Editing Hylomorphism (section)

=== Intellect ===
{{See also|Nous|Active intellect|Passive intellect}}
Aristotle says that the intellect (''[[nous]]''), the ability to think, has no bodily organ (in contrast with other psychological abilities, such as sense-perception and imagination).<ref>''On the Soul'' 429a26-27</ref> Aristotle distinguishes between two types of intellect.<ref>''On the Soul'' 15-25</ref> These are traditionally called the "[[passive intellect]]" and the "[[Active intellect|active (or agent) intellect]]".<ref>Robinson 50</ref> He says that the  "[[Active intellect|active (or agent) intellect]]" is not mixed with the body<ref>''On the Soul'' 429a24-25</ref> and suggests that it can exist apart from it.<ref>''On the Soul'' 413b24-26, 429b6</ref> Hence, scholars face the challenge of explaining the relationship between the intellect and the body in Aristotle.

According to one interpretation, a person's ability to think (unlike his other psychological abilities) belongs to some incorporeal organ distinct from his body.<ref>Caston, "Aristotle's Psychology" 337</ref> This would amount to a form of dualism.<ref>Caston, "Aristotle's Psychology" 337</ref> However, according to some scholars, it would not be a full-fledged [[Mind-body dualism#Substance dualism|Cartesian dualism]].<ref>Shields, "Some Recent Approaches" 165</ref> This interpretation creates what Robert Pasnau has called the "mind-soul problem" within Aristotelian hylomorphism: if the intellect belongs to an entity distinct from the body, and the soul is the form of the body, then how is the intellect part of the soul?<ref>Pasnau 160</ref>

Another interpretation rests on the distinction between the passive intellect and the agent intellect. According to this interpretation, the passive intellect is a property of the body, while the agent intellect is a substance distinct from the body.<ref>McEvilley 534</ref><ref>Vella 110</ref> Some proponents of this interpretation think that each person has his own agent intellect, which presumably separates from the body at death.<ref>Caston, "Aristotle's Two Intellects" 207</ref><ref>Vella 110</ref> Others interpret the agent intellect as a single divine being, perhaps the [[unmoved mover]], Aristotle's God.<ref>Caston, "Aristotle's Psychology" 339</ref><ref>Caston, "Aristotle's Two Intellects" 199</ref>

A third interpretation<ref>Shields, "Soul as Subject"</ref> relies on the theory that an individual form is capable of having properties of its own.<ref>Shields, "Soul as Subject" 142</ref> According to this interpretation, the soul is a property of the body, but the ability to think is a property of the soul itself, not of the body. If that is the case, then the soul is the body's form and yet thinking need not involve any bodily organ.<ref>Shields, "Soul as Subject" 145</ref>