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===Landings=== {{Further|Battle of Tulagi and GavutuโTanambogo}} [[File:Guadalcanal Aug 7 landings.svg|thumb|Routes of Allied amphibious forces for landings on Guadalcanal and Tulagi, 7 August 1942]] Bad weather allowed the Allied expeditionary force to arrive unseen by the Japanese on the night of 6 August and morning of 7 August, taking the defenders by surprise. This is occasionally referred to the "Midnight Raid on Guadalcanal".<ref>McGee, p. 21, Bullard, pp. 125โ126</ref> A Japanese patrol aircraft from Tulagi had searched the general area that the Allied invasion fleet was moving through, but was unable to spot the Allied fleet due to severe storms and heavy clouds.<ref>Bullard; Masaichiro Miyagawa, a Japanese soldier on Tanambogo who was captured by American forces (one of only four of the 3,000 Japanese to survive the battle), wrote that every day four Japanese patrol planes were sent out from Florida Island in fan shape pattern, flying northeast, east, southeast and south of Florida Island to look for enemy activity. Because of poor weather conditions, he said the invading fleet escaped detection, and that if the invasion fleet had been spotted a day or two prior to 7 August, the Allied convoy, with its slow moving transports, probably would have been destroyed. ''Guadalcanal Echoes'', Volume 21, No. 1 Winter 2009/2010 Edition, p. 8 (Publication of the Guadalcanal Campaign Veterans, [American veterans group])</ref> The landing force split into two groups, with one group assaulting Guadalcanal and the other Tulagi, Florida, and other nearby islands.<ref>Frank, p. 60; Jersey, p. 95. The landing force, designated Task Force 62, included six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, 15 destroyers, 13 transports, six cargo ships, four destroyer transports, and five minesweepers.</ref> Allied warships bombarded the invasion beaches, while U.S. carrier aircraft bombed Japanese positions on the target islands and destroyed 15 Japanese [[seaplane]]s at their base near Tulagi.<ref>Hammel, ''Carrier Clash'', pp. 46โ47; Lundstrom, p. 38.</ref> Tulagi and two nearby small islands, [[Gavutu]] and [[Tanambogo]], were assaulted by 3,000 U.S. Marines under the command of [[Brigadier General]] [[William Rupertus]].<ref>Frank p. 51</ref> The 886 IJN personnel manning the naval and seaplane bases on the three islands fiercely resisted the Marine landings.<ref>Frank, p. 50. The IJN personnel included Japanese and Korean construction specialists as well as trained combat troops.</ref> With some difficulty, the Marines secured all three islands: Tulagi on 8 August, and Gavutu and Tanambogo by 9 August.<ref>Shaw, pp. 8โ9; McGee, pp. 32โ34.</ref> The Japanese defenders were killed almost to the last man,<ref>Frank, p. 79. Approximately 80 Japanese personnel escaped to Florida Island, where they were found and killed by Marine patrols over the next two months.</ref> and the Marines suffered 248 casualties.<ref>{{cite web |title=Combat Narratives Solomon Islands Campaign: I The Landing in the Solomons |url=https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/browse-by-topic/Solomons%20I.pdf |access-date=4 March 2023 |website=Naval History and Heritage Command |page=77 |ref=Combat Narrative}}</ref> [[File:GuadLandingsLunga.jpg|thumb|left|upright|U.S. Marines debark from [[LCPL|LCP(L)s]] onto Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942.]] In contrast to Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo, the landings on Guadalcanal encountered much less resistance. At 09:10 on 7 August, Vandegrift and 11,000 U.S. Marines came ashore on Guadalcanal between Koli Point and Lunga Point. Advancing towards Lunga Point, they encountered scant Japanese resistance and secured the airfield by 16:00 on 8 August. The Japanese naval construction units and combat troops, under the command of Captain [[Tei Monzen|Kanae Monzen]], had panicked after coming under naval bombardment and aerial bombing, and had abandoned the airfield and fled about {{convert|3|mi|km|0}} west to the [[Matanikau River]] and Point Cruz area. Japanese troops left behind food, supplies, intact construction equipment and vehicles, and 13 dead at the airfield and surrounding area.<ref>Jersey, pp. 113โ115, 190, 350; Morison, ''The Struggle for Guadalcanal'' p. 15; and Frank, pp. 61โ62, 81.</ref> During the landing operations on 7 and 8 August, Rabaul-based Japanese naval aircraft under the command of [[Yamada Sadayoshi]] attacked the Allied amphibious forces several times, setting on fire the transport {{USS|George F. Elliott|AP-13|6}}, which sank two days later, and heavily damaging the destroyer {{USS|Jarvis|DD-393|6}}.<ref>Loxton pp. 90โ103</ref> Over the course of two days of air attacks, Japanese air units lost 36 aircraft, while the U.S. lost 19 (including 14 carrier aircraft), both in combat and to accidents.<ref>Frank p. 80</ref> After these aerial clashes, Fletcher became concerned about the unexpectedly high losses to his carrier fighter aircraft strength, anxious about the threat to his carriers from further Japanese air attacks, and worried about his ships' remaining fuel supply. Fletcher withdrew from the Solomon Islands area with his carrier task force on the evening of 8 August.<ref>Hammel, ''Carrier Clash'', pp. 99โ100; Loxton, pp. 104โ105. Loxton, Frank p. 94; and Morison (''The Struggle for Guadalcanal'' p. 28) contend Fletcher's fuel situation was not at all critical, but Fletcher implied it was in order to provide further justification for his withdrawal from the battle area.</ref> In response to the loss of carrier-based air cover, Turner decided to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal, even though less than half of the supplies and heavy equipment needed by the troops ashore had been unloaded.<ref>Hammel, ''Carrier Clash'', p. 100</ref> Turner planned to unload as many supplies as possible on Guadalcanal and Tulagi throughout the night of 8 August, and then depart with his ships early on 9 August.<ref>Morison ''The Struggle for Guadalcanal'' p. 31</ref>
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