Editing François Darlan (section)

===Darlan, the French Navy and the British===

The terms of the armistice called for the demobilisation and disarmament of the ships of the French Navy under German supervision in their home ports (mostly in the German-occupied zone). As the British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] pointed out, this meant that French warships would be fully armed when they came under German control.<ref name="Bell 1974" />{{rp|139–40}} At Italian suggestion, the armistice terms were amended to permit the fleet to stay temporarily in North African ports, where they might potentially be seized by Italian troops from Libya.<ref name="Lacouture 1991, p. 246" /> Darlan ordered all ships then in the Atlantic ports (which Germany would soon occupy) to steam to French overseas possessions, out of reach of the Germans, although not necessarily of the Italians.<ref name="Bell 1974" />{{rp|139–40}}

Despite Darlan's assurance, Churchill had remained concerned that Darlan might be overruled by the politicians, and this concern was not allayed by Darlan becoming a government minister himself. Darlan repeatedly refused British requests to place the whole fleet in British custody (or in the [[French West Indies]]). He attempted to get the British to release French warships and gave a version of the armistice terms inconsistent with what the British knew from other sources to be the case. The British lacked confidence that Darlan was being straight with them (one government adviser minuted that he had 'turned crook like the rest')<ref name="Bell 1974" />{{rp|149}} and believed that, even if he was sincere, he could not deliver on his promise. This belief led to the British [[Attack on Mers-el-Kébir]] (Operation Catapult), where, on 3 July 1940 the Royal Navy attacked the French fleet. The plans for "Catapult" had been drawn up as early as 14-16 June.<ref name="Lacouture 1991, p. 246" /> Darlan was at his house at [[Nérac]] in Gascony on 3 July, and could not be contacted.<ref>Lacouture 1991, p. 247</ref>

Thereafter, French forces loyal to Vichy (most of them under Darlan's command) fiercely resisted British moves into French territory, and sometimes co-operated with German forces. However, as Darlan had promised, no capital ships fell into German hands, and only three destroyers and a few dozen submarines and smaller vessels passed into German control.<ref name="Bell 1974">{{cite book|last1=Bell|first1=P M H|title=A Certain Eventuality|date=1974|publisher=Saxon House|location=Farnborough|isbn=0-347-000-10-X|pages=141–42}}</ref>

Darlan expected the Axis to win the war and saw it as to France's advantage to [[Collaboration with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy|collaborate with Germany]]. He distrusted the British, and after the attack on Mers-el-Kébir, he seriously considered waging a naval war against Britain.<ref name="jstor.org">{{cite journal |first=Robert L. |last=Melka |jstor=259994 |title=Darlan between Britain and Germany 1940–41 |journal=Journal of Contemporary History |date=April 1973 |volume=8 |issue=2 |pages=57–80|doi=10.1177/002200947300800204 |s2cid=161469746 }}</ref>