Editing Ernst Röhm (section)

===Second revolution===
Röhm and the SA regarded themselves as the [[Vanguardism|vanguard]] of the "National Socialist revolution". After Hitler's national takeover they expected radical changes in Germany, including power and rewards for themselves, unaware that, as Chancellor, Hitler no longer needed their street-fighting capabilities.{{sfn|McNab|2013|p=17}}

Nevertheless, Hitler did name Röhm to numerous important Party and State positions. On 2 June 1933, Hitler named him a ''[[Reichsleiter]]'', the second highest political rank in the Nazi Party.{{sfn|Orlow|1973|p=74}} He was made a member of the [[Prussian State Council (Nazi Germany)|Prussian State Council]] on 14 September and a member of the [[Academy for German Law]] on 3 October, advancing to its Leadership Council (''Führerrat'') in November. On 12 November, Röhm was elected to the ''[[Reichstag (Nazi Germany)|Reichstag]]''. Finally, on 2 December 1933, he was named to the Reich cabinet as a ''[[Reichsminister]]'' [[Minister without portfolio|without portfolio]] by a provision in the [[Law to Secure the Unity of Party and State]] aimed at interlocking the leadership of the Party and the government.{{sfn|GHDI, "Law to Safeguard the Unity of Party and State"}} At the same time, he also was made a member of the Reich Defense Council.{{sfn|Miller|Schulz|2015|p=171}}

Along with other members of the more radical faction within the Nazi Party, Röhm advocated a "second revolution" that was overtly anti-capitalist in its general disposition.{{sfn|McDonough|1999|p=26}} These radicals rejected capitalism and they intended to take steps to curb monopolies and promoted the nationalization of land and industry.{{sfn|McDonough|1999|p=26}} Such plans were threatening to the business community in general, and to Hitler's corporate financial backers in particular—including many German industrial leaders he would rely upon for arms production. In order to keep from alienating them, Hitler swiftly reassured his powerful industrial allies that there would be no such revolution as espoused by these Party radicals.{{sfn|Bendersky|2007|pp=96–98}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 102-14886, Kurt Daluege, Heinrich Himmler, Ernst Röhm.jpg|thumb|left|upright=1.25|With [[Ordnungspolizei|Orpo]] Chief [[Kurt Daluege]] and SS Chief [[Heinrich Himmler]], in August 1933]]

Many SA "storm troopers" had working-class origins and longed for a radical transformation of German society.{{sfn|Frei|1993|pp=10–11}} They were disappointed by the new regime's lack of socialistic direction and its failure to provide the lavish patronage they had expected.{{sfn|Siemens|2017|pp=122–123, 187–188}} Furthermore, Röhm and his SA colleagues thought of their force as the core of the future German Army, and saw themselves as replacing the ''Reichswehr'' and its established professional officer corps.{{sfn|McNab|2013|pp=16, 17}} By then, the SA had swollen to over three million men, dwarfing the ''Reichswehr'', which was limited to 100,000 men by the [[Treaty of Versailles]]. Although Röhm had been a member of the officer corps, he viewed them as "old fogies" who lacked "revolutionary spirit". He believed that the ''Reichswehr'' should be merged into the SA to form a true "people's army" under his command, a pronouncement that caused significant consternation within the army's hierarchy and convinced them that the SA was a serious threat.{{sfn|Evans|2005|pp=24–25}} At a February 1934 cabinet meeting, Röhm then demanded that the merger be made, under his leadership as [[Ministry of the Reichswehr|Minister of Defence]].{{sfn|Kershaw|2008|p=306}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 102-14393, Ernst Röhm crop.jpg|upright|thumb|Ernst Röhm in Bavaria in 1931]]

This horrified the army, with its traditions going back to [[Frederick the Great]]. The army officer corps viewed the SA as an "undisciplined mob" of "brawling" street thugs, and was also concerned by the pervasiveness of "corrupt morals" within the ranks of the SA. Reports of a huge cache of weapons in the hands of SA members caused additional concern to the army leadership.{{sfn|Kershaw|2008|p=306}} Unsurprisingly, the officer corps opposed Röhm's proposal. They insisted that discipline and honor would vanish if the SA gained control, but Röhm and the SA would settle for nothing less. In addition the army leadership was eager to co-operate with Hitler given his plan of re-armament and expansion of the established professional military forces.{{sfn|McNab|2013|pp=16, 17}}

In February 1934, Hitler told British diplomat [[Anthony Eden]] of his plan to reduce the SA by two-thirds. That same month, Hitler announced that the SA would be left with only a few minor military functions. Röhm responded with complaints, and began expanding the armed elements of the SA. Speculation that the SA was planning a coup against Hitler became widespread in Berlin. In March, Röhm offered a compromise in which "only" a few thousand SA leaders would be taken into the army, but the army promptly rejected that idea.{{sfn|Fest|1974|p=467}}

On 11 April 1934, Hitler met with German military leaders on the ship ''[[German cruiser Deutschland|Deutschland]]''. By that time, he knew President [[Paul von Hindenburg]] would likely die before the end of the year. Hitler informed the army hierarchy of Hindenburg's declining health and proposed that the ''Reichswehr'' support him as Hindenburg's successor. In exchange, he offered to reduce the SA, suppress Röhm's ambitions, and guarantee the ''Reichswehr'' would be Germany's only military force. According to war correspondent [[William L. Shirer]], Hitler also promised to expand the army and navy.{{sfn|Shirer|1960|p=207}}

Although determined to curb the power of the SA, Hitler put off doing away with his long-time ally. A political struggle within the party grew, with those closest to Hitler, including [[Free State of Prussia|Prussian]] premier Hermann Göring, [[Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda|Propaganda Minister]] [[Joseph Goebbels]], and ''[[Reichsführer-SS]]'' [[Heinrich Himmler]], positioning themselves against Röhm. To isolate Röhm, on 20 April 1934, Göring transferred control of the Prussian political police ([[Gestapo]]) to Himmler, who he believed could be counted on to move against Röhm.{{sfn|Evans|2005|p=54}}

Both the ''Reichswehr'' and the conservative business community continued to complain to Hindenburg about the SA. In early June, defence minister [[Werner von Blomberg]] issued an ultimatum to Hitler from Hindenburg: unless Hitler took immediate steps to end the growing tension in Germany, Hindenburg would declare [[martial law]] and turn over control of the country to the army.{{sfn|Wheeler-Bennett|2005|pp=319–320}} The threat of a declaration of martial law from Hindenburg, the only person in Germany with the authority to potentially depose the Nazi regime, put Hitler under pressure to act. Hitler decided the time had come both to destroy Röhm and to settle scores with old enemies. Both Himmler and Göring welcomed Hitler's decision, since both had much to gain by Röhm's downfall—the independence of the SS for Himmler, and the removal of a rival for Göring.{{sfn|Evans|2005|p=31}}