Editing Keiretsu (section)

== History ==
During the [[occupation of Japan]], under the [[Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers]], General [[Douglas MacArthur]], a partially successful attempt was made to dissolve the ''[[zaibatsu]]'' in the late 1940s. Sixteen ''zaibatsu'' were targeted for complete dissolution, and 26 more for reorganization after dissolution. However, the companies formed from the dismantling of the ''zaibatsu'' were later reintegrated.  The dispersed corporations were reinterlinked through share purchases to form [[Horizontal integration|horizontally integrated]] alliances across many industries. Where possible, ''keiretsu'' companies would also supply one another, making the alliances vertically integrated, as well.  In this period, official government policy promoted the creation of robust trade corporations that could withstand heavy pressures from intensified trade competition.<ref>{{cite news |title=Japan Again Plans Huge Corporations |agency=[[Associated Press]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1954/07/17/archives/japan-again-plans-huge-corporations.html?sq=ogasawara&scp=46&st=p |newspaper=[[The New York Times]] |date= 17 July 1954 |access-date=4 July 2011}}</ref>

The major ''keiretsu'' were each centered on one bank, which lent money to the ''keiretsu'' member companies and held equity positions in the companies. Each bank had great control over the companies in the ''keiretsu'' and acted as a monitoring and emergency bail-out entity. One effect of this structure was to minimize the presence of [[hostile takeover]]s in Japan, because no entities could challenge the power of the banks.
Although the divisions between them have blurred in recent years, there have been eight major postwar ''keiretsu''.<ref name="autogenerated1">{{Cite web|title=The Keiretsu of Japan<!-- Bot generated title -->|url=http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/keiretsu.htm|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210301183653/https://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/keiretsu.htm|archive-date=1 March 2021|access-date=24 September 2011}}</ref>

[[Toyota]] is considered the biggest of the [[Vertical integration|vertically integrated]] ''keiretsu'' groups, although the company is rather considered as a "emerged" ''keiretsu'', along with [[Softbank]], [[Seven & I Holdings Co.]]<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/toyota.htm |title=The Toyota Group, the One and Only Horizontal-Vertical Keiretsu<!-- Bot generated title --> |access-date=29 February 2008 |archive-date=23 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210223180443/https://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/toyota.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref> The banks at the top are not as large as normally required, so it is actually considered to be more horizontally integrated than other ''keiretsu''.

The [[Lost Decades|Japanese recession in the 1990s]] had profound effects on the ''keiretsu''. Many of the largest banks were hit hard by bad loan portfolios and forced to merge or go out of business. This had the effect of blurring the lines between the individual ''keiretsu'': [[Sumitomo Bank]] and [[Mitsui Bank]], for instance, became [[Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation]] in 2001, while [[Sanwa Bank]] (the banker for the Hankyu-Toho Group) became part of [[Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ]].

Generally, these causes gave rise to a strong notion in the Japanese business community that the old ''keiretsu'' system was not an effective business model, and led to an overall loosening of ''keiretsu'' alliances. While they still exist, they are not as centralized or integrated as they were before the 2000s. For instance, many troubled Japanese companies are faced with a new reality in which receiving financial support from their main banks is getting harder and unlikelier than ever before. The companies include [[Sharp Corporation]] and [[Toshiba]], both iconic Japanese corporations that were forced to accept foreign investment in the aftermath of financial difficulties in the 2010s.

This changed environment, in turn, has led to a growing [[corporate acquisition]] industry in Japan, as companies are no longer able to be easily "bailed out" by their banks, as well as rising [[derivative suit|derivative litigation]] by more independent shareholders.

===United States–Japan bilateral relationship===
{{see also|Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations}}
By April 2015, [[Office of the United States Trade Representative|U.S. Trade Representative]] [[Michael Froman]] and Japanese Economy Minister [[Akira Amari]], representing the two largest economies of the 12-nation [[Trans-Pacific Partnership]], were involved in bilateral talks regarding agriculture and auto parts, the "two largest obstacles for Japan."<ref name="Bloomberg_US_Japan">{{citation |title=Japan, U.S. Seek Trade Pact Deals on Rice, Auto Parts |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-19/japan-u-s-seek-agreement-on-rice-auto-parts-for-trade-pact |work=Bloomberg |date=19 April 2015 |access-date=8 August 2015}}</ref> These bilateral accords would open each other's markets for products such as rice, pork and automobiles.<ref name="Bloomberg_US_Japan" />

During the two-day ministerial TPP negotiating session held in Singapore in May 2015, veteran US negotiator [[Wendy Cutler]] and Oe Hiroshi of the Japanese [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)|Ministry of Foreign Affairs]] held bilateral trade talks regarding one of the most contentious trade issues, automobiles. American negotiators wanted the Japanese to open their entire ''keiretsu'' structure, a cornerstone of the Japanese economy, to American automobiles. They wanted Japanese dealer networks such as Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mitsubishi, and Mazda to sell American cars.<ref name="Forbes_US_Japan">{{citation |title=Japan Auto Imports, TPP, and the Price of American 'Leadership'|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2014/05/20/japan-auto-imports-tpp-and-the-price-of-american-leadership/ |date=20 May 2015 |access-date=8 August 2015 |author=Stephen Harner |work=Forbes}}</ref> The successful conclusion of these bilateral talks was necessary before the other ten TPP members could complete the trade deal.<ref name="Bloomberg_US_Japan" />

===Outside Japan===
The ''keiretsu'' model is fairly unique to Japan. However, many diversified non-Japanese businesses groups have been described as ''keiretsu'', such as the [[Virgin Group]] (UK), [[Tata Group]] (India),<ref>{{cite book|title=Modern Organisational Governance|page=77|first=David|last= Crowther|year=2017|publisher=Emerald Publishing Limited}}</ref> the Colombian [[Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño]] and the Venezuelan [[Grupo Cisneros]].

The automotive and banking industries have created broad cross-ownership networks across nations, but the national companies are normally independently managed. Banks cited as being central to ''keiretsu''-like systems include [[Deutsche Bank]] and some ''keiretsu''-like systems, generally referred to as [[trust (business)|trusts]], were created by investment banks in the United States such as [[JP Morgan]] and [[Mellon Financial]]/[[Mellon family]] beginning in the late 19th century (roughly the same period they were created in Japan), but they were largely curtailed through [[competition law|anti-trust]] legislation championed by [[Theodore Roosevelt]] in the early part of the 20th century. A form of ''keiretsu'' can also be found in the cross-shareholdings of the large media companies throughout most developed nations.<ref>See ''[[Columbia Journalism Review]]''{{-'}}s [https://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/ "Who Owns What"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070423133215/https://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/ |date=23 April 2007 }} website or [http://www.theyrule.net/ They Rule].</ref> These are largely designed to link content producers to particular distribution channels, and larger content projects, such as expensive movies, are often incorporated with ownership spread across a number of larger companies.