Editing Georgy Zhukov (section)

== World War II ==
=== Before the War ===
==== Pre-war military exercises ====
[[File:Жуков и Тимошенко, 1940 год.jpg|thumb|upright|left|Zhukov and [[Semyon Timoshenko]] in 1940]]
In the autumn of 1940, Zhukov started preparing plans for the [[military exercise]] concerning the defence of the Western border of the Soviet Union. It had been pushed further to the west after the Soviet Union annexed eastern Poland and the Baltic republics.<ref>{{cite book|chapter = Folio 37977. inventory 5, file 564, sheets 32–34|title = Central State Archive of the Red Army|publisher = [[TsAMO RF|TsGAKA]]}}</ref> In his memoirs, Zhukov reports that in this exercise, he commanded the Western or Blue forces—the supposed invasion troops—and his opponent was Colonel General [[Dmitry Pavlov (general)|Dmitry Pavlov]], the commander of the Eastern or Red forces—the supposed Soviet troops. He noted that Blue had 60&nbsp;divisions, while Red had 50&nbsp;divisions. Zhukov describes the exercise as being similar to events that later took place during the German invasion.{{sfn|Zhukov|2002|pp=224–225}}

:''"In this military exercise, I commanded Blue forces representing the Germans, while Pavlov, the commander of Western Military District, commanded the Red forces representing our army [...] After knowing the original documents and the real amount of German forces, when commanding the Blue Forces, I had the attacks developed into three directions, that in the following event the Germans also attacked us in the same manners. The main strikes of us that time was also similar to the main strikes of the Germans later. The army groups built was also nearly similar to the army groups that the Germans formed during the war. [...] Comrade [Stalin] asked why the Blue forces was so powerful, why the original documents of the military exercise allocated too many large forces for the German. He was replied that such forces corresponded to the German capability and the real calculation about the potential forces that the German could unleash after they managed to achieve great superiority on the main axes. That sufficiently showed why the Blue forces could make strong advances during the military exercise.''"<ref>Konstantin Simonov. Notes about the biography of Zhukov. Translated to Vietnamese by Trần Anh Tuấn and published in Vietnam by Publisher of the People's Army in 2004. [https://sachcugiadinh.com/but-ky-ve-tieu-su-giucop/]</ref>

Russian historian Bobylev noted that the details of the exercises were reported differently by the various participants who published memoirs.<ref name="Bobylev">П. Н. БОБЫЛЕВ "Репетиция катастрофы" // "Военно-исторический журнал" № 7, 8, 1993 г. [http://rkka.ru/analys/kshu/main.htm]</ref> He said that there were two exercises; one from 2 to 6 January 1941, for the North-West direction; another from 8 to 11 January, for the South-West direction.<ref name="Bobylev"/> During the first, Western forces attacked Eastern forces on 15&nbsp;July, but the Eastern forces counterattacked and, by 1 August, reached the original border.<ref name="Bobylev"/>

At the time, the Eastern forces had a numerical advantage: 51 infantry divisions against 41; 8,811&nbsp;tanks against 3,512—with the exception of anti-tank guns.<ref name="Bobylev"/> Bobylev describes how by the end of the exercise, the Eastern forces did not manage to surround and destroy the Western forces. In their turn, the Western forces threatened to surround the Eastern forces.<ref name="Bobylev"/> The same historian reported that the second game was won by the Easterners, meaning that on the whole, both games were won by the side commanded by Zhukov.<ref name="Bobylev"/> However, he noted that the games had a serious disadvantage since they did not consider an initial attack by Western forces, but only an attack by Eastern forces from the initial border.<ref name="Bobylev"/>

According to Marshal [[Aleksandr Vasilevsky]], the war-game defeat of Pavlov's Red Troops against Zhukov was not widely known. The victory of Zhukov's Blue Troops was widely publicized, which created a popular illusion of easy success for a preemptive offensive.{{sfn|Vasilevsky|1973|p=24}} On 1&nbsp;February 1941, Zhukov became chief of the Red Army's [[General Staff]].{{sfn|Zhukov|2002|p=205}} He was also elected a candidate member of the [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] In February 1941, and was appointed a Deputy People's Commissar for Defence in March.

==== Soviet offensive controversy ====
{{see also|Soviet offensive plans controversy}}
From 2 February 1941, as the chief of the general staff, and Deputy Minister of Defense, Zhukov was said to take part in drawing up the "Strategic plan for deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of war with Germany and its allies."<ref>A. M. Vasilevsky (May 1941) {{cite web|url=http://www.tuad.nsk.ru/~history/Russia/USSR/1936-1941/soobr.htm |title=Соображения по плану стратегического развёртывания сил Советского Союза на случай войны с Германией и её союзниками |access-date=4 June 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071219152133/http://www.tuad.nsk.ru/~history/Russia/USSR/1936-1941/soobr.htm |archive-date=19 December 2007 }}. tuad.nsk.ru</ref> The plan was completed no later than 15 May 1941, according to a dated document found in the Soviet archives after they were declassified in the 1990s. Some researchers, such as [[Victor Suvorov]], have theorized that on 14 May, Soviet People's Commissar of Defense [[Semyon Timoshenko]] and General Zhukov presented these plans to Stalin for a preemptive attack against Germany through Southern Poland.

Soviet forces would occupy the [[Vistula]] Border and continue to [[Katowice]] or even [[Berlin]]—should the main German armies retreat—or the Baltic coast, should German forces not retreat and be forced to protect Poland and [[East Prussia]]. The attacking Soviets were supposed to reach [[Siedlce]], [[Dęblin]], and then capture [[Warsaw]] before penetrating toward the southwest and imposing final defeat at [[Lublin]].<ref>[[Viktor Suvorov]] (2006). [http://tapirr.com/texts/history/suvorov/pravda/nevezhin.htm Стратегические замыслы Сталина накануне 22 июня 1941 года], in ''Правда Виктора Суворова: переписывая историю Второй мировой'', Moscow: Yauza</ref>

Historians do not have the original documents that could verify the existence of such a plan, and there is no evidence that Stalin accepted it. In a transcript of an interview on 26 May 1965, Zhukov said that Stalin did not approve the plan. But Zhukov did not clarify whether execution was attempted. {{As of|1999}}, no other approved plan for a Soviet attack had been found.<ref>[[Mikhail Meltyukhov|Mikhail I. Meltyukhov]] (1999) ''Упущенный шанс Сталина. Советский Союз и борьба за Европу, 1939–1941''. Moscow</ref>

On 10 June 1941, Zhukov sent a message to the Military Council of the Kiev Special Military District, after someone, most likely the commander of the Kiev district, [[Mikhail Kirponos]], had ordered troops on the border to occupy forward positions. Zhukov ordered: "Such action could provoke the Germans into armed confrontation fraught with all sorts of consequences. Revoke this order immediately and report who, specifically, gave such an unauthorised order." On 11 June, he sent a telegram saying that his immediate superior, Timoshenko, had ordered that they were to report back by 16 June confirming that the troops had been withdrawn from their forward positions." According to the historian David E. Murphy, "the action by Timoshenko and Zhukov must have been initiated at the request of Stalin."<ref>{{cite book |last=Murphy |first=David E. |title=What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |location=New Haven, CT |date=2005 |pages=135–136 |isbn=0-300-10780-3}}</ref>

[[David Glantz]] and [[Jonathan House]], American scholars of the Red Army, argue that "the Soviet Union was not ready for war in June 1941, nor did it intend, as some have contended, to launch a preventative war."{{sfn|Uldricks|1999|p=629}} [[Gerhard Weinberg]], a scholar of Nazi foreign policy, supports their view, arguing that [[Adolf Hitler]]'s decision to launch ''[[Operation Barbarossa]]'' was not because of a sense of urgent foreboding, but rather from a "purposeful determination" and he had started his planning for the invasion well in advance of the summer of 1941{{sfn|Uldricks|1999|pp=629–630}}

=== The Eastern front ===
==== Germany invades the Soviet Union ====
[[File:RIAN archive 2410 Marshal Zhukov speaking.jpg|thumb|upright|Zhukov speaking in 1941]]
On 22 June 1941, Germany launched [[Operation Barbarossa]], an invasion of the Soviet Union. On the same day, Zhukov responded by signing the "Directive of Peoples' Commissariat of Defence No. 3", which ordered an all-out counteroffensive by Red Army forces. He commanded the troops to "encircle and destroy [the] enemy grouping near [[Suwałki]] and to seize the Suwałki region by the evening of 24 June" and "to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping invading in [the] Vladimir-Volynia and Brody direction" and even "to seize the [[Lublin]] region by the evening of 24 June".<ref>{{Cite web|title=Operation Barbarossa|url=https://codenames.info/operation/barbarossa/|last=Chant|first=Christopher|date=2020|access-date=24 May 2020}}</ref> This manoeuvre failed and disorganized Red Army units were destroyed by the Wehrmacht.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kashuba|first=Steven|title=Destination Gulag|publisher=Trafford Publishing|year=2013|isbn=978-1-4669-8312-0|location=Bloomington|pages=260}}</ref>  Furthermore the subsequent [[Battle of Kiev (1941)|Battle of Kiev]] in September, where over 600,000 Soviet troops were captured or killed, lowered his standing with Stalin. Zhukov subsequently claimed that he was forced by [[Joseph Stalin]] to sign the directive, supposedly written by [[Aleksandr Vasilevsky]],<ref>P. Ya. Mezhiritzky (2002), ''Reading Marshal Zhukov'', Philadelphia: Libas Consulting, chapter 32.</ref> despite the reservations that he raised.{{sfn|Zhukov|2003|p=269}}

When Stalin arrived unannounced at command headquarters on 29 June, demanding to know why he was not being told what was happening at the front, Zhukov courageously told him: "Comrade Stalin, our duty is first of all to help the front commanders and only then to inform you." But when he had to admit that they lost contact with the front commanders in Belarus, Stalin lost his temper and called him "useless".<ref>{{cite book |last1=Pleshakov |first1=Constantine |title=Stalin's Folly: The Secret History of the German Invasion of Russia, June 1941 |date=2005 |publisher=Weidenfeld & Nicolson |location=London |isbn=978-0-297-84626-0 |page=214}}</ref>

On 29 July, Zhukov was removed from his post of chief of the general staff. In his memoirs he gives his suggested abandoning of [[Kiev]] to avoid an encirclement as a reason for it.{{sfn|Zhukov|2003|p=353}} On the next day the decision was made official and he was appointed the commander of the [[Reserve Front]].{{sfn|Zhukov|2003|p=353}} There he oversaw the [[Yelnya offensive]], delivering the Red Army's first victory over the Germans. On 10 September, Zhukov was made the commander of the [[Leningrad Front]].{{sfn|Zhukov|2003|p=382}} There he oversaw the [[Siege of Leningrad|defense of the city]].

On 6 October, Zhukov was appointed the representative of [[Stavka]] for the [[Reserve Front|Reserve]] and [[Western Front (Soviet Union)|Western Fronts]].{{sfn|Zhukov|2003|p=8}} On 10 October, those fronts were merged into the Western Front under Zhukov's command.{{sfn|Zhukov|2003|p=16}} This front then participated in the [[Battle of Moscow]] and several [[Battles of Rzhev]].

In late August 1942, Zhukov was made deputy commander in chief, subordinate only to Stalin, and sent to the southwestern front to take charge of the [[defence of Stalingrad]].{{sfn|Chaney|1996|pp=212–213}}<ref>{{cite magazine |last=Taylor |first=Blaine |date=July 2003 |title=Marshal Georgi Zhukov: Hero of the Soviet Union |url=https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/marshal-georgi-zhukov-hero-of-the-soviet-union/ |magazine=WWII History |location=McLean, Virginia |publisher=Warfare History Network |access-date=17 February 2025}}</ref> He and Vasilevsky later planned the [[Operation Uranus|Stalingrad counteroffensive]].{{sfn|Chaney|1996|p=224}}{{additional citations needed|date=February 2025}} In November, Zhukov was sent to coordinate the Western Front and the [[Kalinin Front]] during [[Operation Mars]]. In January 1943, he—together with [[Kliment Voroshilov]]—coordinated the actions of the [[Leningrad Front|Leningrad]] and [[Volkhov Front]]s and the [[Baltic Fleet]] in [[Operation Iskra]].<ref name="Gareev_Zhukov_1996">Махмут А. Гареев ''Маршал Жуков. Величие и уникальность полководческого искусства''. М.: – Уфа, 1996.</ref> On January 18, 1943, Zhukov was promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Ziemke |first1=Earl Frederick |last2=Bauer |first2=Magna E. |date=1987 |title=Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yjOxtqM8768C&pg=PA507 |location=Washington, DC |publisher=Center of Military History, United States Army |page=507 |isbn=978-0-1608-0081-8 |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref>

==== Battle of Kursk ====

[[File:Жуков и Конев.jpg|thumb|left|Zhukov and [[Ivan Konev]] during the Battle of Kursk, 1943]]
Zhukov was a [[Stavka]] coordinator at the [[battle of Kursk]] in July 1943. He was considered the main architect of the Soviet victory together with Vasilevsky.<ref>{{cite book |last=Roberts |first=Geoffrey |title=Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 |publisher=Yale University Press |location=New Haven, CT |date=2006 |pages=159 |isbn=0-300-11204-1}}</ref> According to Zhukov's memoirs, he played a central role in the planning of the battle and the hugely successful offensive that followed. Commander of the Central Front [[Konstantin Rokossovsky]], said, however, that the planning and decisions for the Battle of Kursk were made without Zhukov, that he only arrived just before the battle, made no decisions and left soon afterward, and that Zhukov exaggerated his role.<ref name="ReferenceB">Военно-исторический журнал, 1992 N3 p.&nbsp;31.</ref> A sense of the nature of the beginning of Rokossovsky's famous World War II rivalry with Zhukov can be gathered from reading Rokossovsky's comments in an official report on Zhukov's character:<ref>{{cite book|last=Kokoshin|first=Andreĭ Afanas'evich|title=Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917–1991|year=1998|publisher=MIT Press|page=43}}</ref>

<blockquote>Has a strong will. Decisive and firm. Often demonstrates initiative and skillfully applies it. Disciplined. Demanding and persistent in his demands. A somewhat ungracious and not sufficiently sympathetic person. Rather stubborn. Painfully proud. In professional terms well trained. Broadly experienced as a military leader... Absolutely cannot be used in staff or teaching jobs because constitutionally he hates them.</blockquote>

From 12 February 1944, Zhukov coordinated the actions of the [[1st Ukrainian Front|1st Ukrainian]] and [[2nd Ukrainian Front|2nd Ukrainian]] Fronts.{{sfn|Zhukov|2003|p=205}} On 1 March, Zhukov was appointed the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front until early May following the ambush of [[Nikolai Vatutin]], its commander, by the anti-Soviet [[Ukrainian Insurgent Army]] near [[Ostroh]].{{sfn|Zhukov|2003|pp=209–217}} During the Soviet offensive named [[Operation Bagration]], Zhukov coordinated the [[1st Belorussian Front|1st Belorussian]] and [[2nd Belorussian Front|2nd Belorussian]] Fronts, and later the 1st Ukrainian Front as well.{{sfn|Zhukov|2003|p=222}} On 23 August, Zhukov was sent to the [[3rd Ukrainian Front]] to prepare for the advance into Bulgaria.{{sfn|Zhukov|2003|p=246}}

=== Surrender of Germany ===
==== March on Berlin ====
On 16 November, he became commander of the 1st Belorussian Front which took part in the [[Vistula–Oder offensive]] and the [[Battle of Berlin]].{{sfn|Zhukov|2003|p=259}} He called on his troops to "remember our brothers and sisters, our mothers and fathers, our wives and children tortured to death by Germans&nbsp;... We shall exact a brutal revenge for everything". More than 20&nbsp;million Soviet soldiers and civilians died as a result of the war. In a reprise of atrocities committed by German soldiers against Soviet civilians in the eastward advance into Soviet territory during Operation Barbarossa, the westward march by Soviet forces was marked by brutality towards German civilians, which included looting, burning and systematic rapes.<ref>William I. Hitchcock, ''The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe'' (2008) pp.&nbsp;160–161.</ref>

Zhukov was chosen to personally accept the [[German Instrument of Surrender]] in Berlin.{{sfn|Zhukov|2003|p=332}}