Editing First Battle of the Marne (section)

==The battle==
[[File:Battle of the Marne, west flank 1914.jpg|thumb|right|250px|9 September 1914. The BEF (brown) and French 5th army (red) exploit the gap between the German 1st and 2nd armies.]]  
[[File:Infanterie-française-rol.jpg|thumb|{{center|French infantry charge, 1914}}]]
[[File:Taxi de la Marne, Musée de l'Armée-IMG 0987.jpg|thumb|{{centre|[[Renault Taxi de la Marne|Taxi cab of the Marne]]}}]]
[[File:The battle of Meaux September 1914.jpg|thumb|The battle of Meaux September 1914]]
"At dawn on 6 September, 980,000 French and 100,000 British soldiers with 3,000 guns assaulted the German line of 750,000 men and 3,300 guns between Verdun and Paris."{{sfn|Herwig|2009|page=244. Quoted from Anthony Clayton, ''Paths of Glory.''}}  Joffre had finally found the propitious time to end the Great Retreat and counterattack. The battle would take place in two distinct locations near southern tributaries of the Marne with the French 5th and 9th army assaulting the German's 2nd and 3rd armies and north of the Marne between the French 6th army facing the German 1st army. Communications and coordination were poor between German armies and with Moltke's headquarters in Luxembourg, each German army would fight its own battle.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|pages=231–236}}   
[[File:Fotografie-ersten-weltkrieg4.jpg|thumb|French soldiers rest in a forest during the battle of the Marne. [[Autochrome]] colour photograph.]]

=== Kluck ===
On 5 September, one day before Joffre's plan to begin the French offensive, the French and Germans clashed on Kluck's 1st army's right flank. Part of Maunoury's 6th army, made up mostly of reservists and numbering in total 150,000 was probing {{cvt|40|km|mile}} northeast from Paris near the Ourcq River looking for the Germans when it encountered the [[IV Reserve Corps (German Empire)|IV Reserve Corps]] of 24,000 men commanded by German general [[Hans von Gronau]]. Gronau had the responsibility of covering the outermost right flank of Kluck. He discerned the danger of a flank attack against Kluck and, although greatly outnumbered, attacked the French, holding them off for 24 hours before retreating. Kluck was therefore warned of the unexpected threat to his right flank and indeed his whole army. Kluck chose to mount a counteroffensive. He ordered his army to turn to the right and face west to confront the threat from the 6th French army. This involved a withdrawal of Kluck's forces who had crossed the Marne River to the south and now had to march {{cvt|130|km|miles}} in two days to reach positions facing the French. Kluck's swift reaction prevented the 6th Army from advancing across the Ourcq River to the German rear. Kluck moved off French attacks on 6 and 7 September.{{sfn|Keegan|1998|page=113–115}}{{sfn|Herwig|2009|pages=227–228, 240–248}}

On the night of 7–8 September came the most storied event of the Battle of the Marne. Military Governor Gallieni in Paris reinforced the 6th army guarding Paris by shuttling soldiers to the front by rail, truck, and [[Renault Taxi de la Marne|Renault taxis]]. Gallieni commandeered about six hundred taxicabs at [[Les Invalides]] in central Paris to carry soldiers to the front at [[Nanteuil-le-Haudouin]], fifty kilometres away. Most of the taxis were demobilised on 8 September but some remained longer to carry the wounded and refugees. The taxis, following city regulations, dutifully ran their meters. The French treasury reimbursed the total fare of 70,012 francs.{{sfn|Boucard|2013|p=750}}{{sfn|Fierro|1996|page=1166}}{{sfn|Tyng|2007|pp=239–240}}

The arrival of six thousand soldiers by rail, truck, and taxi has been described as critical in preventing a possible German breakthrough against the 6th Army. However, in General Gallieni's memoirs, he notes how some had "exaggerated somewhat the importance of the taxis."{{sfn|Mom|2014|p=245}} In 2001, [[Hew Strachan|Strachan]] mentions only the taxis as "fewer than legend" and in 2009 Herwig called the taxis militarily insignificant.{{sfn|Strachan|2001|p=254}}{{sfn|Herwig|2009|p=262}} The positive impact on French morale was undeniable.<ref name=smith>{{cite web|url=https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/fleet-taxis-did-not-really-save-paris-germans-during-world-war-i-180952140/|title=A Fleet of Taxis Did Not Really Save Paris From the Germans During World War I|work=Smithsonian Magazine|last=Hanc|first=John|date=24 July 2014|access-date=24 December 2019}}</ref>

Kluck telegrammed Moltke on the night of 8 September that "The decision will be obtained tomorrow by an enveloping attack by General von Quast."{{sfn|Herwig|2009|page=263}} The next morning Quast fought his way through the defences of the French 6th army and the way to Paris, {{cvt|50|km|mile}} distant, was open. In Keegan's words, "The balance of advantage on the Marne once more seemed to have tilted the Germans' way."{{sfn|Meyer|2007|page=212}}{{sfn|Herwig|2009|pages=281–282}}{{sfn|Keegan|1998|pages=119–120}}

=== Bülow and Hausen ===
Bülow's 2nd army south of the Marne on 6 September was as worn and depleted as Kluck’s, having marched {{cvt|440|km|mile}} since leaving Germany and having suffered more than 26,000 casualties and soldiers felled by illnesses. Bülow had begun the war with 260,000 soldiers; in September he had 154,000. Moreover, his relations with Kluck were poor.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|pages=234–235, 250–251}}

While Kluck was on the offensive near Paris, Bülow went on the defensive after the French attack on 6 September. On 7 September, Bülow ordered his right wing to retreat {{cvt|15|km|mile}} to the [[Petit Morin River]] after attacks by the French 5th army of [[Franchet d'Esperey]], called "Desperate Frankie" as a compliment by the British. During the retreat, the French massacred 450 Germans who were attempting to surrender. With his right wing retreating, Bülow conversely ordered his left wing to attack with help from Hausen's 3rd army.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|pages=235–236, 248–251}}  Hausen covered Bülow's left flank and assaulted Foch's 9th army in the Marshes of Saint–Gond near the city of [[Sézanne]] on 8 September. He had 82,000 men for the task. Hausen's attack was a surprise, launched at night with no artillery preparation. His soldiers overran artillery positions "with the bayonet." Hausen pushed Foch back {{cvt|13|km|mile}}. Hausen's attack then bogged down with his soldiers exhausted and having suffered about 11,000 casualties.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|pages=255–261}}{{sfn|Keegan|1998|pages=118–119}}and also

=== The gap ===
Kluck's turn to the northwest on 5 to 7 September to fight the 6th French army opened a {{cvt|50|km|mile}} gap on his left flank between his soldiers and those of Bülow of the 2nd German army.  French air reconnaissance observed German forces moving north to face the Sixth Army and discovered the gap.{{sfn|Mead|1983|pages=55–56}} The lack of coordination between von Kluck and Bülow caused the gap to widen even further.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|page=49}}

The Allies exploited the gap in the German lines, sending the BEF northwest toward Kluck and the 5th Army northeast toward Bülow into the gap between the two German armies. The right wing of the French 5th Army attacked on 6 September and pinned the 2nd Army in the Battle of the Two Morins, named for the two rivers in the area, the [[Grand Morin]] and [[Petit Morin]]. The BEF advanced on {{nowrap|6–8 September}}, crossed the Petit Morin, captured bridges over the Marne, and established a bridgehead {{convert|8|km|mi|0}} deep. Despite the promise by BEF commander French to Joffre that he would reenter the battle, the slow pace of the BEF's advance enraged [[Louis Franchet d'Espèrey|d'Espèrey]], commander of the 5th Army, and other French commanders. On 6 September the British force moved so slowly it finished the day {{convert|12|km|mi|0}} behind its objectives and suffered only seven men killed.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|page=253}} The BEF, though outnumbering Germans in the gap ten to one, advanced only {{cvt|40|km|mile}} in three days.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|page=254}} The 5th Army by 8 September crossed the Petit Morin, which forced Bülow to withdraw the right flank of the 2nd Army. The next day, the 5th Army crossed the Marne, and the German 2nd Army retreated further.{{sfn|Doughty|2005|pages=92–95}}

=== Hentsch's tour ===
Moltke, at [[Oberste Heeresleitung|headquarters]] in Luxembourg, was out of communication with the German armies in France.  Moltke preferred sending instructions to his armies by emissary rather than relying on his inadequate telephone and telegraph system. He sent his intelligence officer, [[Lieutenant Colonel]] Richard Hentsch, to visit the armies. Moltke's instructions to Hentsch were verbal, not written, although apparently Moltke gave Hentsch, a mere lieutenant  colonel, the authority to order the German armies to retreat if necessary for their survival. Hentsch's mission, in the words of historian Herwig, was to become "the most famous staff tour in military history."{{Sfn|Herwig|2009|page=265}}

Hentsch departed Luxembourg on 8 September by automobile and visited the 5th, 4th, and 3rd German Armies that afternoon. He reported back to Moltke that the situation of those armies was "entirely favorable." At 6:45 that evening, he received a different message at 2nd Army headquarters in a meeting with Bülow and his staff. Hentsch was told that Bülow's right flank (bordering the gap between Bülow's and Kluck's armies) was at the point of collapse. Bülow said that his army was "cinders" and "in no condition" to take the offensive against the French. He blamed Kluck for the crisis and said that Kluck should immediately break off the battle with the French 6th Army and close the gap between them. If not, the situation could become "extremely serious".{{sfn|Herwig|2009|pages=267–274}}

Lt. Colonel Hentsch apparently responded to Field Marshall Bülow that, he, Hentsch had "full power of authority" to order Kluck to withdraw from his battle with the 6th French Army. During the meeting Bülow received the news that his army was buckling under pressure from the French. Bülow ordered a {{cvt|20|km|mile}} withdrawal of his forces and prognosticated "incalculable consequences". Hentsch agreed with Bülow that when French and British forces crossed the Marne a general retreat by the Germans would be necessary. They agreed that Kluck must disengage and march to the Marne to link up with Bülow's 2nd Army. If Kluck refused, Bülow would retreat north of the Marne.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|pages=273–276}}

The next morning, 9 September, with additional bad news from the front arriving, Bülow ordered another withdrawal without knowing what Kluck would do. Meanwhile, Hentsch proceeded onwards to Kluck's 1st Army headquarters near the Ourcq River, arriving at 11:30 am after a journey through the devastation of war. He met with Kluck's chief of staff, [[Hermann von Kuhl]]. Hentsch described the hazardous position of Bülow and said a general retreat was necessary, again asserting his authority in the name of Moltke. Kuhl "was thunderstruck." The 1st Army was poised to assault the city of Paris and, hopefully, win the war, but Kuhl acceded to Hentsch and informed Kluck. With Bülow retreating, Kluck had no choice but to follow suit and he issued the order to retreat. His order said he was retreating "at the behest" of Moltke's General Staff.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|page=281–283}}{{sfn|Meyer|2007|page=212}} On 11 September Moltke himself visited the 3rd, 4th, and 5th German armies and ordered a retreat of those armies in addition to the ongoing retreat of the 1st and 2nd armies) to the [[Aisne River]] to regroup for another offensive. The Germans were pursued by the French and British, although the pace of the exhausted Allied forces was slow and averaged only {{convert|12|mi|km|abbr=on|order=flip}} per day. The Germans ceased their retreat after {{convert|40|mi|km|abbr=on|order=flip|round=5}}, at a point north of the Aisne River where they dug in, preparing [[Trench warfare|trenches]]. Joffre ordered allied troops to pursue, leading to the First Battle of the Aisne (see below).{{sfn|Herwig|2009|pages=298–306}}

"Along a front of nearly 250 miles [400km], the German infantry faced about and began to retrace its steps over the ground won in bitter combat during the last two weeks."{{sfn|Keegan|1998|page=122}} Many of the German soldiers and officers on the front lines of the conflict were bitter at what they regarded as a foolish order to retreat.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|pages=302–303}} Meyer said that the First Battle of the Marne "has come down to us in history as the fight that saved Paris but in fact was settled by one side's decision not to fight."{{sfn|Meyer|2007|page=184}}