Editing Fact (section)

===Fact–value distinction===
{{Main|Fact–value distinction}}

Moral philosophers since [[David Hume#Ethics|David Hume]] have debated whether [[values]] are objective, and thus factual. In ''[[A Treatise of Human Nature]]'' Hume pointed out there is no obvious way for a series of statements about what ''ought'' to be the case to be derived from a series of statements of what ''is'' the case.  This is called the [[is–ought distinction]].  Those who insist there is a logical gulf between [[Fact–value distinction|facts and values]], such that it is fallacious to attempt to derive values (e.g., "it is good to give food to hungry people") from facts (e.g., "people will die if they can't eat"), include [[G. E. Moore]], who called attempting to do so the [[naturalistic fallacy]].