Paper 1, pp. 60, 61</ref>}}

====Post-attack flight====
At the time of the attack, the plane had been cruising at an altitude of about {{convert|35000|ft|m}}. Tapes recovered from the airliner's [[cockpit voice recorder]] indicate that the crew was unaware that they were off course and [[Prohibited airspace|violating Soviet airspace]]. Immediately after missile detonation, the airliner began a 113-second arc upward because of a damaged crossover cable between the left inboard and right outboard elevators.<ref name="ICAO93-55">ICAO '93, p. 55</ref>

At 18:26:46&nbsp;UTC (03:26 [[Time in Japan|Japan Time]]; 06:26 Sakhalin time),<ref name="ICAO93-54">ICAO '93, p. 54</ref> at the apex of the arc at altitude {{convert|38250|ft|m}},<ref name="ICAO93-55" /> the autopilot disengaged (this was either done by the pilots, or it disengaged automatically). Now being controlled manually, the plane began to descend to {{convert|35000|ft|m}}. From 18:27:01 until 18:27:09, the flight crew reported to the Tokyo Area Control Center informing that KAL&nbsp;007 would "descend to 10,000" [feet; 3,000{{nbsp}}m]. At 18:27:20, ICAO graphing of Digital Flight Data Recorder tapes showed that after a descent phase and a 10-second "nose-up", KAL&nbsp;007 was leveled out at pre-missile detonation altitude of {{convert|35000|ft|m|abbr=on}}, forward acceleration was back to pre-missile detonation rate of zero acceleration, and airspeed had returned to pre-detonation velocity.

[[Aircraft principal axes|Yaw]] oscillations, beginning at the time of missile detonation, continued decreasingly until the end of the 1-minute 44-second section of the tape. The Boeing did not break up, explode, or plummet immediately after the attack; it continued its gradual descent for four minutes, then leveled off at {{convert|16,424|ft|m|abbr=on}} (18:30–18:31&nbsp;UTC), rather than continuing to descend to {{convert|10,000|ft|m|abbr=on}} as previously reported to Tokyo Area Control Center. It continued at this altitude for almost five more minutes (18:35&nbsp;UTC).

The last [[cockpit voice recorder]] entry occurred at 18:27:46 while in this phase of the descent. At 18:28&nbsp;UTC, the aircraft was reported turning to the north.<ref name="ICAO93-132">ICAO '93, Information Paper No. 1, p. 132</ref> ICAO analysis concluded that the flight crew "retained limited control" of the aircraft.<ref>ICAO '93, sect. 3.38, p. 61</ref> However, this lasted for only five minutes. The crew then lost all control. The aircraft began to descend rapidly in spirals over [[Moneron Island]] for {{convert|2.6|mi|km}}. The aircraft then broke apart in mid-air and crashed into the ocean, just off the west coast of [[Sakhalin|Sakhalin Island]]. All 269 people on board were killed.<ref group="note">The last plotted radar position of the target was 18:35 hours at 5,000&nbsp;meters." (ICAO '93, p. 53, para. 2.15.8)</ref> The aircraft was last seen visually by Osipovich, "somehow descending slowly" over Moneron Island. The aircraft disappeared off long-range military radar at [[Wakkanai, Hokkaidō|Wakkanai]], Japan, at a height of {{convert|1000|ft|m}}.<ref>Johnson, p. 30</ref>

KAL 007 was probably attacked in international airspace, with a 1993 Russian report listing the location of the missile firing outside its territory at {{Coord|46|46|27|N|141|32|48|E |type:event|name=KAL007}},<ref name="Fischer" /><ref>Oberg, ''KAL 007: The Real Story''</ref> although the intercepting pilot stated otherwise in a subsequent interview. Initial reports that the airliner had been forced to land on Sakhalin were soon proven false{{citation needed|date=November 2021}}. One of these reports conveyed via phone by Orville Brockman, the Washington office spokesman of the [[Federal Aviation Administration]], to the press secretary of Larry McDonald, was that the FAA in Tokyo had been informed by the Japanese Civil Aviation Bureau that "Japanese self-defense force radar confirms that the Hokkaido radar followed Air Korea to a landing in Soviet territory on the island of Sakhalinska and it is confirmed by the manifest that Congressman McDonald is on board".<ref>"KAL&nbsp;007: Cover-Up", David Pearson, ''Summit Press'', N.Y., 1987, p. 122</ref>

A Japanese fisherman aboard ''58th Chidori Maru'' later reported to the [[Japan Coast Guard|Japanese Maritime Safety Agency]] (this report was cited by ICAO analysis) that he had heard a plane at low altitude, but had not seen it. Then he heard "a loud sound followed by a bright flash of light on the horizon, then another dull sound and a less intense flash of light on the horizon"<ref>ICAO '93, 1.2.1, p. 5</ref> and smelled aviation fuel.<ref>Daniloff, p. 300</ref>

====Soviet command response to post-detonation flight====
Though the interceptor pilot reported to ground control, "Target destroyed", the Soviet command, from the general on down, indicated surprise and consternation at KAL&nbsp;007's continued flight, and ability to regain its altitude and maneuver. This consternation continued through to KAL&nbsp;007's subsequent level flight at altitude {{convert|16424|ft|m|abbr=on}}, and then, after almost five minutes, through its spiral descent over Moneron Island. (See [[s:Korean Air Lines Flight 007 transcripts|Korean Air Lines Flight 007 transcripts]] from 18:26 UTC onwards: "Lt. Col. Novoseletski: Well, what is happening? What is the matter? Who guided him in?  He locked on; why didn't he shoot it down?")

====Missile damage to plane====
The following damage to the aircraft was determined by the ICAO from its analysis of the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder:

=====Hydraulics=====
KAL&nbsp;007 had four [[Redundancy (engineering)|redundant]] hydraulic systems of which systems one, two, and three were damaged or destroyed. There was no evidence of damage to system four.<ref name="ICAO93-54" /> The hydraulics provided actuation of all primary and secondary flight controls (except leading edge slats in the latter) as well as landing gear retraction, extension, gear steering, and wheel braking. Each primary flight control axis received power from all four hydraulic systems.<ref>Norris and Wagner, ''Boeing''</ref> Upon missile detonation, the jumbo jet began to experience oscillations (yawing) as the dual channel yaw damper was damaged. Yawing would not have occurred if hydraulic systems one or two were fully operational. The result is that the control column did not thrust forward after missile detonation (it should have done so as the plane was on autopilot) to bring the plane down to its former altitude of {{convert|35000|ft|m}}. This failure of the autopilot to correct the rise in altitude indicates that hydraulic system number three, which operates the autopilot actuator, a system controlling the plane's elevators, was damaged or out. KAL&nbsp;007's airspeed and acceleration rate both began to decrease as the plane began to climb. At twenty seconds after the missile detonation, a click was heard in the cabin, which is identified as the "automatic pilot disconnect warning" sound. Either the pilot or co-pilot had disconnected the autopilot and was manually thrusting the control column forward to bring the plane lower. Though the autopilot had been turned off, manual mode did not begin functioning for another twenty seconds. This failure of the manual system to engage upon command indicates failure in hydraulic systems one and two. With wing flaps up, "control was reduced to the right inboard [[aileron]] and the innermost of spoiler section of each side".<ref name="ICAO93-54" />

=====Left wing=====
Contrary to Major Osipovich's statement in 1991 that he had taken off half of KAL&nbsp;007's left wing,<ref name="Illesh-Eng" /> ICAO analysis found that the wing was intact: "The interceptor pilot stated that the first missile hit near the tail, while the second missile took off half the left wing of the aircraft... The interceptor's pilot's statement that the second missile took off half of the left wing was probably incorrect. The missiles were fired at a two-second interval and would have detonated at an equal interval. The first detonated at 18:26:02&nbsp;UTC. The last radio transmissions from KE007 to Tokyo Radio were between 18:26:57 and 18:27:15&nbsp;UTC using HF [high frequency]. The HF 1 radio aerial of the aircraft was positioned in the left wing tip suggesting that the left wing tip was intact at this time. Also, the aircraft's maneuvers after the attack did not indicate extensive damage to the left wing."<ref name="ICAO93-39">ICAO '93, p. 39</ref>

=====Engines=====
The co-pilot reported to Captain Chun twice during the flight after the missiles' detonation, "Engines normal, sir."<ref name="safety">{{cite web |date=October 16, 2004 |title=CVR transcript Korean Air Flight 007 – 31 Aug 1983 |url=http://aviation-safety.net/investigation/cvr/transcripts/cvr_ke007.php |access-date=January 22, 2009 |website=Aviation Safety Network |publisher=Flight Safety Foundation}}</ref>

=====Tail section=====
The first missile was radar-controlled and [[proximity fuze]]d, and detonated {{convert|50|m|ft}} behind the aircraft. Sending fragments forward, it either severed or unraveled the crossover cable from the left inboard elevator to the right elevator.<ref name="ICAO93-55" /> This, with damage to one of the four hydraulic systems, caused KAL&nbsp;007 to ascend from {{convert|35000|to|38250|ft|m}}, at which point the autopilot was disengaged.

=====Fuselage=====
Fragments from the [[proximity fuze]]d [[air-to-air missile]] that detonated {{convert|50|m|ft}} behind the aircraft, punctured the fuselage and caused [[Uncontrolled decompression|rapid decompression]] of the pressurised cabin. The interval of 11 seconds between the sound of missile detonation picked up by the cockpit voice recorder and the sound of the alarm sounding in the cockpit enabled ICAO analysts to determine that the size of the ruptures to the pressurised fuselage was {{convert|1.75|ft2|m2}}.<ref name="ICAO93-93">ICAO '93, Information Paper 1, p. 93</ref>