Editing Cyprus problem (section)

==Independence, constitutional breakdown, and intercommunal talks, 1960–1974==
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| image1 = Makarios III and Robert F. Wagner NYWTS cropped.jpg
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| footer = President of the [[Republic of Cyprus]], archbishop [[Makarios III]] (left) and Vice-President Dr. [[Fazıl Küçük]] (right)
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According to constitutional arrangements, Cyprus was to become an independent, non-aligned republic with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president. General executive authority was vested in a [[Cabinet (government)|council of ministers]] with a ratio of seven Greeks to three Turks. (The Greek Cypriots represented 78% of the population and the Turkish Cypriots 18%. The remaining 4% was made up by the three minority communities: the Latins, [[Maronite]]s and [[Armenians]].) A [[House of Representatives]] of fifty members, also with a seven-to-three ratio, were to be separately elected by communal balloting on a [[universal suffrage]] basis. In addition, separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communal Chambers were provided to exercise control in matters of religion, culture, and education. According to Article 78(2) "any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the representatives elected by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively taking part in the vote". Legislation on other subjects was to take place by simple majority but again the President and the vice-president had the same right of veto—absolute on foreign affairs, defence and internal security, delaying on other matters—as in the Council of Ministers. The judicial system would be headed by a Supreme [[Constitutional Court]], composed of one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot and presided over by a contracted judge from a neutral country. The Constitution of Cyprus, while establishing an independent and sovereign republic, was, in the words of [[Stanley Alexander de Smith|de Smith]], an authority on Constitutional Law, "Unique in its tortuous complexity and in the multiplicity of the safeguards that it provides for the principal minority; the Constitution of Cyprus stands alone among the constitutions of the world".<ref name="Humanrights.coe.int">{{cite web |url=http://www.humanrights.coe.int/minorities/eng/FrameworkConvention/StateReports/1999/cyprus/B.htm |title=Report Submitted By Cyprus – Recent Political History And Developments |publisher=Humanrights.coe.int |access-date=22 March 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090125115646/http://www.humanrights.coe.int/minorities/eng/FrameworkConvention/StateReports/1999/cyprus/B.htm |archive-date=25 January 2009 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
Within a short period of time the first disputes started to arise between the two communities. Issues of contention included taxation and the creation of separate municipalities. Because of the legislative veto system, this resulted in a lockdown in communal and state politics in many cases.

===Crisis of 1963–1964===
{{Main|Cyprus crisis of 1963–64}}
Repeated attempts to solve the disputes failed. Eventually, on 30 November 1963, [[Makarios III|Makarios]] put forward to the three guarantors a [[13 Amendments proposed by Makarios III|thirteen-point proposal]] designed, in his view, to eliminate impediments to the functioning of the government. The [[13 Amendments proposed by Makarios III|thirteen points]] involved constitutional revisions, including the abandonment of the veto power by both the president and the vice-president. Turkey initially rejected it (although later in future discussed the proposal). A few days later, on [[Bloody Christmas (1963)|Bloody Christmas]], 21 December 1963, fighting erupted between the communities in [[Nicosia]]. In the days that followed it spread across the rest of the island, resulting in the death of 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cypriots, and the forced displacement of 25,000 Turkish Cypriots. At the same time, the power-sharing government collapsed. How this happened is one of the most contentious issues in modern Cypriot history. The Greek Cypriots argue that the Turkish Cypriots withdrew to form their own administration. The Turkish Cypriots maintain that they were forced out. Many Turkish Cypriots chose to withdraw from the government. However, in many cases those who wished to stay in their jobs were prevented from doing so by the Greek Cypriots. Also, many of the Turkish Cypriots refused to attend because they feared for their lives after the recent violence that had erupted. There was even some pressure from the [[Turkish Resistance Organisation|TMT]] as well. In any event, in the days that followed the fighting a frantic effort was made to calm tensions. In the end, on 27 December 1963, an interim peacekeeping force, the Joint Truce Force, was put together by Britain, Greece and Turkey. After the partnership government collapsed, the Greek Cypriot led administration was recognised as the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus at the stage of the debates in New York in February 1964.<ref>[http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/03/09/unficyp-a-living-fossil-of-the-cold-war "UNFICYP: a living fossil of the Cold War"]. ''Cyprus-Mail'', 9 March 2014</ref> The Joint Truce Force held the line until a [[United Nations peacekeeping]] force, [[United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus|UNFICYP]], was formed following [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 186]], passed on 4 March 1964.

===Peacemaking efforts, 1964–1974===
At the same time as it established a peacekeeping force, the Security Council also recommended that the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties and the Guarantor Powers, designate a mediator to take charge of formal peacemaking efforts. [[U Thant]], then the UN Secretary-General, appointed [[Sakari Tuomioja]], a Finnish diplomat. While Tuomioja viewed the problem as essentially international in nature and saw ''[[enosis]]'' as the most logical course for a settlement, he rejected union on the grounds that it would be inappropriate for a UN official to propose a solution that would lead to the dissolution of a UN member state. The United States held a differing view. In early June, following another Turkish threat to intervene, Washington launched an independent initiative under [[Dean Acheson]], a former Secretary of State. In July he presented a plan to unite Cyprus with Greece. In return for accepting this, Turkey would receive a sovereign military base on the island. The Turkish Cypriots would also be given minority rights, which would be overseen by a resident international commissioner. [[Makarios III|Makarios]] rejected the proposal, arguing that giving Turkey territory would be a limitation on ''enosis'' and would give Ankara too strong a say in the island's affairs. A second version of the plan was presented that offered Turkey a 50-year lease on a base. This offer was rejected by the Greek Cypriots and by Turkey. After several further attempts to reach an agreement, the United States was eventually forced to give up its effort.

Following the sudden death of Ambassador Tuomioja in August, [[Galo Plaza]] was appointed Mediator. He viewed the problem in communal terms. In March 1965 he presented a report criticising both sides for their lack of commitment to reaching a settlement. While he understood the Greek Cypriot aspiration of ''enosis'', he believed that any attempt at union should be held in voluntary abeyance. Similarly, he considered that the Turkish Cypriots should refrain from demanding a federal solution to the problem. Although the Greek Cypriots eventually accepted the report, despite its opposition to immediate ''enosis'', Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots rejected the plan, calling on Plaza to resign on the grounds that he had exceeded his mandate by advancing specific proposals. He was simply meant to broker an agreement. But the Greek Cypriots made it clear that if Galo Plaza resigned they would refuse to accept a replacement. U Thant was left with no choice but to abandon the mediation effort. Instead he decided to make his Good Offices available to the two sides via resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 and a Mediator was appointed. In his Report (S/6253, A/6017, 26 March 1965), the Mediator, now rejected by the Turkish Cypriot community, Dr Gala Plaza, criticized the 1960 legal framework, and proposed major amendments which were rejected by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots.

The end of the mediation effort was effectively confirmed when, at the end of the year, Plaza resigned and was not replaced.

In March 1966, a more modest attempt at peacemaking was initiated under the auspices of Carlos Bernades, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cyprus. Instead of trying to develop formal proposals for the parties to bargain over, he aimed to encourage the two sides agree to settlement through direct dialogue. However, ongoing political chaos in Greece prevented any substantive discussions from developing. The situation changed the following year.

On 21 April 1967, a [[Greek military junta of 1967–1974|coup d'état in Greece brought to power a military administration]]. Just months later, in November 1967, Cyprus witnessed its most severe bout of intercommunal fighting since 1964. Responding to a major attack on Turkish Cypriot villages in the south of the island, which left 27 dead, Turkey bombed Greek Cypriot forces and appeared to be readying itself for an intervention. Greece was forced to capitulate. Following international intervention, Greece agreed to recall General [[George Grivas]], the Commander of the Greek [[Cypriot National Guard]] and former EOKA leader, and reduce its forces on the island.<ref>{{cite journal | last=Coşkun| first=Yasin | title=The Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and The British-Turkish Policies | journal=Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi| volume=18 | issue=2 | year=2018| doi=10.32449/egetdid.471803 | pages=377–398| doi-broken-date=1 November 2024 | language=tr}}</ref> Capitalising on the weakness of the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed their own provisional administration on 28 December 1967. Makarios immediately declared the new administration illegal. Nevertheless, a major change had occurred. The Archbishop, along with most other Greek Cypriots, began to accept that the Turkish Cypriots would have to have some degree of political autonomy. It was also realised that unification of Greece and Cyprus was unachievable under the prevailing circumstances.

In May 1968, intercommunal talks began between the two sides<ref>{{cite journal | last=CoşKun | first=Yasin | title=The Beginning of a New Era in the Cyprus Problem after the 1967 Crisis: The Inter-Communal Talks | journal=History Studies: International Journal of History | volume=10 | issue=9 |year=2018| doi=10.9737/hist.2018.675 | pages=55–84| doi-access=free }}</ref> under the auspices of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General. Unusually, the talks were not held between President Makarios and Vice-president Kucuk. Instead they were conducted by the presidents of the communal chambers, [[Glafcos Clerides]] and [[Rauf Denktaş]]. Again, little progress was made. During the first round of talks, which lasted until August 1968, the Turkish Cypriots were prepared to make several concessions regarding constitutional matters, but Makarios refused to grant them greater autonomy in return. The second round of talks, which focused on local government, was equally unsuccessful. In December 1969 a third round of discussion started. This time they focused on constitutional issues. Yet again there was little progress and when they ended in September 1970 the Secretary-General blamed both sides for the lack of movement. A fourth and final round of intercommunal talks also focused on constitutional issues, but again failed to make much headway before they were forced to a halt in 1974.