Editing Epistemology (section)

==== Analysis ====
{{main|Definitions of knowledge}}

The analysis of knowledge is the attempt to identify the [[Essence|essential components]] or [[Necessity and sufficiency|conditions of all and only]] propositional knowledge states. According to the so-called ''traditional analysis'',{{efn|The accuracy of the label ''traditional analysis'' is debated since it suggests widespread acceptance within the history of philosophy, an idea not shared by all scholars.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=54–55}} | {{harvnb|Ayers|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Qt-RDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 4]}} }}</ref>}} knowledge has three components: it is a belief that is [[Justification (epistemology)|justified]] and true.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=53–54}} }}</ref> In the second half of the 20th century, this view was challenged by a [[Gettier problem|series of thought experiments]] aiming to show that some justified true beliefs do not amount to knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=61–62}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 3. The Gettier Problem}} }}</ref> In one of them, a person is unaware of all the [[Potemkin village|fake barns]] in their area. By coincidence, they stop in front of the only real barn and form a justified true belief that it is a real barn.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rodríguez|2018|pp=29–32}} | {{harvnb|Goldman|1976|pp=771–773}} | {{harvnb|Sudduth|loc=§ 2b. Defeasibility Analyses and Propositional Defeaters}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 10.2 Fake Barn Cases}} }}</ref> Many epistemologists agree that this is not knowledge because the justification is not directly relevant to the truth.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=61–62}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 8. Epistemic Luck}} }}</ref> More specifically, this and similar counterexamples involve some form of epistemic luck, that is, a cognitive success that results from fortuitous circumstances rather than competence.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DGVcCIDbUQ8C&pg=PA1 1–4]}} | {{harvnb|Broncano-Berrocal|Carter|2017|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>

[[File:Justified_True_Belief_model_of_knowledge.svg|thumb|alt=Venn diagram with circles for true beliefs, justified beliefs, and knowledge|The so-called ''traditional analysis'' says that knowledge is justified true belief. [[Edmund Gettier]] tried to show that some justified true beliefs do not amount to knowledge.<ref name="Crumley II 2009 65">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=65}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=Lead section, § 3. The Gettier Problem}} }}</ref>]]

Following these [[thought experiment]]s, philosophers proposed various alternative definitions of knowledge by modifying or expanding the traditional analysis.<ref name="Crumley II 2009 65"/> According to one view, the known fact has to cause the belief in the right way.<ref>{{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=67–68}}</ref> Another theory states that the belief is the product of a reliable belief formation process.<ref>{{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 6.1 Reliabilist Theories of Knowledge}}</ref> Further approaches require that the person would not have the belief if it was false,<ref>{{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 5.1 Sensitivity}}</ref> that the belief is not inferred from a falsehood,<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=75}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 4. No False Lemmas}} }}</ref> that the justification cannot be [[Defeater#Undercutting|undermined]],<ref>{{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=69}}</ref> or that the belief is [[infallible]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 5c. Questioning the Gettier Problem, § 6. Standards for Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Kraft|2012|pp=49–50}} }}</ref> There is no consensus on which of the proposed modifications and reconceptualizations is correct.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 3. The Gettier Problem, § 7. Is Knowledge Analyzable?}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|pp=93–94, 104–105}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 2.3 Knowing Facts}} }}</ref> Some philosophers, such as [[Timothy Williamson]], reject the basic assumption underlying the analysis of knowledge by arguing that [[Knowledge-first epistemology|propositional knowledge is a unique state]] that cannot be dissected into simpler components.<ref>{{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 7. Is Knowledge Analyzable?}}</ref>