Editing Free will (section)

====Metaphysical libertarianism====
{{Main|Libertarianism (metaphysics)}}
[[File:FreewillConceptsBasedUponPhilosophyOfMindCausationViews.svg|thumb|Various definitions of free will that have been proposed for Metaphysical Libertarianism (agent/substance causal,<ref name=stanfordincompatibilismtheories/> centered accounts,<ref name="Kane2005" /> and efforts of will theory<ref name="RKane1" />), along with examples of other common free will positions (Compatibilism,<ref name="Velmans2002"/> Hard Determinism,<ref>Paul Henri Thiry, Baron d'Holbach, ''System of Nature; or, the Laws of the Moral and Physical World'' (London, 1797), Vol. 1, p. 92</ref> and Hard Incompatibilism<ref name="Derk1"/>). Red circles represent mental states; blue circles represent physical states; arrows describe causal interaction.]]

One kind of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires that the [[agency (philosophy)|agent]] be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances.<ref name="Georgiev-2021">{{cite journal
 | author = Danko D. Georgiev
 | title = Quantum propensities in the brain cortex and free will
 | journal = Biosystems
 | volume = 208
 | issue = 
 | pages = 104474
 | year = 2021
 | doi = 10.1016/j.biosystems.2021.104474| issn=0303-2647 
 | pmid = 34242745
 | arxiv = 2107.06572
 | bibcode = 2021BiSys.20804474G
 | s2cid = 235785726
 | quote = Free will is the capacity of conscious agents to choose a future course of action among several available physical alternatives.
}}</ref>

Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into non-physical theories and physical or naturalistic theories. Non-physical theories hold that the events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation, which requires that the world is not closed under physics. This includes [[interactionist dualism]], which claims that some non-physical [[mind]], will, or [[soul]] overrides physical [[causality]]. Physical determinism implies there is only one possible future and is therefore not compatible with libertarian free will. As consequent of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarian explanations that do not involve dispensing with [[physicalism]] require physical indeterminism, such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior&nbsp;– theory unknown to many of the early writers on free will. Incompatibilist theories can be categorised based on the type of indeterminism they require; uncaused events, non-deterministically caused events, and agent/substance-caused events.<ref name=stanfordincompatibilismtheories>{{cite encyclopedia |last=Randolph |first=Clarke |editor=Edward N. Zalta |title=Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |edition=Fall 2008 |year=2008 |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/incompatibilism-theories |access-date=2012-12-27 |archive-date=2024-02-08 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240208233501/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/incompatibilism-theories/ |url-status=live }}</ref>