Editing Imre Lakatos (section)

===Research programmes===<!-- This section is linked from [[Quasi-empiricism in mathematics]] -->
Lakatos's second major contribution to the philosophy of science was his model of the "research programme",<ref>Lakatos, Imre. (1970). "Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes". In: Lakatos, Musgrave eds. (1970), pp. 91–195.</ref> which he formulated in an attempt to resolve the perceived conflict between [[Karl Popper|Popper's]] [[falsifiability|falsificationism]] and the revolutionary structure of science described by [[Thomas Samuel Kuhn|Kuhn]]. Popper's standard of falsificationism was widely taken to imply that a theory should be abandoned as soon as any evidence appears to challenge it, while Kuhn's descriptions of scientific activity were taken to imply that science is most fruitful during periods in which popular, or "normal", theories are supported despite known anomalies. Lakatos's model of the research programme aims to combine Popper's adherence to empirical validity with Kuhn's appreciation for conventional consistency.

A Lakatosian research programme<ref>Bruce J. Caldwell (1991) "[http://public.econ.duke.edu/~bjc18/docs/MSRP%20in%20Economics.pdf The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Criticisms and Conjectures]" in G. K. Shaw ed. (1991) ''Economics, Culture, and Education: Essays in Honor of Mark Blaug''. Aldershot: Elgar, 1991 pp. 95–107.</ref> is based on a ''hard core'' of theoretical assumptions that cannot be abandoned or altered without abandoning the programme altogether. More modest and specific theories that are formulated in order to explain evidence that threatens the "hard core" are termed ''auxiliary hypotheses''. Auxiliary hypotheses are considered expendable by the adherents of the research programme—they may be altered or abandoned as empirical discoveries require in order to "protect" the "hard core". Whereas Popper was generally read as hostile toward such {{lang|la|ad hoc}} theoretical amendments, Lakatos argued that they can be ''progressive'', i.e. productive, when they enhance the programme's explanatory and/or predictive power, and that they are at least permissible until some better system of theories is devised and the research programme is replaced entirely. The difference between a ''progressive'' and a ''degenerative'' research programme lies, for Lakatos, in whether the recent changes to its auxiliary hypotheses have achieved this greater explanatory/predictive power or whether they have been made simply out of the necessity of offering some response in the face of new and troublesome evidence. A degenerative research programme indicates that a new and more progressive system of theories should be sought to replace the currently prevailing one, but until such a system of theories can be conceived of and agreed upon, abandonment of the current one would only further weaken our explanatory power and was therefore unacceptable for Lakatos. Lakatos's primary example of a research programme that had been successful in its time and then progressively replaced is that founded by [[Isaac Newton]], with his three [[Newton's laws of motion|laws of motion]] forming the "hard core".

The Lakatosian research programme deliberately provides a framework within which research can be conducted on the basis of "first principles" (the "hard core"), which are shared by those involved in the research programme and accepted for the purpose of that research without further proof or debate. In this regard, it is similar to Kuhn's notion of a paradigm. Lakatos sought to replace Kuhn's paradigm, guided by an irrational "psychology of discovery", with a research programme no less coherent or consistent, yet guided by Popper's objectively valid [[The Logic of Scientific Discovery|logic of discovery]].

Lakatos was following [[Pierre Duhem]]'s idea that one can always protect a cherished theory (or part of one) from hostile evidence by redirecting the criticism toward other theories or parts thereof. (See ''[[Confirmation holism]]'' and [[Duhem–Quine thesis]]). This aspect of falsification had been acknowledged by Popper.

[[Karl Popper|Popper]]'s theory, falsificationism, proposed that scientists put forward theories and that nature "shouts NO" in the form of an inconsistent observation. According to Popper, it is irrational for scientists to maintain their theories in the face of nature's rejection, as Kuhn had described them doing. For Lakatos, however, "It is not that we propose a theory and Nature may shout NO; rather, we propose a maze of theories, and nature may shout INCONSISTENT".<ref>Lakatos, Musgrave eds. (1970), p. 130.</ref> The continued adherence to a programme's "hard core", augmented with adaptable auxiliary hypotheses, reflects Lakatos's less strict standard of falsificationism.

Lakatos saw himself as merely extending Popper's ideas, which changed over time and were interpreted by many in conflicting ways. In his 1968 article "Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes",<ref name=La68>Lakatos, Imre. (1968). "Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes". ''Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society'' '''69'''(1):149–186 (1968).</ref> Lakatos contrasted ''Popper0'', the "naive falsificationist" who demanded unconditional rejection of any theory in the face of any anomaly (an interpretation Lakatos saw as erroneous but that he nevertheless referred to often); ''Popper1'', the more nuanced and conservatively interpreted philosopher; and ''Popper2'', the "sophisticated methodological falsificationist" that Lakatos claims is the logical extension of the correctly interpreted ideas of ''Popper1'' (and who is therefore essentially Lakatos himself). It is, therefore, very difficult to determine which ideas and arguments concerning the research programme should be credited to whom.

While Lakatos dubbed his theory "sophisticated methodological falsificationism", it is not "methodological" in the strict sense of asserting universal methodological rules by which all scientific research must abide. Rather, it is methodological only in that theories are only abandoned according to a methodical progression from worse theories to better theories—a stipulation overlooked by what Lakatos terms "dogmatic falsificationism". Methodological assertions in the strict sense, pertaining to which methods are valid and which are invalid, are, themselves, contained within the research programmes that choose to adhere to them, and should be judged according to whether the research programmes that adhere to them prove progressive or degenerative. Lakatos divided these "methodological rules" within a research programme into its "negative heuristics", i.e., what research methods and approaches to avoid, and its "positive heuristics", i.e., what research methods and approaches to prefer. While the "negative heuristic" protects the hard core, the "positive heuristic" directs the modification of the hard core and auxiliary hypotheses in a general direction.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Great readings in clinical science: essential selections for mental health professionals |date=2012 |publisher=Pearson |others=Lilienfeld, Scott O., 1960–, O'Donohue, William T. |isbn=9780205698035 |location=Boston |oclc=720560483}}</ref>

Lakatos claimed that not all changes of the auxiliary hypotheses of a research programme (which he calls "problem shifts") are equally productive or acceptable. He took the view that these "problem shifts" should be evaluated not just by their ability to defend the "hard core" by explaining apparent anomalies, but also by their ability to produce new facts, in the form of predictions or additional explanations.<ref>Theoretical progressiveness is if the new theory has more empirical content than the old. Empirical progressiveness is if some of this content is corroborated. (Lakatos ed., 1970, p. 118).</ref> Adjustments that accomplish nothing more than the maintenance of the "hard core" mark the research programme as degenerative.

Lakatos's model provides for the possibility of a research programme that is not only continued in the presence of troublesome anomalies but that remains progressive despite them. For Lakatos, it is essentially necessary to continue on with a theory that we basically know cannot be completely true, and it is even possible to make scientific progress in doing so, as long as we remain receptive to a better research programme that may eventually be conceived of. In this sense, it is, for Lakatos, an acknowledged misnomer to refer to "falsification" or "refutation", when it is not the truth or falsity of a theory that is solely determining whether we consider it "falsified", but also the availability of a ''less false'' theory. A theory cannot be rightfully "falsified", according to Lakatos, until it is superseded by a better (i.e. more progressive) research programme. This is what he says is happening in the historical periods Kuhn describes as revolutions and what makes them rational as opposed to mere leaps of faith or periods of deranged social psychology, as Kuhn argued.