Editing Erich von Manstein (section)

==Second World War==

===Invasion of Poland===
{{Main|Invasion of Poland}}
On 18 August 1939, in preparation for [[Fall Weiss (1939)|''Fall Weiss'']] (Case White){{snd}}the German [[invasion of Poland]]{{snd}}Manstein was appointed Chief of Staff to [[Gerd von Rundstedt]]'s [[Army Group South]]. Here he worked along with Rundstedt's Chief of Operations, Colonel [[Günther Blumentritt]], to develop the operational plan. Rundstedt accepted Manstein's plan calling for the concentration of the majority of the army group's armoured units into [[Walter von Reichenau]]'s [[10th Army (Wehrmacht)|10th Army]], with the objective of a decisive breakthrough which would lead to the encirclement of Polish forces west of the [[River Vistula]]. In Manstein's plan, two other armies comprising Army Group South, [[Wilhelm List]]'s [[14th Army (Wehrmacht)|14th Army]], and [[Johannes Blaskowitz]]'s [[8th Army (Wehrmacht)|8th Army]], would provide flank support for Reichenau's armoured thrust towards [[Warsaw]], the Polish capital. Privately, Manstein was lukewarm about the Polish campaign, thinking that it would be better to keep Poland as a buffer between Germany and the [[Soviet Union]]. He also worried about an Allied attack from the west once the Polish campaign was underway, which would draw Germany into a two-front war.{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|p=11}}

Manstein took part in a conference on 22 August 1939 where Hitler underlined to his commanders the need for the physical destruction of Poland as a nation.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=117}} After the war, he would state in his memoirs that he did not recognise at the time of this meeting that Hitler was going to pursue a policy of extermination against the Poles.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=117}} He did become aware of the policy later on, as he and other ''Wehrmacht'' generals received reports{{sfn|Longerich, Chapter 10|2003}}{{sfn|Lemay|2010|pp=81–88}} on the activities of the ''[[Einsatzgruppen]]'', the ''[[Schutzstaffel]]'' (SS) death squads tasked with following the army into Poland to murder intellectuals and other civilians.{{sfn|Evans|2008|pp=14–15}} These squads were also assigned to round up Jews and others for relocation to [[ghetto]]s and [[Nazi concentration camps]]. Manstein would later face three charges of war crimes relating to Jewish and civilian deaths in the sectors under his control, and the mistreatment and deaths of prisoners of war.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=469–470}}

Launched on 1 September 1939, the invasion began successfully. In Army Group South's area of responsibility under Rundstedt, the 8th, 10th and 14th Armies pursued the retreating Poles. The initial plan was for the 8th Army, the northernmost of the three, to advance towards [[Łódź]]. The 10th Army, with its motorised divisions, was to move quickly towards the Vistula, and the 14th Army was to advance and attempt to encircle the Polish troops in the [[Kraków]] area. These actions led to the encirclement and defeat of Polish forces in the [[Radom]] area on 8–14 September by six German corps. Meanwhile, the German Eighth Army was under attack from the north, so elements of the Fourth, Eighth and Tenth Armies were quickly redeployed with air support in an improvised attempt to cut off any Polish break-out back towards Warsaw. The flexibility and agility of the German forces led to the defeat of nine Polish infantry divisions and other units in the resulting [[Battle of the Bzura]] (8–19 September), the largest engagement of the war thus far.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=120–125}} The conquest of Poland was quickly over, with the last Polish military units surrendering on 6 October.{{sfn|Evans|2008|p=7}}

===The Offensive in the West===
{{Main|Battle of France}}
[[File:Evolution of Plan Yellow.PNG|thumb|The evolution of German plans for ''Fall Gelb'', the invasion of the Low Countries. The series begins at the upper left corner.]]
''Fall Gelb'' ("Case Yellow"), the initial plan for the invasion of France, was prepared by [[Commander-in-Chief]] of the Army [[Colonel General]] (''Generaloberst'') [[Walther von Brauchitsch]], Halder, and other members of the OKH in early October 1939.{{sfn|Lemay|2010|p=96}} Like the [[Schlieffen Plan]] of World War I, it called for an encirclement attack through the [[Netherlands]] and [[Belgium]].{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=140}} Hitler was not satisfied, so revisions of the plan continued throughout October. Manstein was not satisfied with the plan either, as it focused heavily on the northern wing; he felt an attack from this direction would lack the element of surprise and would expose the German forces to counterattacks from the south. The terrain in Belgium was not well-suited as a base of operations for further attacks on France, so Manstein felt the operation would fail to wipe out the enemy{{snd}}as it did in the First World War{{snd}}leading to only partial success and trench warfare. By the end of October Manstein had prepared the outline of a different plan and submitted it to the OKH via his superior, Rundstedt, for whom he was now serving as chief of staff of [[Army Group A]].{{sfn|Lemay|2010|pp=98–102}}{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp=11–14}}

Manstein's plan, developed with the informal co-operation of [[Heinz Guderian]], suggested that the Panzer divisions attack through the wooded hills of the [[Ardennes]] where no one would expect them, then establish bridgeheads on the [[Meuse]] and rapidly drive to the [[English Channel]]. The ''Wehrmacht'' would thus cut off the French and [[Allies of World War II|Allied armies]] in Belgium and [[Flanders]]. This part of the plan later became known as the ''Sichelschnitt'' ("sickle cut"). Manstein's proposal also included a second thrust outflanking the [[Maginot Line]], which would allow the ''Wehrmacht'' to force any future defensive line much further south.{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp=11–14}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=145}}

The OKH originally rejected the proposal; Halder in particular said the plan was entirely without merit. However, on 11 November, Hitler ordered the reallocation of the forces needed to make a surprise thrust in [[Sedan, Ardennes|Sedan]], thus pushing the plan in the direction that Manstein had suggested.{{sfn|Lemay|2010|pp=110–111}} When documents outlining details of ''Fall Gelb'' [[Mechelen Incident|fell into the hands of the Belgians]] on 10 January 1940, Hitler became even more receptive to change. But Manstein's superiors, Generals Halder and Brauchitsch, resented Manstein's repeated insistence that his plan be implemented in place of theirs. Halder had Manstein removed from Rundstedt's headquarters and sent to [[Stettin]] to command the [[XXXVIII Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|XXXVIII Army Corps]] on 27 January.{{sfn|Lemay|2010|pp=117–119}} Hitler, still looking for a more aggressive plan, approved a modified version of Manstein's ideas, today known as the [[Manstein Plan]], after meeting with him on 17 February.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=132}} Manstein and his corps played a minor role during the operations in France, serving under [[Günther von Kluge]]'s [[4th Army (Wehrmacht)|4th Army]]. His corps helped achieve the first breakthrough east of [[Amiens]] during ''[[Fall Rot]]'' ("Case Red"{{snd}}the second phase of the invasion plan), and was the first to reach and cross the [[River Seine]]. The invasion of France was an outstanding military success; Manstein was promoted to full [[General (Germany)|general]] and awarded the [[Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross]].{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp=11–14}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=178–179}}

===Battle of Britain===
{{Main|Operation Sea Lion}}
Manstein was a proponent of the prospective German invasion of Great Britain, named [[Operation Sea Lion]]. He considered the operation risky but necessary. Early studies by various staff officers determined that air superiority was a prerequisite to the planned invasion. His corps was to be shipped across the English Channel from [[Boulogne]] to [[Bexhill-on-Sea|Bexhill]] as one of four units assigned to the first wave. But as the Luftwaffe failed to overcome the [[Royal Air Force]] during the [[Battle of Britain]], Operation Sea Lion was postponed indefinitely on 12 October. For the rest of the year, Manstein, with little to do, spent time in Paris and at home.{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|p=16}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=186, 193}}

===Invasion of the Soviet Union===
{{Main|Operation Barbarossa}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-209-0086-12, Russland-Nord, Erich von Manstein, Brandenberger.jpg|thumb|Manstein (right) with ''[[General der Panzertruppe]]'' [[Erich Brandenberger]], one of his divisional commanders, in June 1941.]]
In July 1940 the German High Command commenced planning [[Operation Barbarossa]], the invasion of the [[Soviet Union]].{{sfn|Evans|2008|p=160}} On 15 March 1941 Manstein was appointed commander of the [[LVI Panzer Corps (Germany)|LVI Panzer Corps]]; he was one of 250 commanders to be briefed for the upcoming major offensive, first seeing detailed plans of the offensive in May. His corps was part of the [[4th Panzer Army|Fourth Panzer Group]] under the command of General [[Erich Hoepner]] in [[Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb]]'s [[Army Group North]].{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=198–199}} The Army Group was tasked with thrusting through the [[Baltic States]] and then advancing on [[Leningrad]]. Manstein arrived at the front only six days prior to the launch of the offensive. Operation Barbarossa commenced on 22 June 1941 with a massive German attack along the whole front line. Manstein's corps was to advance with [[Georg-Hans Reinhardt]]'s [[XLI Panzer Corps]] to the [[Daugava River|Dvina River]] to secure the bridges near the town of [[Daugavpils]].{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=205}} The Soviet forces mounted a number of counterattacks, but those were aimed against Reinhardt's corps, leading to the [[Battle of Raseiniai]]. Manstein's corps advanced rapidly, reaching the Dvina River, {{convert|315|km}} distant, in just 100 hours. Overextended and well ahead of the rest of the army group, he fended off a number of determined Soviet counterattacks.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=209–210}} After Reinhardt's corps closed in, the two corps were tasked with encircling the Soviet formations around [[Luga, Leningrad Oblast|Luga]] in a pincer movement. [[File:German advance into USSR.png|thumb|left|Progress of Army Group North, June to December 1941]]Again having penetrated deep into the Soviet lines with unprotected flanks, his corps was the target of a Soviet counteroffensive from 15 July at [[Soltsy]] by the [[Soviet 11th Army]], commanded by [[Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin|Nikolai Vatutin]]. Manstein's [[8th Panzer Division]] was cut off. Although it was able to fight its way free, it was badly mauled, and the Red Army succeeded in halting Manstein's advance at Luga. The corps regrouped at [[Dno]].{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=217–218}}{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp=16–20}} The 8th Panzer was sent on anti-partisan duties and Manstein was given the [[4th SS Polizei Division]]. The attack on Luga was repeatedly delayed.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=220–221}}

The assault on Luga was still underway when Manstein received orders on 10 August that his next task would be to begin the advance toward Leningrad. No sooner had he moved to his new headquarters at Lake Samro than he was told to send his men towards [[Staraya Russa]] to relieve the X Corps, which was in danger of being encircled. On 12 August the Red Army had launched an offensive with the 11th and [[34th Army (Soviet Union)|34th]] Armies against Army Group North, cutting off three divisions. Frustrated with the loss of the 8th Panzer and the missed opportunity to advance on Leningrad, Manstein returned to Dno. His counteroffensive led to a major Soviet defeat when his unit encircled five Soviet divisions, receiving air support for the first time on that front. They captured 12,000 prisoners and 141 tanks. His opponent, General Kuzma M. Kachanov of the 34th Army, was subsequently court martialed and executed for the defeat. Manstein tried to obtain rest days for his men, who had been constantly fighting in poor terrain and increasingly poor weather since the start of the campaign, but to no avail. They were ordered to advance to the east on [[Demyansk]]. On 12 September, when he was near the city, he was informed that he would take over [[11th Army (Wehrmacht)|11th Army]] of [[Army Group South]] in Ukraine.{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp=16–20}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=221–224}}

===Crimea and the Battle of Sevastopol===
{{Main|Siege of Sevastopol (1941–42)|Battle of the Kerch Peninsula}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-218-0543-10, Russland-Süd, Erich v. Manstein, Hermann Hoth.jpg|thumb|Manstein with ''[[Generaloberst]]'' [[Hermann Hoth]], commander of the [[4th Panzer Army]], 1942]]

In September 1941 Manstein was appointed commander of the 11th Army after its previous commander, Colonel-General [[Eugen Ritter von Schobert]], perished when his plane landed in a Soviet minefield. The 11th Army was tasked with invading the [[Crimean Peninsula]], capturing [[Sevastopol]], and pursuing enemy forces on the flank of Army Group South during its advance into the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|p= 20}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p= 227}} Hitler aimed to prevent the Red Army from using airbases in the Crimea and to cut off the Soviet supply of oil from the Caucasus.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=229}}

Manstein's forces{{snd}}mostly infantry{{snd}}achieved a rapid breakthrough during the first days against heavy Soviet resistance. After most of the neck of the [[Isthmus of Perekop|Perekop Isthmus]] had been taken, his forces were substantially reduced, leaving six German divisions and the [[Third Army (Romania)|Romanian Third Army]]. The rest of the Perekop Isthmus was captured slowly and with some difficulty; Manstein complained of a lack of air support to contest Soviet air superiority in the region. He next formed a mobile reconnaissance unit to press down the peninsula, cutting the road between [[Simferopol]] and [[Sevastopol]] on 31 October 1941. Axis forces captured Simferopol the next day. The 11th Army had captured all of the Crimean Peninsula—except for Sevastopol—by 16 November. Meanwhile, the Red Army had evacuated 300,000 personnel out of the city by sea.{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|p=21}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=233–235, 237}}

[[File:Gen. Erich von Manstein na froncie pod Kerczem na Ukrainie. (2-678).jpg|thumb|Manstein at the Kerch front, May 1942]]

Manstein's first attack on Sevastopol in November failed, and with insufficient forces left for an immediate assault, he ordered an [[Investment (military)|investment]] of the heavily fortified city. By 17 December 1941 he launched another offensive, which also failed. On 26 December Soviet troops landed on the [[Kerch Strait]]s to retake [[Kerch]] and its peninsula, and on 30 December 1941 executed another landing near [[Feodosiya]]. Only a hurried withdrawal from the Kerch Peninsula, in contravention of Manstein's orders, by the [[46th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|46th Infantry Division]] under General [[Hans Graf von Sponeck]], prevented an Axis collapse in the eastern part of the Crimea; the division lost most of its heavy equipment. Manstein cancelled a planned resumption of the attack and sent most of his forces east to destroy the Soviet bridgehead. The Soviet forces were in a superior position regarding men and materiel as they were able to re-supply by sea; accordingly, Stalin pushed them to conduct further offensives. However, the Soviet troops were unable to capture the critical rail- and road-access points which would have cut the German lines of supply.{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp= 21–22}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp= 238–239, 247, 252}}

[[File:German Conquest of the Crimea.png|thumb|left|Map shows progress as of 5 May 1942]]

For the [[Battle of the Kerch Peninsula]], launched on 8 May 1942, Hitler finally assigned Manstein major air support. The 11th Army was outnumbered on the ground, so Manstein had them feint an attack in the north while the bulk of the force attacked to the south. The Soviet troops soon fled. Manstein recorded in his memoirs the capture of "170,000 prisoners, 1,133 guns and 258 tanks".{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=259}} Kerch was captured on 16 May. The ''Wehrmacht'' lost only 8,000 men.{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|p=23}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=256–259}}

After a month's delay, Manstein turned his attention once more to the capture of Sevastopol, a battle in which Germany used some of the largest guns ever built. Along with large numbers of regular artillery pieces, super-heavy {{convert|600|mm|in|abbr= on}} [[Karl-Gerät]] mortars and the {{convert|800|mm|in|abbr= on}} [[Schwerer Gustav|"Dora"]] [[railway gun]] were brought in for the assault. A furious barrage began on the morning of 2 June 1942. All of the resources of the ''[[Luftwaffe]]''{{'}}s ''[[Luftflotte 4]]'', commanded by [[Wolfram von Richthofen]], were committed; the barrage continued for five days before the ground assault began.{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp= 23–24}}{{sfn|Glantz|1995|pp= 94, 117}}

[[File:Marszałek Erich von Manstein w ruinach Sewastopolu (2-679).jpg|thumb|Manstein observing the ruins of Sevastopol, July 1942]]

The 11th Army gained ground during mid-June, focusing their attention on the northern approaches to the city. Casualties were high on both sides as the month dragged on. Aware of the need to act before the German [[Case Blue|offensive of 1942]] reduced the availability of reinforcements and supplies, Manstein ordered a surprise attack across {{ill|Severnaya Bay|ru|Северная бухта (Севастополь)}} using amphibious landings on 29 June 1942. The operation was a success; Soviet resistance crumbled. On 1 July 1942 German forces entered the city while the Soviet forces conducted a disorganised evacuation, and Hitler promoted Manstein to ''Generalfeldmarschall'' the same day. The entire city was in German hands by 4 July 1942.{{sfn|Glantz|1995|pp= 94, 117}}{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp= 24–25}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp= 265–270}}{{sfn|Forczyk|2008|p= 91}}

During the Crimean campaign Manstein was indirectly involved in atrocities against the Soviet population, especially those committed by ''[[Einsatzgruppe]]'' D, one of several [[Schutzstaffel]] (SS) groups that had been tasked with the elimination of the Jews of Europe. ''Einsatzgruppe'' D travelled in the wake of Manstein's 11th Army and were provided by Manstein's command with vehicles, fuel, and drivers. Military police cordoned off areas where the ''Einsatzgruppe'' planned to shoot Jews to prevent anyone from escaping. Captain Ulrich Gunzert, shocked to have witnessed ''Einsatzgruppe'' D massacre a group of Jewish women and children, went to Manstein to ask him to do something to stop the murders. Gunzert states that Manstein told him to forget what he had seen and to concentrate on fighting the Red Army.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p= 98}}{{sfn|Lemay|2010|pp= 288–292}} Eleven of the seventeen charges against Manstein at his later war crimes trial related to Nazi maltreatment and murder of Jews and prisoners-of-war in the Crimea.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p= 240}}

===Siege of Leningrad===
{{Main|Siege of Leningrad|Sinyavin Offensive (1942)}}
After the capture of Sevastopol, Hitler felt Manstein was the right man to command the forces at [[Siege of Leningrad|Leningrad]], which had been under siege since September 1941. With elements of the 11th Army, Manstein was transferred to the Leningrad front, arriving on 27 August 1942. Manstein again lacked the proper forces to storm the city, so he planned [[Operation Nordlicht (1942)|Operation Nordlicht]], a bold plan for a thrust to cut off Leningrad's supply line at [[Lake Ladoga]].{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp=25–26}}

However, on the day of his arrival, the Red Army launched the [[Sinyavin Offensive (1942)|Sinyavin Offensive]]. Originally planned as a spoiling attack against [[Georg Lindemann]]'s [[18th Army (Wehrmacht)|18th Army]] in the narrow German [[Salients, re-entrants and pockets|salient]] west of Lake Ladoga, the offensive appeared able to break through the German lines, lifting the siege. Hitler, bypassing the usual chain of command, telephoned Manstein directly and ordered him to take offensive action in the area. After a series of heavy battles, he launched a counterattack on 21 September 1942 that cut off the two Soviet armies in the salient. Fighting continued throughout October 1942. Although the Soviet offensive was fended off, the resulting attrition meant that the ''Wehrmacht'' could no longer execute a decisive assault on Leningrad, and ''Nordlicht'' was put on hold.{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp=25–28}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=275–278}} The siege was finally lifted by the Soviet forces in January 1944.{{sfn|Evans|2008|p=621}}

===Battle of Stalingrad===
{{Main|Battle of Stalingrad}}
[[File:Map Battle of Stalingrad-en.svg|thumb|upright|The Soviet counterattack at Stalingrad {{legend-line|solid#dd0000 2px|German front, 19 November}} {{legend-line|solid#ff6600 2px|German front, 12 December}} {{legend-line|solid#009a00 2px|German front, 24 December}} {{legend|#c3c3c3|border=solid grey 1px|Russian advance, 19–28 November}}]]
In an attempt to resolve their persistent shortage of oil, the ''Wehrmacht'' had launched ''Fall Blau'' ([[Case Blue]]), a massive offensive aimed against the Caucasian oilfields, in 1942.{{sfn|Glantz|1995|pp=108–110}} After German air attacks, the [[6th Army (Wehrmacht)|6th Army]], led by [[Friedrich Paulus]], was tasked with capturing [[Stalingrad]], a key city on the [[River Volga]]. His troops, supported by [[4th Panzer Army]], entered the city on 12 September. Hand-to-hand combat and street fighting ensued.{{sfn|Evans|2008|pp=409–411}} The Red Army launched a huge counteroffensive on 19 November, codenamed [[Operation Uranus]], which was designed to encircle the German armies and trap them in the city; this goal was accomplished on 23 November.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=282, 285}} Hitler, aware that if Stalingrad were lost it would likely never be retaken, appointed Manstein as commander of the newly created [[Army Group Don]] (''Heeresgruppe Don''), tasked with mounting a relief operation named ''Unternehmen Wintergewitter'' ([[Operation Winter Storm]]), to reinforce the German hold on the city. Manstein's initial assessment on 24 November was that the 6th Army, given adequate air support, would be able to hold on.{{sfn|Evans|2008|p=413}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=287, 294}}

In October 1942, his son, Gero, was killed in battle. He later described this as "The worst thing that happened to me personally during the war".{{sfn|Knopp|2000|p=163}}

Launched on 12 December, Winter Storm achieved some initial success. Manstein's three Panzer divisions (comprising the [[23rd Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|23rd]], [[6th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|6th]], and [[17th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|17th Panzer Divisions]]) and supporting units of the LVII Panzer Corps advanced to within {{convert|48|km|abbr=on}} of Stalingrad by 20 December at the Myshkova River, where they came under assault by Soviet tanks in blizzard conditions. Manstein made a request to Hitler on 18 December that 6th Army should attempt to break out.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=304–305}} Hitler was against it, and both Manstein and Paulus were reluctant to openly disobey his orders.{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|p=289}} Conditions deteriorated inside the city; the men suffered from lice, the cold weather, and inadequate supplies of food and ammunition. Reichsminister of Aviation [[Hermann Göring]] had assured Hitler that the trapped 6th Army could be adequately supplied by air, but due to poor weather, a lack of aircraft, and mechanical difficulties, this turned out not to be the case.{{sfn|Evans|2008|pp=413, 416–417}} On 24 January, Manstein urged Hitler to allow Paulus to surrender, but he refused.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=313}} In spite of Hitler's wishes, Paulus surrendered with his remaining 91,000 soldiers on 31 January 1943. Some 200,000 German and Romanian soldiers died; of those who surrendered, only 6,000 survivors returned to Germany after the end of the war.{{sfn|Evans|2008|pp=419–420}} Manstein believed he had done his best for the 6th Army. The encircled men saw it differently:

{{blockquote|His weakness was that he didn't take a stronger stance against Hitler. One can resign. Or accept the death sentence. If you are totally convinced, and he was, that it was wrong to keep the army in Stalingrad.{{sfn|Knopp|1998}}|[[Winrich Behr]]}}

American historians [[Williamson Murray]] and Allan Millett wrote that Manstein's message to Hitler on 24 November advising him that the 6th Army should not break out, along with Göring's statements that the Luftwaffe could supply Stalingrad, "... sealed the fate of Sixth Army".{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|p=288}} Historians, including [[Gerhard Weinberg]], have pointed out that Manstein's version of the events at Stalingrad in his memoir is distorted and several events described there were probably made up.{{sfn|Weinberg|2005|p=451}}{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp=29, 62}} "Because of the sensitivity of the Stalingrad question in post-war Germany, Manstein worked as hard to distort the record on this matter as on his massive involvement in the murder of Jews", wrote Weinberg.{{sfn|Weinberg|2005|p=1045}}

Meanwhile, the Red Army launched an offensive of their own. [[Operation Saturn]] was intended to capture [[Rostov-on-Don|Rostov]] and thus cut off the German [[Army Group A]]. However, after the launch of Winter Storm, the Soviet army had to reallocate forces to prevent the relief of Stalingrad, so the operation was scaled down and redubbed "Little Saturn". The offensive forced Manstein to divert forces to avoid the collapse of the entire front. The attack also prevented the [[XLVIII Panzer Corps (Germany)|XLVIII Panzer Corps]] (comprising the [[336th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|336th Infantry Division]], the [[3rd Luftwaffe Field Division (Germany)|3rd Luftwaffe Field Division]], and the [[11th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|11th Panzer Division]]), under the command of General [[Otto von Knobelsdorff]], from joining up with the LVII Panzer Corps as planned to aid the relief effort. Instead, the XLVIII Panzer Corps held a line along the [[Chir River]], beating off successive Soviet attacks. General [[Hermann Balck]] used the 11th Panzer Division to counterattack Soviet salients. On the verge of collapse, the German units were able to hold the line, but the [[Italian Army in Russia|Italian 8th Army]] on the flanks was overwhelmed and subsequently destroyed.{{sfn|Nipe|2000|pp=18–33}}{{sfn|Glantz|1995|pp=143–147}}

Spurred on by this success, the Red Army planned a series of follow-up offensives in January and February 1943 intended to decisively beat the German forces in southern Russia. After the destruction of the remaining Hungarian and Italian forces during the [[Ostrogozhsk–Rossosh Offensive]], [[Operation Star]] and [[Operation Gallop]] were launched to recapture [[Kharkov]] and [[Kursk]] and to cut off all German forces east of [[Donetsk]]. Those operations succeeded in breaking through the German lines and threatened the whole southern part of the German front. To deal with this threat, Army Group Don, [[Army Group B]], and parts of Army Group A were united as [[Army Group South]] (''Heeresgruppe Süd'') under Manstein's command in early February.{{sfn|Glantz|1995|pp=143–147}}{{sfn|Nipe|2000|pp=54–64, 110}}

===Kharkov counter-offensive===
{{Main|Third Battle of Kharkov}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1995-041-23A, Ostfront, Adolf Hitler, Erich v. Manstein.jpg|thumb|On 10 March 1943, under heavy security, Hitler flew to Army Group South's headquarters at [[Zaporozh'ye]], Ukraine, only {{convert|48|km|abbr=on}} from the front lines, to review the military situation. Manstein greets Hitler upon his arrival at the local airfield; on the right are [[Hans Baur]] and the Luftwaffe Generalfeldmarschall [[Wolfram von Richthofen]].]]
During their offensives in February 1943, the Red Army broke through the German lines, retaking Kursk on 9 February.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=333}} As Army Groups B and Don were in danger of being surrounded, Manstein repeatedly called for reinforcements. Although Hitler called on 13 February for Kharkov to be held "at all costs",{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=333}} ''[[SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer]]'' [[Paul Hausser]], commander of the [[II SS Panzer Corps]], ordered the city evacuated on 15 February.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=334}} Hitler arrived at the front in person on 17 February, and over the course of three days of exhausting meetings, Manstein convinced him that offensive action was needed in the area to regain the initiative and prevent encirclement. Troops were reorganised and reinforcements were pulled into the zone from neighbouring armies. Manstein immediately began planning a counteroffensive, launched on 20 February, that later became known as the "backhand blow"; Vatutin and the Soviet forces, believing that Manstein would retreat, were taken completely by surprise. By 2 March, the ''Wehrmacht'' had captured 615 tanks and had killed some 23,000 Soviet soldiers.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=338–341, 344}}

To reinforce the point that the recapture of Kharkov was important politically, Hitler travelled again to the front lines in Ukraine on 10 March 1943 where he met with Manstein to review the situation. Manstein carefully assembled his available forces along a wide front to prevent their encirclement and the Germans recaptured Kharkov on 14 March, after bloody street fighting in the [[Third Battle of Kharkov]].{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=343}} For this accomplishment, he received the Oak Leaves for the Knight's Cross.{{sfn|Manstein|2004|p=565}} Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps captured [[Belgorod]] on 18 March. Manstein's counteroffensive had not only prevented the disintegration of the entire front, it had regained substantial territory and resulted in the destruction of three Soviet armies and the retreat of three others. Soviet casualties for the preceding month in that sector had been 46,000 dead and 14,000 taken prisoner. Captured or destroyed were 600 tanks and 1,200 pieces of artillery.{{sfn|Lemay|2010|p=346}} The spring thaw began by 23 March, ending operations in the area for the time being. Planning was then undertaken to eliminate the enemy salient at Kursk.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=343–344}}

===Operation Citadel===
{{Main|Battle of Kursk}}

Manstein favoured an immediate pincer attack on the Kursk salient after the battle at Kharkov, but Hitler was concerned that such a plan would draw forces away from the industrial region in the [[Donets Basin]]. In any event, the ground was still [[Rasputitsa|too muddy]] to move the tanks into position. In lieu of an immediate attack, the OKH prepared Operation Citadel, the launching of which would be delayed while more troops were gathered in the area and the mud solidified. Meanwhile, the Red Army, well aware of the danger of encirclement, also moved in large numbers of reinforcements, and their intelligence reports revealed the expected locations and timing of the German thrusts.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=350–351}}{{sfn|Evans|2008|p=485}}

[[File:Kursk south.svg|thumb|Battle of Kursk: southern pincer]]

Citadel was the last German strategic offensive on the Eastern Front, and one of the largest battles in history, involving more than four million men. By the time the ''Wehrmacht'' launched their initial assault on 5 July 1943, the Soviet forces outnumbered them by nearly three to one.{{sfn|Evans|2008|p=486}} [[Walter Model]] was in command of the northern pincer, with the [[9th Army (Wehrmacht)|Ninth Army]], while Manstein's Army Group South formed the southern pincer.

Both armies were slowed as the tanks were blown up in minefields and caught up in combat on a series of prepared Soviet defensive lines.{{sfn|Evans|2008|p=487}} After five days of fighting Model's advance was stopped, with the Ninth Panzers suffering 25,000 casualties. By 13 July Model's forces were being drawn away towards Orel, where the Soviet army had launched [[Operation Kutuzov]].{{sfn|Glantz|House|1999|p=217}} Manstein's forces were able to penetrate the Soviet lines, causing heavy casualties. He reached, but did not enter or capture, [[Prokhorovka, Belgorod Oblast|Prokhorovka]], his first major objective, on 11 July, inflicting serious Soviet losses in the resulting [[Battle of Prokhorovka]].

However, on 13 July Hitler called off the failed Kursk offensive; the Allies had [[Allied invasion of Sicily|landed in Sicily]], so he issued the order for a withdrawal. Manstein protested; he felt that the Soviet forces had exhausted all their reserves in the area, and he did not want to stop until all his own reserves had been committed. Hitler, however, insisted on calling off the operation.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1999|p=218}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=377–378}} Although Soviet casualties were indeed heavy, modern historians discount the possibility of a successful German continuation of the offensive.{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp=41–45}}{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|p=298}}{{sfn|Glantz|1995|pp=160–167}}

===Retreat to the Dnieper===
{{See also|Belgorod-Khar'kov Offensive Operation}}
Manstein regarded the Battle of Kursk as something of a German victory, as he believed that he had destroyed much of the Red Army's offensive capacity for the rest of 1943. This assessment turned out to be incorrect, as the Red Army was able to recover much faster than Manstein expected. Manstein moved his panzer reserves to the [[Mius River]] and the lower Dnieper, not realising the Soviet activities there were a diversion. A Soviet offensive that began on 3 August put Army Group South under heavy pressure. After two days of heavy fighting, the Soviet troops broke through the German lines and retook [[Belgorod]], punching a {{convert|56|km|abbr=on}} wide hole between the Fourth Panzer Army and the [[Army Detachment Kempf]], tasked with holding Kharkov. In response to Manstein's demands for reinforcements, Hitler sent the [[Panzer-Grenadier-Division Großdeutschland|''Großdeutschland'']], [[7th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|7th Panzer]], [[2nd SS Division Das Reich|SS 2nd ''Das Reich'']], and [[3rd SS Division Totenkopf|SS 3rd ''Totenkopf'']] Divisions.{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|pp=390–391}}{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp=41–47}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=384–385}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-705-0262-06, Ukraine, von Manstein und Speidel.jpg|thumb|left|Manstein (right) with ''Generalmajor'' [[Hans Speidel]] on the [[Dnieper]], September 1943]]

Construction began of defensive positions along the Dnieper, but Hitler refused requests to pull back, insisting that Kharkov be held. With reinforcements trickling in, Manstein waged a series of counterattacks and armoured battles near [[Bohodukhiv]] and [[Okhtyrka]] between 13 and 17 August, which resulted in heavy casualties as they ran into prepared Soviet lines. On 20 August he informed the OKH that his forces in the Donets river area were holding a too-wide front with insufficient numbers, and that he needed to either withdraw to the [[Dnieper River]] or receive reinforcements. Continuous pressure from the Soviet forces had separated Army Group Centre from Army Group South and severely threatened Manstein's northern flank. When the Red Army threw their main reserves behind a drive to retake Kharkov on 21–22 August, Manstein took advantage of this to close the gap between the 4th Panzer and 8th Armies and reestablish a defensive line. Hitler finally allowed Manstein to withdraw back across the Dnieper on 15 September.{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp=41–47}}{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|pp=391–392}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=386–394}} During the withdrawal, Manstein ordered [[scorched earth]] actions to be taken in a zone {{convert|20|to|30|km}} from the river, and later faced charges at his war crimes trial for issuing this order.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=396, 471}} Soviet losses in July and August included over 1.6 million casualties, 10,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces, and 4,200 aircraft. German losses, while only one-tenth that of the Soviet losses, were much more difficult to sustain, as there were no further reserves of men and materiel to draw on.{{sfn|Evans|2008|pp=489–490}} In a series of four meetings that September, Manstein tried unsuccessfully to convince Hitler to reorganise the high command and let his generals make more of the military decisions.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=387–392}}

===Battle of the Dnieper===
{{Main|Battle of the Dnieper}}

In September 1943 Manstein withdrew to the west bank of the Dnieper in an operation that for the most part was well-ordered, but at times degenerated into a disorganised rout as his exhausted soldiers became "unglued".{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|p=393}} Hundreds of thousands of Soviet civilians travelled west with them, many bringing livestock and personal property.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=397}} Manstein correctly deduced that the next Soviet attack would be towards [[Kiev]], but as had been the case throughout the campaign, the Red Army used ''[[Russian military deception|maskirovka]]'' (deception) to disguise the timing and exact location of their intended offensive.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=399}} Historians [[Williamson Murray]] and Allan Reed Millett wrote that many German generals' "fanatical belief" in [[Nazism and race|Nazi racial theories]] " ... made the idea that Slavs could manipulate German intelligence with such consistency utterly inconceivable".{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|p=395}} The [[1st Ukrainian Front]], led by [[Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin]], met the outnumbered Fourth Panzer Army near Kiev. Vatutin first made a thrust near Liutezh, just north of Kiev, and then attacked near Bukrin, to the south, on 1 November. The German troops, thinking Bukrin would be the location of the main attack, were taken completely by surprise when Vatutin captured the bridgehead at Liutezh and gained a foothold on the west bank of the Dnieper. Kiev was liberated on 6 November.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=402}} The [[17th Army (Wehrmacht)|17th Army]] was cut off and isolated in the Crimea by the attacking [[4th Ukrainian Front]] on 28 October.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=400, Map 15}}

[[File:Map of dnieper battle grand.jpg|thumb|Operations along the Dnieper, July to December 1943]]

Under the guidance of General [[Hermann Balck]], the cities of [[Zhytomyr]] and [[Korosten]] were retaken in mid-November,{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=402}} but after receiving reinforcements Vatutin resumed the offensive on 24 December 1943,{{sfn|Barratt|2012|pp=21–22}} and the Red Army continued its successful advance. Manstein's repeated requests to Hitler for more reinforcements were turned down.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=402, 404, 411}} On 4 January 1944 Manstein met with Hitler to tell him that the Dnieper line was untenable and that he needed to retreat in order to save his forces.{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|p=396}} Hitler refused, and Manstein again requested changes in the highest levels of the military leadership, but was turned down, as Hitler believed that he alone was capable of managing the wider strategy.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=410}}

In January Manstein was forced to retreat further west by the Soviet offensive. Without waiting for permission from Hitler, he ordered the German [[XI Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|XI]] and XXXXII Corps (consisting of 56,000 men in six divisions) of Army Group South to break out of the [[Korsun Pocket]] during the night of 16–17 February 1944. By the beginning of March, the Soviet forces had driven the ''Wehrmacht'' well back of the river. Because of Hitler's directive of 19 March that from that point forward all positions were to be defended to the last man, Manstein's [[1st Panzer Army]] became encircled on 21 March when permission to break out was not received from Hitler in time. Manstein flew to Hitler's headquarters in [[Lvov]] to try to convince him to change his mind. Hitler eventually relented, but relieved Manstein of his command on 30 March 1944.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=414–418}}

Manstein appeared on the cover of the 10 January 1944 issue of [[Time (magazine)|''Time'' magazine]], above the caption "Retreat may be masterly, but victory is in the opposite direction".{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=412}}{{sfn|''Time''|1944}}

===Dismissal===
Manstein received the Swords of the Knight's Cross on 30 March 1944{{sfn|Scherzer|2007|p=503}} and handed over control of Army Group South to Model on 2 April during a meeting at Hitler's mountain retreat, the [[Berghof (residence)|Berghof]]. Model's adjutant, Günther Reichhelm, later described the scene and Manstein's response:

{{blockquote|He must have paid him compliments about his strategic skills during the attack operations, but he also said, "I cannot use you in the South. Field Marshal Model will take over." And Manstein replied, "My Führer ... please believe me when I say I will use all strategic means at my disposal to defend the soil in which my son lies buried."{{sfn|Knopp|1998}}}}

While on medical leave after surgery to remove a cataract in his right eye, Manstein recovered at home in [[Liegnitz]] and in a medical facility in [[Dresden]]. He suffered from an infection and for a time was in danger of losing his sight. On the day of the failed [[20 July plot]], an assassination attempt on Hitler's life that was part of a planned [[Operation Valkyrie|military ''coup d'état'']], Manstein was at a seaside resort on the Baltic. Although he had met at various times with three of the main conspirators{{snd}}[[Claus von Stauffenberg]], [[Henning von Tresckow]], and [[Rudolf Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff]]{{snd}}Manstein was not involved in the conspiracy; he later said ''"Preussische Feldmarschälle meutern nicht"''—"Prussian field marshals do not mutiny."{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=276}} Still, the [[Gestapo]] placed Manstein's house under surveillance.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=420–425}}

When it became obvious that Hitler was not going to appoint him to a new post, Manstein bought an estate in East Pomerania in October 1944, but he was soon forced to abandon it when Soviet forces overran the area. His home at Liegnitz had to be evacuated on 22 January 1945, and he and his family took refuge temporarily with friends in Berlin. While there, Manstein tried to get an audience with Hitler in the ''[[Führerbunker]]'' but was turned away. He and his family continued to move farther west into Germany until the war in Europe ended with a German defeat in May 1945. Manstein suffered further complications in his right eye and was receiving treatment in a hospital in [[Heiligenhafen]] when he was arrested by the British and transferred to a prisoner of war camp near [[Lüneburg]] on 26 August.{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp=58–60}}{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|p=401}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=425–431}}