Editing Federalism (section)

===Reasons for adoption===
According to [[Daniel Ziblatt]], there are four competing theoretical explanations  for adopting a federal system:
# Ideational theories, which hold: that among subunit population(s), a greater ideological commitment to [[Decentralization|decentralist]] ideas makes federalism more likely to be sought and adopted.
# Cultural-historical theories: that in societies with [[Multiculturalism|culturally]] or ethnically fragmented populations, federalized subunits are more likely to be favored and adopted.
# "[[Social contract]]" theories: that federalism emerges via a bargaining process between the center and a periphery (subunit)—where the center is not powerful enough to dominate the periphery, but the periphery is not powerful enough to secede from the center, (e.g., modern [[Iraq]] re [[Kurdistan]]).
# "Infrastructural power" theories: that federalism is likely to emerge for the subunit population that already has highly developed infrastructures, (e.g., they already are a constitutional, parliamentary, and administratively modernized state).<ref>{{cite book |first=Daniel |last=Ziblatt |url=http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8201.html |title=Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of Federalism |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |date=2008 |isbn=9780691136493 |access-date=2017-03-11 |archive-date=2017-03-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170307232537/http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8201.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

[[Immanuel Kant]] noted that "the problem of setting up a state can be solved even by a nation of devils"<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=v7v3CwAAQBAJ&pg=PT79 |title=Kant: Political Writings |first=H.S. |last=Reiss |date=2013 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=9781107268364}}</ref>—''if'' they possess a constitution that pits opposing factions against each other with a durable system of binding [[Separation of powers#Checks and balances|checks and balances]]. Essentially, particular states may use federation as a mechanism (a safeguard) against the possibilities of rebellion or war—or the rise of repressive government via a would-be dictator or a centralized [[oligarchy]].

Proponents of federal systems have historically argued that the structures of checks-and-balances and power-sharing that are inherent in a federal system reduces threats—both foreign and domestic. And federalism enables a state to be ''both large and diverse'', by mitigating the risk of a central government turning tyrannical.<ref>{{cite book |last=Deudney |first=Daniel H. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NalIdFN65e8C |title=Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village |date=2007 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-1-4008-3727-4 |language=en |access-date=2022-04-15 |archive-date=2023-07-31 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230731153735/https://books.google.com/books?id=NalIdFN65e8C |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Deudney |first=Daniel |date=2004 |title=Publius Before Kant: Federal-Republican Security and Democratic Peace |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066104045540 |journal=European Journal of International Relations |language=en |volume=10 |issue=3 |pages=315–356 |doi=10.1177/1354066104045540 |s2cid=143608840 |issn=1354-0661 |access-date=2022-04-15 |archive-date=2022-04-15 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220415013609/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066104045540 |url-status=live }}</ref>