Editing Essentialism (section)

===Biological essentialism===
{{Main|Species#The species problem}}
Before [[evolution]] was developed as a [[scientific theory]], the essentialist view of [[biology]] posited that all species are unchanging throughout time. The historian Mary P. Winsor has argued that biologists such as [[Louis Agassiz]] in the 19th century believed that taxa such as species and genus were fixed, reflecting the mind of the creator.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Bowler |first1=Peter J. |title=Evolution. The History of an Idea |date=1989 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-06386-0 |page=[https://archive.org/details/evolutionhistory0000bowl/page/128 128] |url=https://archive.org/details/evolutionhistory0000bowl/page/128 }}</ref> Some [[creation–evolution controversy|religious opponents of evolution]] continue to maintain this view of biology. 

Work by historians of [[systematics|systematic biology]] in the 21st century has cast doubt upon this view of pre-Darwinian thinkers. Winsor, Ron Amundson and Staffan Müller-Wille have each argued that in fact the usual suspects (such as [[Carl Linnaeus|Linnaeus]] and the Ideal Morphologists) were very far from being essentialists, and that the so-called "essentialism story" (or "myth") in biology is a result of conflating the views expressed and biological examples used by philosophers going back to [[Aristotle]] and continuing through to [[John Stuart Mill]] and [[William Whewell]] in the immediately pre-Darwinian period, with the way that biologists used such terms as ''species''.<ref>Amundson, R. (2005) ''The changing rule of the embryo in evolutionary biology: structure and synthesis'', New York, Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|0-521-80699-2}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1=Müller-Wille | first1=Staffan | year=2007 | title=Collection and collation: theory and practice of Linnaean botany | journal=Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences | volume=38 | issue=3| pages=541–562 | doi=10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.06.010| pmid=17893064 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1=Winsor | first1=M. P. | year=2003 | title=Non-essentialist methods in pre-Darwinian taxonomy | journal=Biology & Philosophy | volume=18 | issue=3| pages=387–400 |doi=10.1023/A:1024139523966| s2cid=54214030 }}</ref> 

Anti-essentialists contend that an essentialist typological categorization has been rendered obsolete and untenable by evolutionary theory for several reasons.<ref>[[Sober, Elliott]] (1980). "Evolution, population thinking, and essentialism." ''Philos'' Sci 47:350–383</ref><ref>Okasha S (2002). "Darwinian metaphysics: species and the question of essentialism." ''Synthese'' 131:191–213</ref> First, they argue that biological species are dynamic entities, emerging and disappearing as distinct populations are molded by natural selection. This view contrasts with the static essences that essentialists say characterize [[natural kinds|natural categories]]. Second, the opponents of essentialism argue that our current understanding of biological species emphasizes [[genealogical]] relationships rather than ''intrinsic'' traits. Lastly, non-essentialists assert that every organism has a [[mutational load]], and the variability and diversity within species contradict the notion of fixed biological natures.