Editing Irredentism (section)

=== Power and economy ===
Various accounts stress the role of power and economic benefits as reasons for irredentism. [[Realism (international relations)|Realist]] explanations focus on the power balance between the irredentist state and the target state: the more this power balance shifts in favor of the irredentist state, the more likely violent conflicts become. A key factor in this regard is also the reaction of the [[international community]], i.e. whether irredentist claims are tolerated or rejected.{{sfn|Ambrosio|2011|pp=1346–1348|loc=irredentism}} Irredentism can be used as a tool or pretext to increase the parent state's power.{{sfn|Griffiths|O'Callaghan|Roach|2008|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9vU7xX4eNf4C&pg=PA175 175–177]}}{{sfn|Orabator|1981|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/41857111 166–181]}} Rational choice theories study how irredentism is caused by decision-making processes of certain groups within a state. In this view, irredentism is a tool used by elites to secure their political interests. They do so by appealing to popular nationalist sentiments. This can be used, for example, to gain public support against political rivals or to divert attention away from domestic problems.{{sfn|Ambrosio|2011|pp=1346–1348|loc=irredentism}}{{sfn|Siroky|Hale|2017|p=4}}

Other explanations focus on economic factors. For example, larger states enjoy advantages that come with having an increased market and decreased [[per capita]] cost of defense. However, there are also disadvantages to having a bigger state, such as the challenges that come with accommodating a wider range of citizens' [[preference]]s.{{sfn|Siroky|Hale|2017|pp=1–3}}{{sfn|Bain|2008|loc=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/economics-business-and-labor/businesses-and-occupations/economies-scale Economies of Scale]}} Based on these lines of thought, it has been argued that states are more likely to advocate irredentist claims if the [[enclave]] is a relatively rich territory.{{sfn|Orabator|1981|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/41857111 166–181]}}{{sfn|Siroky|Hale|2017|pp=1–3}}