Editing Epaminondas (section)

===Early career===
[[File:Epaminondas defending Pelopidas.jpg|thumb|Epaminondas defending [[Pelopidas]] at the [[siege of Mantinea]] (385 BC), picture by William Rainey (1900).]]
Epaminondas supposedly served in a Theban contingent that aided Sparta in its [[Siege of Mantinea|attack]] against the city of [[Mantinea]] in 385 BC, during which he is said to have saved the life of Pelopidas, an act that cemented their friendship. The anecdote, reported by [[Plutarch]] and [[Pausanias (geographer)|Pausanias]], has been dismissed as an unhistorical doublet of [[Socrates]]'s saving of [[Alcibiades]] at the [[Battle of Delium]] in 424 BC.{{sfn|Buck|1994|p=63}} While some historians at least accept that Epaminondas served with the Spartans in 385 BC,{{sfnm|1a1=Cawkwell|1y=1972|1p=257|2a1=Stylianou|2y=1998|2p=172}} one author has questioned altogether the existence of a Spartan–Theban alliance during this period.{{sfn|Buck|1994|p=63}}

====Theban coup of 378 BC====
In the years following the Spartan takeover, the exiled Thebans regrouped in Athens and, at the instigation of Pelopidas, prepared to liberate their city. Meanwhile, in Thebes, Epaminondas began preparing the young men of the city to fight the Spartans. In the winter of 379&nbsp;BC, a small group of the exiles, led by Pelopidas, infiltrated the city. They then assassinated the leaders of the pro-Spartan government, and supported by Epaminondas and [[Gorgidas]], who led a group of young men, and a force of Athenian [[hoplite]]s, they surrounded the Spartans on the Cadmeia. The following day, Epaminondas and Gorgidas brought Pelopidas and his men before the Theban assembly and exhorted the Thebans to fight for their freedom; the assembly responded by acclaiming Pelopidas and his men as liberators. The Cadmeia was surrounded, and the Spartans attacked; Pelopidas realised that they must be expelled before an army came from Sparta to relieve them. The Spartan garrison eventually surrendered on the condition that they were allowed to march away unharmed. The narrow margin of the conspirators' success is demonstrated by the fact that the Spartan garrison met a Spartan force on the way to rescue them as they marched back to Sparta.

====Aftermath, 378–371 BC====
When news of the uprising at Thebes reached Sparta, an army under [[Cleombrotus I]] had been dispatched to subdue the city, but turned back without engaging the Thebans. Another army under Agesilaus II was then dispatched to attack the Thebans. However, the Thebans refused to meet the Spartan army in battle, instead building a trench and stockade outside Thebes, which they occupied, preventing the Spartans advancing on the city. The Spartans ravaged the countryside but eventually departed, leaving Thebes independent. This victory so heartened the Thebans that they undertook operations against other neighboring cities as well.{{refn|1=They attacked twice [[Thespiae]]{{sfn|Beck|2008|p=97}}|group=note}} In short order the Thebans were able to reconstitute their old Boeotian confederacy in a new, democratic form. The cities of Boeotia united as a federation with an executive body composed of seven generals, or [[Boeotarch]]s, elected from seven districts throughout Boeotia.{{sfn|Beck|2008|pp=97{{ndash}}98}} This political fusion was so successful that henceforth the names ''Theban'' and ''Boeotian'' were used interchangeably in a nod to the newfound solidarity of the region.

Seeking to crush the Thebans, the Spartans would invade Boeotia three times over the next few years (378 BC, 377 BC, ? possibly Leuctra). At first, the Thebans feared facing the Spartans head on, but the conflict gave them much practice and training, and they "had their spirits roused and their bodies thoroughly inured to hardships, and gained experience and courage from their constant struggles". Although Sparta remained the dominant land power in Greece, the Boeotians had demonstrated that they, too, were a martial threat and a politically cohesive power. At the same time, Pelopidas, an advocate of an aggressive policy against Sparta, had established himself as a major political leader in Thebes.

Epaminondas's role in the years prior to 371 BC is difficult to piece together. Certainly, he served with the Theban armies in the defence of Boeotia in the 370s BC, and by 371 BC, he had become a Boeotarch.{{sfn|Cawkwell|1972|pp=257{{ndash}}258}} It seems safe to assume, given their close friendship and their close collaboration after 371 BC, that Epaminondas and Pelopidas also collaborated closely on Theban policy in the period of 378–371 BC.{{sfn|Cawkwell|1972|pp= 263{{ndash}}264}}

====Peace conference of 371 BC====
The years following the Theban coup had seen desultory fighting between Sparta and Thebes, with Athens also drawn into the conflict. A feeble attempt at a common peace had been made in 375 BC, but desultory fighting between Athens and Sparta had resumed by 373&nbsp;BC (at the latest). By 371 BC, Athens and Sparta were again war-weary, and in 371 BC a conference was held at Sparta to discuss another attempt at a common peace.

Epaminondas was serving as a Boeotarch for 371&nbsp;BC, and led the Boeotian delegation to the peace conference. Peace terms were agreed at the outset of the conference, and the Thebans presumably signed the treaty in their own name alone.{{sfn|Beck|2008|p=41}}{{sfn|Buck|1994|p=112}} However, on the following day, Epaminondas caused a drastic break with Sparta when he insisted on signing not for the Thebans alone, but for all the Boeotians. Agesilaus refused to allow the change of the Theban envoys' signature, insisting that the cities of Boeotia should be independent; Epaminondas countered that if this were to be the case, the cities of [[Laconia]] should be as well. Irate, Agesilaus struck the Thebans from the document. The delegation returned to Thebes, and both sides mobilized for war.{{sfn|Beck|2008|pp=41{{ndash}}42}}{{sfn|Fine|1983|p=575}}{{sfn|Buck|1994|pp=112{{ndash}}113}}

====Battle of Leuctra (371 BC)====
{{Main|Battle of Leuctra}}
[[File:Battle of Leuctra, 371 BC - Decisive action.svg|thumb|The [[Battle of Leuctra]] (371&nbsp;BC), showing Epaminondas's tactical advances]]
Immediately following the failure of the peace talks, orders were sent out from Sparta to the Spartan king Cleombrotus, who was at the head of an army in [[Phocis]], commanding him to march directly to Boeotia. Skirting north to avoid mountain passes where the Boeotians were prepared to ambush him, Cleombrotus entered Boeotian territory from an unexpected direction and quickly seized a fort and captured 10 or 12 [[trireme]]s. Then marching towards Thebes, he camped at [[Leuctra]], in the territory of [[Thespiae]]. Here, the Boeotian army came to meet him. The Spartan army contained some 10,000 hoplites, 700 of whom were the elite warriors known as [[Spartiate]]s. The Boeotians opposite them numbered about 6,000, but were bolstered by a cavalry superior to that of the Peloponnesians.{{sfn|Buck|1994|pp=113{{ndash}}114}}{{sfn|Gabriel|2001|p=90}}

Epaminondas was given charge of the Boeotian army, with the other six Boeotarchs in an advisory capacity. Pelopidas, meanwhile, was captain of the [[Sacred Band of Thebes|Sacred Band]], the elite Theban troops. Before the battle, there was evidently much debate amongst the Boeotarchs about whether to fight or not. As a consistent advocate of an aggressive policy, Epaminondas wished to fight, and supported by Pelopidas, he managed to swing the vote in favour of battle.{{sfn|Sage|2002|p=138}}{{sfn|Seager|2000|p=183}} During the course of the battle, Epaminondas was to display a grasp of tactics hitherto unseen in Greek warfare.{{sfn|Lazenby|1993|p=258}}

The [[phalanx formation]] used by Greek armies had a distinct tendency to veer to the right during battle, "because fear makes each man do his best to shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the man next him on the right".{{sfn|Thucydides|1933|p=384}} Traditionally, a phalanx therefore lined up for battle with the elite troops on the right flank to counter this tendency.{{citation required|date=January 2022}} Thus, in the Spartan phalanx at Leuctra, Cleombrotus and the elite 'Spartiates' were on the right, while the less experienced Peloponnesian allies were on the left. However, needing to counter the Spartans' numerical advantage, Epaminondas implemented two tactical innovations. Firstly, he took the best troops in the army, and arranged them 50 ranks deep (as opposed to the normal 8–12 ranks) on the ''left'' wing, opposite Cleombrotus and the Spartans, with Pelopidas and the Sacred Band on the extreme left flank.{{sfn|Davis|2001|p=24}}{{sfn|Gabriel|2001|pp=182{{ndash}}183}} Secondly, recognizing that he could not have matched the width of the Peloponnesian phalanx (even before deepening the left flank), he abandoned all attempts to do so. Instead, placing the weaker troops on the right flank, he "instructed them to avoid battle and withdraw gradually during the enemy's attack". The tactic of the deep phalanx had been anticipated by [[Pagondas]], another Theban general, who used a 25 man deep formation at the [[Battle of Delium]].{{sfn|Kagan|1990|p=283}} However, the reversing of the position of the elite troops, and an oblique line of attack were innovations; it seems that Epaminondas was therefore responsible for the military tactic of refusing one's flank.{{sfn|Hanson|1999<!-- |p= -->}}{{page needed|date=January 2022}}

The fighting at Leuctra opened with a clash between the cavalry, in which the Thebans were victorious over the inferior Spartan cavalry, driving them back into the ranks of the infantry, and thereby disrupting the phalanx. The battle then commenced in earnest, with the strengthened Theban left flank advancing at double speed, while the right flank retreated. After intense fighting, the Spartan right flank began to give way under the impetus and the mass of Thebans, and Cleombrotus was killed. Although the Spartans held on for long enough to rescue the body of the king, their line was soon broken by the sheer force of the Theban assault. The Peloponnesian allies on the left wing, seeing the Spartans put to flight, also broke and ran, and the entire army retreated in disarray.{{sfn|Jones|1987|pp=5{{ndash}}6}}{{sfn|Davis|2001|p=26}} One thousand Peloponnesians were killed, while the Boeotians lost only 300 men. Most importantly, since it constituted a significant proportion of the entire Spartan manpower, 400 of the 700 Spartiates present were killed, a loss that posed a serious threat to Sparta's future war-making abilities.{{sfn|Cartledge|1979|p=295}}{{sfn|Sealey|1976|p=420}} When, after the battle, the Spartans asked if they and the Peloponnesians could collect the dead, Epaminondas suspected that the Spartans would try to cover-up the scale of their losses. He therefore allowed the Peloponnesians to remove their dead first, so that those remaining would be shown to be Spartiates, and emphasise the scale of the Theban victory.{{sfn|Tritle|1997|p=84}}

The victory at Leuctra shook the foundations of the [[Spartan hegemony|Spartan dominance]] of Greece to the core. Since the number of [[Spartiates]] was always relatively small, Sparta had relied on her allies in order to field substantial armies. However, with the defeat at Leuctra, the Peloponnesian allies were less inclined to bow to Spartan demands. Furthermore, with the loss of men at Leuctra and other battles, the Spartans were not in a strong position to reassert their dominance over their erstwhile allies.{{sfn|Joint Association of Classical Teachers|1984|p=48}}{{sfn|Roy|2000|p=187}}