Editing George C. Marshall (section)

==World War II==
[[File:Winston Churchill As Prime Minister 1940-1945 H12744.jpg|thumb|Marshall standing behind President Roosevelt and British prime minister [[Winston Churchill]] aboard the British battleship {{HMS|Prince of Wales|53|6}} on 10 August 1941]]
As Chief of Staff, Marshall organized the largest military expansion in American history, inheriting an outmoded, poorly equipped army of 189,000 men and, partly drawing from his experience teaching and developing techniques of modern warfare as an instructor at the [[United States Army War College|Army War College]], coordinated the large-scale expansion and modernization of the U.S. Army. Under his name were produced significant works of doctrine such as [[Field Manual 100-5]]. During his first week in office, he advised Roosevelt to issue an [[executive order]] expanding the [[Regular Army (United States)|Regular Army]] to 227,000 troops and the [[National Guard (United States)|National Guard]] to 235,000 reservists, although the President could not immediately act because the [[United States Congress]] still favored [[United States non-interventionism|isolationism]].<ref name=":1">{{Harvp|Roberts|2009|p=32-34}}</ref>

Marshall's efforts to expand the [[United States Armed Forces]] began to have more success after the [[Axis powers]] conquered most of [[Western Europe]] in the [[Battle of France]]. Beginning in July 1940, he was greatly assisted in this effort by newly appointed Secretary of War Henry Stimson, whom Marshall would gradually displace as the most significant leader of the U.S. military apparatus in a deviation from the United States' tradition of [[civilian control of the military]].<ref name=":1" /> Though he had never actually led troops in combat, Marshall was a skilled organizer with a talent for inspiring other officers.{{sfn|Bland|2020|pp=27–51}} Many of the American generals who were given top commands during the war were either picked or recommended by Marshall, including [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], [[Jacob L. Devers]], [[George S. Patton]], [[Terry de la Mesa Allen Sr.]], [[Lloyd Fredendall]], [[Lesley J. McNair]], [[Mark Wayne Clark]] and [[Omar Bradley]].{{sfn|Ossad|2003}}

===Expands military force fortyfold===
[[File:Infantry in battle cover.gif|thumb|upright|Cover to the book ''Infantry in Battle'', the World War II officer's guide to infantry combat operations. Marshall directed production of the book, which is still used as a reference today]]
Faced with the necessity of turning former civilians into an army of over eight million soldiers by 1942 (a fortyfold increase within three years), Marshall directed McNair as commander of [[Army Ground Forces]] to focus efforts on rapidly producing large numbers of soldiers. With the exception of airborne forces, Marshall approved McNair's concept of an abbreviated training schedule for men entering Army land forces training, particularly in regard to basic infantry skills, weapons proficiency, and combat tactics.{{sfn|Ambrose|1997|pp=271–84}}{{sfn|Keast|1945}} At the time, most U.S. commanders at lower levels had little or no combat experience of any kind. Without the input of experienced British or Allied combat officers on the nature of modern warfare and enemy tactics, many resorted to formulaic training methods emphasizing static defense and orderly large-scale advances by motorized convoys over improved roads.{{sfn|George|1981|pp= 13–21}} In consequence, Army forces deploying to Africa in [[Operation Torch]] suffered serious initial reverses when they encountered German armored units in Africa in the [[Battle of Kasserine Pass]] and other major battles.{{sfn|Keast|1945}} Even as late as 1944, American soldiers undergoing stateside training in preparation for deployment against German forces in Europe were not being trained in combat procedures and tactics in use there.{{sfn| Hanford| 2008|p= viii}}

===Replacement system criticized===
[[File:George marshall&henry stimson.jpg|thumb|Army Chief of Staff Marshall with [[United States Secretary of War|Secretary of War]] [[Henry Stimson]]|left]]
Originally, Marshall had planned a 265-division army with a system of unit rotation such as that practiced by the [[United Kingdom|British]] and other Allies.{{sfn| Vandergriff | 2003}} By mid-1943, however, after pressure from government and business leaders to preserve manpower for industry and agriculture, he had abandoned this plan in favor of a 90-division Army using individual replacements sent via a circuitous process from training to divisions in combat.{{sfn| Vandergriff | 2003}} The individual replacement system devised by Marshall and implemented by McNair exacerbated problems with [[unit cohesion]] and effective transfer of combat experience to new soldiers and officers.{{sfn|Keast|1945}}{{sfn|Ambrose|1997|pp=277–84}} In Europe, where there were few pauses in combat with German forces, the individual replacement system had broken down completely by late 1944.{{sfn|Henry|2001 |pp= 12–14}} Hastily trained replacements or service personnel reassigned as infantry were often given only a few weeks' refresher training before being thrown into battle with Army divisions locked in front-line combat.

The new men were often not even proficient in the use of their own weapons, and once in combat, could not receive enough practical instruction from veterans before being killed or wounded, sometimes within the first few days.{{sfn|Keast|1945}}{{sfn|Henry|2001 |pp= 12–14}}{{sfn|Ambrose|1997|pp=271–84}} Under such conditions, many soldiers suffered a crippling loss of morale, while veterans were kept at the front until they were killed, wounded, or incapacitated by battle fatigue or illness. Incidents of soldiers going [[AWOL]] from combat duty as well as battle fatigue and self-inflicted injury rose rapidly during the last eight months of the war with [[Nazi Germany]].{{sfn|Keast|1945}}{{sfn|Ambrose|1997|pp=277–84}}{{sfn|Henry| 2001 |pp= 12-14}} As one historian concluded, "Had the Germans been given a free hand to devise a replacement system..., one that would do the Americans the most harm and the least good, they could not have done a better job."{{sfn|Henry| 2001 |pp= 12-14}}{{sfn|Ambrose|1997|p=277}}

Marshall's abilities to pick competent field commanders during the early part of the war was decidedly mixed. He was instrumental in advancing the careers of the highly capable generals such as [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], [[Omar Bradley]], [[George S. Patton]], [[Walter Krueger]] and [[Mark W. Clark]]. A notable exception was his recommendation of the swaggering [[Lloyd Fredendall]] to Eisenhower for a major command in the American invasion of North Africa during Operation Torch. Marshall was especially fond of Fredendall, describing him as "one of the best" and remarking in a staff meeting when his name was mentioned, "I like that man; you can see determination all over his face." Eisenhower duly picked him to command the 39,000-man Central Task Force (the largest of three) in Operation Torch. Both men would come to regret that decision, as Fredendall was the leader of U.S. Army forces at the disastrous [[Battle of Kasserine Pass]].{{sfn|Ossad|2003}}

===Planned invasion of Europe===
[[File:Gen. George C. Marshall, U. S. Army Chief of Staff, and Gen. Henry "Hap" Arnold, Commanding General, U. S. Army Air... - NARA - 198960.jpg|left|thumb|General George C. Marshall with Chief of the [[United States Army Air Forces|Army Air Force]] General [[Henry H. Arnold|Henry "Hap" Arnold]] at [[Franz Urbig#Villa Urbig|Villa Urbig]] on 23 July 1945 during the [[Potsdam Conference]]. The two generals return the salute of the Guard of Honor formed by a detachment of [[Scots Guards]] of the British [[Brigade of Guards]]]]

During World War II, Marshall was instrumental in preparing the U.S. Army and [[United States Army Air Forces|Army Air Forces]] for the invasion of [[Continental Europe]]. Marshall wrote the document that would become the central strategy for all Allied operations in Europe. During the [[Arcadia Conference]], he convinced the United Kingdom to accept this strategy, including the focus on defeating Germany first and the establishment of international unified commands in control of all Allied forces in a given theatre. His push for unity of command, in particular through the [[Combined Chiefs of Staff]] and the [[American-British-Dutch-Australian Command]], met with resistance from the [[British Armed Forces]] under [[Alan Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke|Alan Brooke]] because the scheme would allow the United States to dominate the Western Allied war effort, but the British government ultimately approved.{{Sfn|Roberts|2009|p=66-81}}

He initially scheduled [[Operation Overlord]] for 1 April 1943, but met with strong opposition from Winston Churchill, who convinced Roosevelt to commit troops to [[Allied invasion of Sicily|Operation Husky]] for the invasion of [[Italy]].{{sfn|D-Day Year Too Late?|2019}} Marshall and his advisors also opposed the [[Operation Torch|Allied invasion of French North Africa]] after it became clear that [[Vichy France]] would offer resistance, concerns over an Axis intervention through [[Francoist Spain]] and [[Gibraltar]], and suspicions that the operation was intended to defend European colonial territory with little strategic value to the war.<ref>{{Harvp|Roberts|2009|p=70-84}}</ref>

[[File:Joseph Stalin & Generals, Tehran Conference.jpg|thumb|Marshall with [[Joseph Stalin]], [[Vyacheslav Molotov]], and [[Harry Hopkins]] at the [[Tehran Conference]] in Iran, December 1943]]
When rumors circulated that Marshall would become the Supreme Commander of Operation Overlord, many critics viewed the potential transfer as a demotion, since he would leave his position as Chief of Staff of the Army and lose his seat on the [[Combined Chiefs of Staff]].{{sfn|Pogue}} While Marshall enjoyed considerable success in working with Congress and Roosevelt, he refused to lobby for the position. Roosevelt selected Eisenhower, in large part because he did not want to do without Marshall in the Chief of Staff position. He told Marshall, "I didn't feel I could sleep at ease if you were out of Washington."{{sfn|Buell|John H. Bradley|p=258}}

On 16 December 1944, Marshall became the first American general to be promoted to the newly created rank of [[General of the Army (United States)#World War II era|general of the Army]], a [[five-star rank]] that placed senior American commanders on an equal footing with the [[field marshal]]s of European Allies; Marshall had objected to being awarded the title of field marshal, as it would have given him the title of "Marshal Marshall".{{sfn|Frequently Asked Questions Five-Star}}<ref>{{Cite web |last=Stilwell |first=Blake |date=2021-03-11 |title=This is why there's no Field Marshal rank in the US military |url=https://www.wearethemighty.com/mighty-history/why-theres-no-field-marshal-rank/ |access-date=2024-01-11 |website=We Are The Mighty |language=en}}</ref>

Throughout the remainder of World War II, Marshall coordinated Allied operations in both Europe and the Pacific. He was characterized as the organizer of Allied victory by Churchill. ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine named Marshall [[Time Magazine Person of the Year|Man of the Year]] for 1943.{{sfn|Person of Year Photo|2006}} Marshall resigned his post of chief of staff on 18 November 1945, but did not retire, as regulations stipulate that generals of the Army remain on active duty for life. He was succeeded as Army chief of staff by General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower.{{sfn|Wedemeyer}} During this time, he also received a Bronze [[oak leaf cluster]] to his Army DSM for his unprecedented work from 1939 to 1945. The medal's citation reads:

{{Blockquote|The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress 9 July 1918, takes pleasure in presenting a Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster in lieu of a Second Award of the Army Distinguished Service Medal to General of the Army George Catlett Marshall, Jr. (ASN: 0-1616), United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious and distinguished services to the Government of the United States, in a duty of great responsibility during the period from September 1939 through November 1945. The singularly distinctive accomplishments of General Marshall reflect the highest credit upon himself and the United States Army.<ref name="Valor"/>}}

=== Analysis of Pearl Harbor intelligence failure ===
[[File:Photograph of President Truman shaking hands with Secretary of State James F. Byrnes after awarding him the... - NARA - 199180.jpg|thumb|President Truman, Marshall, Secretary of State [[James F. Byrnes]], and General Arnold at the White House, August 1945]]
After World War II ended, the Congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|Pearl Harbor Attack]] received testimony on the intelligence failure. It amassed 25,000 pages of documents, 40 volumes, and included nine reports and investigations, eight of which had been previously completed. These reports included criticism of Marshall for delaying sending Lieutenant General [[Walter Short]], the Army commander in Hawaii, important information obtained from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. The report also criticized Marshall's lack of knowledge of the readiness of the [[Hawaiian Department|Hawaiian Command]] during November and December 1941.{{sfn|U.S. Senate Joint Committee}} Marshall also advised President Roosevelt to move part of the United States Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Ocean to assist [[Neutrality Patrol]]s, and that the defenses at [[Oahu]] made a Japanese attack on the island impossible. These recommendations were dismissed by the President but could have been catastrophic if they had not been.{{Sfn|Roberts|2009|p=51}}

Ten days after the attack, Short and Admiral [[Husband E. Kimmel]], commander of the [[United States Pacific Fleet]] at [[Naval Station Pearl Harbor]], were both relieved of their duties. The final report of the Joint Committee did not single out or fault Marshall. While the report was critical of the overall situation, the committee noted that subordinates had failed to pass on important information to their superiors, including to Marshall.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39 |year=1946 |publisher=Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=fSQ7kKogRGIC&pg=PA144 |location= Washington, D.C. |pages=144–45}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Conclusions and Recommendations of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack |url=http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol40.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol40.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-09 |url-status=live |publisher=Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress |location= Washington, D.C. |pages=252, 265}}</ref>

A secret review of the Army's role, which resulted in the [[Clausen Report]], was authorized by Secretary [[Henry L. Stimson|Henry Stimson]].{{sfn|Clausen|2001|pp=23–24}} The report was critical of Short and also of Colonel [[Rufus S. Bratton]] of the Military Intelligence Division (G-2), who investigator [[Henry Clausen]] concluded arrived at the War Department later on the morning of 7 December 1941 than he initially claimed during testimony and invented a story about a warning to affected army commanders about the imminent Pearl Harbor Attack being delayed because he had been unable to get in touch with Marshall, an allegation which "nearly destroyed" Marshall.{{sfn|Clausen|2001|pp=23–24}}