Editing Darwin's Dangerous Idea (section)

===Part III: Mind, Meaning, Mathematics and Morality===
[[Image:Leviathan.jpg|thumb|The frontispiece to Thomas Hobbes' ''[[Leviathan (Hobbes book)|Leviathan]]'', which appears at the beginning of chapter 16 "On the Origin of Morality".]]
"Mind, Meaning, Mathematics and Morality" is the name of Part III, which begins with a quote from Nietzsche.<ref>{{cite book |title=[[Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality]] |last=Nietzsche |first=Friedrich |author-link=Friedrich Nietzsche |year=1881 }} Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982].</ref> Chapter 12, "The Cranes of Culture", discusses [[cultural evolution]]. It asserts that the [[meme]] has a role to play in our understanding of culture, and that it allows [[human]]s, alone among [[animal]]s, to "transcend" our [[gene-centered view of evolution|selfish genes]].<ref>{{cite book |title=[[The Selfish Gene]] |last=Dawkins |first=Richard |author-link=Richard Dawkins |year=1976 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford }}</ref> "Losing Our Minds to Darwin" follows, a chapter about the evolution of brains, minds and [[language]]. Dennett criticizes [[Noam Chomsky]]'s perceived resistance to the [[evolution of language]], its modeling by [[artificial intelligence]], and [[reverse engineering]].

The evolution of meaning<!-- to what can I link? maybe [[Meaning (philosophy of language)]]? --> is then discussed, and Dennett uses a series of [[thought experiment]]s to persuade the reader that meaning is the product of meaningless, algorithmic processes.

[[Image:Racknitz - The Turk 3.jpg|thumb|left|[[Wolfgang von Kempelen|Von Kempelen]]'s chess automaton, discussed in chapter 15.]]
Chapter 15 asserts that [[Gödel's incompleteness theorems|Gödel's Theorem]] does not make certain sorts of [[artificial intelligence]] impossible. Dennett extends his criticism to [[Roger Penrose]].<ref>{{cite book |title=[[The Emperor's New Mind]] |last=Penrose |first=Roger |author-link=Roger Penrose |year=1989 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford }}</ref> The subject then moves on to the [[evolution of morality|origin and evolution of morality]], beginning with [[Thomas Hobbes]]<ref>{{cite book |title=[[Leviathan (Hobbes book)|Leviathan]] |last=Hobbes |first=Thomas |author-link=Thomas Hobbes |year=1651 |publisher=Crooke |location=London }}</ref> (who Dennett calls "the first [[sociobiology|sociobiologist]]") and [[Friedrich Nietzsche]].<ref>{{cite book |title=[[On the Genealogy of Morals]] |last=Nietzsche |first=Friedrich |author-link=Friedrich Nietzsche |year=1887 }} Translated by [[Walter Kaufmann (philosopher)|Walter Kaufmann]] [New York: Vintage, 1967].</ref> He concludes that only an evolutionary analysis of [[ethics]] makes sense, though he cautions against some varieties of 'greedy ethical reductionism'. Before moving to the next chapter, he discusses some [[sociobiology]] controversies.

The penultimate chapter, entitled "Redesigning Morality", begins by asking if ethics can be 'naturalized'. Dennett does not believe there is much hope of discovering an algorithm for doing the right thing, but expresses optimism in our ability to design and redesign our approach to moral problems. In "The Future of an Idea", the book's last chapter, Dennett praises [[biodiversity]], including [[cultural diversity]]. In closing, he uses ''[[Beauty and the Beast]]'' as an analogy; although Darwin's idea may seem dangerous, it is actually quite beautiful.