Editing Contras (section)

==U.S. military and financial assistance==
{{See also|CIA activities in Nicaragua}}
In front of the [[International Court of Justice]], the Nicaraguan government claimed that the Contras were altogether a creation of the U.S.<ref name="Gill 1989, p. 328">Gill 1989, p. 328</ref> This claim was rejected<ref name="Gill 1989, p. 328"/> but the evidence of a very close relationship between the Contras and the United States was considered overwhelming and incontrovertible.<ref>Gill 1989, p. 329</ref> The U.S. played a very large role in financing, training, arming, and advising the Contras over a long period, and it is unlikely that the Contras would have been capable of carrying out significant military operations without this support, given the large amount of training and weapons shipments that the Sandinistas had received from [[Cuba]] and the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>"The United States has played a very large role in financing, training, arming, and advising the contras over a long period. The contras only became capable of carrying out significant (para)military operations as a result of this support." As seen at: Gill 1989, p. 329</ref>

===Political background===
{{See also|Reagan Doctrine|History of Nicaragua (1979–90)}}
The US government viewed the leftist Sandinistas as a threat to economic interests of American corporations in Nicaragua and to national security. US President Ronald Reagan stated in 1983 that "The defense of [the USA's] southern frontier" was at stake.<ref>John A., Thompson, "The Exaggeration of American Vulnerability: An Anatomy of Tradition", ''Diplomatic History'', 16/1, (1992): p 23.</ref> "In spite of the Sandinista victory being declared fair, the United States continued to oppose the left-wing Nicaraguan government."<ref>[http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/5/newsid_2538000/2538379.stm "1984: Sandinistas claim election victory"] BBC News, 5 November 1984</ref><ref>"President Reagan renewed his commitment to the Nicaraguan insurgents Sunday, though he appeared to shift the focus of his Administration's policy away from the military situation to the need to ''restore democracy'' to the Central American country". Cited in: [https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-05-04-mn-4758-story.html "President Shifts Emphasis From Contra Warfare"]. ''[[Los Angeles Times]]'', 4 May 1987</ref> and opposed its ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=c6wvAQAAIAAJ&q=+the+United+States%2C+which+is+working+through+the+contras+to+restore+democracy+to+Nicaragua+and+break+the+Sandinistas%27+Cuban+and+Soviet+ties. "The Foreign Connection"]. ''The Washington Post''. 6 January 1987</ref><ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/12/world/mudslinging-over-contras.html | title=Mudslinging over Contras | newspaper=The New York Times| date=12 March 1986 | first=R. W. Jr. | last=Apple | access-date=21 September 2017 }}</ref> [[Ronald Reagan]], who had assumed the American presidency in January 1981, accused the Sandinistas of importing Cuban-style socialism and aiding [[FMLN|leftist guerrillas]] in El Salvador.<ref name="Fas.org">{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-017.htm |title=NSDD – National Security Decision Directives – Reagan Administration |publisher=Fas.org |date=30 May 2008}}</ref> The Reagan administration continued to view the Sandinistas as undemocratic despite the 1984 Nicaraguan elections being generally declared fair by foreign observers.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ni0027) |title=Nicaragua |publisher=Lcweb2.loc.gov |access-date=2014-08-18}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/5/newsid_2538000/2538379.stm|title=BBC On This Day - 5 - 1984: Sandinistas claim election victory|work=bbc.co.uk|date=1984-11-05}}</ref><ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/1984/11/16/opinion/l-nicaraguan-vote-free-fair-hotly-contested-089345.html "Nicaraguan Vote: 'Free, Fair, Hotly Contested'"] ''The New York Times'', 16 November 1984</ref> Throughout the 1980s the Sandinista government was regarded as "Partly Free" by [[Freedom House]], an organization financed by the U.S. government.<ref name="FH1972">{{cite web | url = http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%20All%20Scores%2C%20Countries%2C%201973-2012%20%28FINAL%29.xls | title = Country ratings and status, FIW 1973-2012 | access-date = 2012-08-22 | author = [[Freedom House]] | year = 2012 | format = XLS}}</ref> 
 
[[File:Bush reagan.jpg|thumb|President [[Ronald Reagan]] and Vice President [[George H. W. Bush|George Bush]] in 1984]]
On 4 January 1982, Reagan signed the [[Classified information|top secret]] National Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD-17),<ref name="Fas.org"/> giving the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] the authority to recruit and support the Contras with $19 million in military aid. The effort to support the Contras was one component of the [[Reagan Doctrine]], which called for providing military support to movements opposing [[Soviet Union|Soviet-supported]], communist [[communist state|governments]].

By December 1981, the United States had already begun to support armed opponents of the Sandinista government. From the beginning, the CIA was in charge.<ref>Lee et al. 1987, p.3</ref> The arming, clothing, feeding and supervision of the Contras<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 3">Lee et al. 1987, p. 3</ref> became the most ambitious paramilitary and political action operation mounted by the agency in nearly a decade.<ref>"In December 1982, ''The New York Times'' reported intelligence officials as saying that Washington's 'covert activities have&nbsp;... become the most ambitious paramilitary and political action operation mounted by the C.I.A. in nearly a decade&nbsp;...'" As seen at: Lee et al. 1987, p. 33</ref>

In the fiscal year 1984, the U.S. Congress approved $24 million in aid to the Contras.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 3"/> After this, since the Contras failed to win widespread popular support or military victories within Nicaragua,<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 3"/> opinion polls indicated that a majority of the U.S. public was not supportive of the Contras,<ref>"opinion polls indicated that a majority of the public was not supportive." As seen at: Lee et al. 1987, p. 3</ref> the Reagan administration lost much of its support regarding its Contra policy within Congress after disclosure of CIA mining of Nicaraguan ports,<ref>"Following disclosure&nbsp;... that the CIA had a role in connection with the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors&nbsp;..., public criticism mounted and the administration's Contra policy lost much of its support within Congress". As seen at: Lee et al. 1987, p. 3</ref> and a report of the [[Bureau of Intelligence and Research]] commissioned by the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] found Reagan's allegations about Soviet influence in Nicaragua "exaggerated",<ref>[http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?p_product=MH&s_site=miami&p_multi=MH&p_theme=realcities&p_action=search&p_maxdocs=200&p_topdoc=1&p_text_direct-0=0EB3607DABC0BCB3&p_field_direct-0=document_id&p_perpage=10&p_sort=YMD_date:D&s_trackval=GooglePM "U.S. Delayed Report On Soviets in Nicaragua"] ''The Miami Herald'', 18 September 1984</ref> Congress cut off all funds for the contras in 1985 by the third [[Boland Amendment]].<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 3"/> The Boland Amendment had first been passed by Congress in December 1982. At this time, it only outlawed U.S. assistance to the contras "for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government", while allowing assistance for other purposes.<ref name=clr>{{cite journal |last=Riesenfeld|first=Stefan A.|date=January 1987|title=The Powers of Congress and the President in International Relations: Revisited|journal=California Law Review|volume= 75|issue= 1 |pages=405–414|doi=10.2307/3480586|quote=The Boland Amendment was part of the Joint Resolution of December 21, 1982, providing further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1983 |jstor=3480586 |url=http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1975&context=californialawreview}}</ref> In October 1984, it was amended to forbid action by not only the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency but all U.S. government agencies.

Nevertheless, the case for support of the Contras continued to be made in Washington, D.C., by both the Reagan administration and [[the Heritage Foundation]], which argued that support for the Contras would counter Soviet influence in Nicaragua.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Boyd |first1=Gerald M. |last2=Times |first2=Special To the New York |date=1986-02-19 |title=REAGAN SAYS SUPPORT FOR THE CONTRAS MUST GO BEYOND 'BAND-AIDS' |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/19/world/reagan-says-support-for-the-contras-must-go-beyond-band-aids.html |access-date=2023-01-23 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Conservative Think Tank Funneled Money to North Associates |url=https://apnews.com/article/9022634f7b9fd7ff0d23f1924c5036fa |access-date=2023-01-23 |website=AP NEWS |language=en}}</ref>

On 1 May 1985 President Reagan announced that his administration perceived Nicaragua to be "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States", and declared a "national emergency" and a [[United States embargo against Nicaragua|trade embargo]] against Nicaragua to "deal with that threat".<ref>[https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12513.html  "Executive Order 12513--Prohibiting trade and certain other transactions involving Nicaragua"] National Archives</ref> It "is now a given; it is true", the Washington Post declared in 1986, "the Sandinistas are communists of the Cuban or Soviet school"; that "The Reagan administration is right to take Nicaragua as a serious menace—to civil peace and democracy in Nicaragua and to the stability and security of the region"; that we must "fit Nicaragua back into a Central American mode" and "turn Nicaragua back toward democracy", and with the "Latin American democracies" "demand reasonable conduct by regional standard."<ref>[https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/03/14/is-there-a-chance-in-nicaragua/d7d4a7ff-058d-45d5-ae3b-996246bf64c0/ "Is There a Chance in Nicaragua?"] Washington Post, 14 March 1986</ref>

Soon after the embargo was established, [[Managua]] re-declared "a policy of nonalignment" and sought the aid of Western Europe, who were opposed to U.S. policy, to escape dependency on the Soviet Union.<ref>[http://www.csmonitor.com/1985/0516/oteg.html "Ortega collects warm words of support on European trip. Yet his visit is unlikely to drum up much concrete aid"] Christian Science Monitor, 16 May 1985</ref> Since 1981 U.S. pressures had curtailed Western credit to and trade with Nicaragua, forcing the government to rely almost totally on the Eastern bloc for credit, other aid, and trade by 1985.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 112">{{cite book|author1=John A. Booth|author2=Christine J. Wade|author3= Thomas W. Walker|title=Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change|date=2014|publisher=Avalon Publishing|page=112|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UcA_BAAAQBAJ|isbn=9780813349589}}</ref> In his 1997 study on U.S. low intensity warfare, Kermit D. Johnson, a former Chief of the U.S. Army Chaplains, contends that U.S. hostility toward the revolutionary government was motivated not by any concern for "national security", but rather by what the world relief organization Oxfam termed "the threat of a good example":

<blockquote>It was alarming that in just a few months after the Sandinista revolution, Nicaragua received international acclaim for its rapid progress in the fields of literacy and health. It was alarming that a socialist-mixed-economy state could do in a few short months what the Somoza dynasty, a U.S. client state, could not do in 45 years! It was truly alarming that the Sandinistas were intent on providing the very services that establish a government's political and moral legitimacy.<ref name="D. Johnson, p. 19">{{cite book|author1=Kermit D. Johnson|title=Ethics and Counterrevolution: American Involvement in Internal Wars|date=1997|publisher=University Press of Americas|page=19|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aPBZXeRev9AC|isbn=9780761809067}}</ref></blockquote>

The government's program included increased wages, subsidized [[food prices]], and expanded health, welfare, and education services. And though it nationalized Somoza's former properties, it preserved a private sector that accounted for between 50 and 60 percent of GDP.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 107">{{cite book|author1=John A. Booth|author2=Christine J. Wade|author3= Thomas W. Walker|title=Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change|date=2014|publisher=Avalon Publishing|page=107|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UcA_BAAAQBAJ|isbn=9780813349589}}</ref>

=== Atrocities ===
 
The United States began to support Contra activities against the Sandinista government by December 1981, with the CIA at the forefront of operations. The CIA supplied the funds and the equipment, coordinated training programs, and provided intelligence and target lists. While the Contras had little military successes, they did prove adept at carrying out CIA guerrilla warfare strategies from training manuals which advised them to incite mob violence, "neutralize" civilian leaders and government officials and attack "soft targets" — including schools, health clinics and cooperatives. The agency added to the Contras' sabotage efforts by blowing up refineries and pipelines, and mining ports.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 107" /><ref>"The Contras did prove adept at carrying out U.S. guerrilla warfare strategies, supplied in the CIA training manuals, which advised them to 'neutralize' civilian leaders, incite mob violence and attack 'soft' targets such as agricultural cooperatives." {{cite book|author1=Thomas W. Walker|title=Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua|date=1991|publisher=Westview Press|page=335|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=d1FqAAAAMAAJ|isbn=9780813308623}}</ref><ref name="Sklar, p. 179">The CIA manual, ''Tayacan'', advises the paramilitaries "to neutralize carefully selected and planned targets, such as court judges ''etc.''" In the section entitled, "Implicit and Explicit Terror", the manual states that it is necessary to "kidnap all officials or agents of the Sandinista government" or "individuals in tune with the regime", who then should be removed from the town "without damaging them ''publicly''". As noted in: {{cite book|author1=Holly Sklar|title=Washington's War on Nicaragua|date=1988|publisher=South End Press|page=179|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=d1FqAAAAMAAJ|isbn=9780813308623}}</ref> Finally, according to former Contra leader [[Edgar Chamorro]], CIA trainers also gave Contra soldiers large knives. "A commando knife [was given], and our people, everybody wanted to have a knife like that, to kill people, to cut their throats".<ref>[http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=2288&C=2189 "War Against the Poor: Low-Intensity Conflict and Christian Faith"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170406110730/http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=2288&C=2189 |date=6 April 2017 }} Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, 1989</ref><ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYT8IX14W44&t=326s "Nicaraguan Contra Atrocities"] West 57th, 1987, Video: 11:34</ref> In 1985 ''Newsweek'' published a series of photos taken by Frank Wohl, a conservative student admirer traveling with the Contras, entitled "Execution in the Jungle":

<blockquote>The victim dug his own grave, scooping the dirt out with his hands&nbsp;... He crossed himself. Then a contra executioner knelt and rammed a k-bar knife into his throat. A second enforcer stabbed at his jugular, then his abdomen. When the corpse was finally still, the contras threw dirt over the shallow grave — and walked away.<ref name="Sklar, p. 268">{{cite book|author1=Holly Sklar|title=Washington's War on Nicaragua|date=1988|publisher=South End Press|page=268|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=d1FqAAAAMAAJ|isbn=9780813308623}}</ref><ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYT8IX14W44&t=326s "Nicaraguan Contra Atrocities"] West 57th, 1987, Video: 11:20</ref></blockquote>

The CIA officer in charge of the covert war, [[Duane Clarridge|Duane "Dewey" Clarridge]], admitted to the House Intelligence Committee staff in a secret briefing in 1984 that the Contras were routinely murdering "civilians and Sandinista officials in the provinces, as well as heads of cooperatives, nurses, doctors and judges". But he claimed that this did not violate President Reagan's executive order prohibiting assassinations because the agency defined it as just 'killing'. "After all, this is war—a paramilitary operation", Clarridge said in conclusion.<ref>[https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/120079409/ "CIA-assisted 'contras' murdered Sandinistas, official reportedly says"] Knight-Ridder, 20 October 1984</ref> Edgar Chamorro explained the rationale behind this to a U.S. reporter. "Sometimes terror is very productive. This is the policy, to keep putting pressure until the people cry 'uncle'".<ref>{{cite book|author1=Mary J. Ruwart|title=Healing Our World in an Age of Aggression|date=2003|publisher=SunStar Press|page=309|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IIlZAAAAYAAJ|isbn=9780963233660}}</ref><ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYT8IX14W44&t=326s "Nicaraguan Contra Atrocities"] West 57th, 1987, Video: 1:50</ref> The CIA manual for the Contras, ''Tayacan'', states that the Contras should gather the local population for a public tribunal to "shame, ridicule and humiliate" Sandinista officials to "reduce their influence". It also recommends gathering the local population to witness and take part in public executions.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=IbFXs7_LutMC "Washington's War on Nicaragua"] Holly Sklar, p. 179</ref> These types of activities continued throughout the war. After the signing of the Central American Peace Accord in August 1987, the year war related deaths and economic destruction reached its peak, the Contras eventually entered negotiations with the Sandinista government (1988), and the war began to deescalate.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 107" />

By 1989 the U.S.-backed Contra war and economic isolation had inflicted severe economic suffering on Nicaraguans. The US government knew that the Nicaraguans had been exhausted from the war, which had cost 30,865 lives, and that voters usually vote the incumbents out during economic decline. By the late 1980s Nicaragua's internal conditions had changed so radically that the US approach to the 1990 elections differed greatly from 1984. A united opposition of fourteen political parties organized into the [[National Opposition Union (Nicaragua, 1990)|National Opposition Union]] (Unión Nacional Oppositora, UNO) with the support of the United States [[National Endowment for Democracy]]. UNO presidential nominee [[Violeta Chamorro]] was received by President Bush at the White House.

The Contra war escalated over the year before the election. The US promised to end the economic embargo should Chamorro win.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 113">{{cite book|author1=John A. Booth|author2=Christine J. Wade|author3= Thomas W. Walker|title=Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change|date=2014|publisher=Avalon Publishing|page=113|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UcA_BAAAQBAJ|isbn=9780813349589}}</ref>

The UNO scored a decisive victory on 25 February 1990. Chamorro won with 55 percent of the presidential vote as compared to Ortega's 41 percent. Of 92 seats in the National Assembly, UNO gained 51, and the FSLN won 39. On 25 April 1990, Chamorro assumed presidency from Daniel Ortega.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 113" />

===Illegal covert operations===
{{See also|Iran–Contra affair}}
With Congress blocking further aid to the Contras, the Reagan administration sought to arrange funding and military supplies by means of third countries and private sources.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4">Lee et al. 1987, p. 4</ref> Between 1984 and 1986, $34 million from third countries and $2.7 million from private sources were raised this way.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> The secret contra assistance was run by the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]], with officer [[Lieutenant Colonel|Lt. Col.]] [[Oliver North]] in charge.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> With the third-party funds, North created an organization called ''The Enterprise'', which served as the secret arm of the NSC staff and had its own airplanes, pilots, airfield, ship, operatives, and secret Swiss bank accounts.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> It also received assistance from personnel from other government agencies, especially from CIA personnel in Central America.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> This operation functioned, however, without any of the accountability required of U.S. government activities.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> The Enterprise's efforts culminated in the [[Iran Contra affair|Iran–Contra Affair of 1986–1987]], which facilitated contra funding through the proceeds of arms sales to Iran.

According to the London Spectator, U.S. journalists in Central America had long known that the CIA was flying in supplies to the Contras inside Nicaragua before the scandal broke. No journalist paid it any attention until the alleged CIA supply man, [[Eugene Hasenfus]], was shot down and captured by the Nicaraguan army. Similarly, reporters neglected to investigate many leads indicating that Oliver North was running the Contra operation from his office in the National Security Council.<ref>[http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/16th-may-1987/13/who-helped-oliver-north "Who Helped Oliver North?"] ''[[The Spectator]]'', 15 May 1987</ref>

According to the [[National Security Archive]], Oliver North had been in contact with [[Manuel Noriega]], the military leader of [[Panama]] later convicted on drug charges, whom he personally met. The issue of drug money and its importance in funding the Nicaraguan conflict was the subject of various reports and publications. The contras were funded by drug trafficking, of which the United States was aware.<ref name="archive">{{cite web|title =  The Contras, cocaine, and covert operations: Documentation of official U.S. knowledge of drug trafficking and the Contras|publisher= The [[National Security Archive]] / [[George Washington University]]|date = c. 1990|url = http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/nsaebb2.htm }}</ref> [[United States Senate|Senator]] [[John Kerry]]'s 1988 [[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations|Committee on Foreign Relations]] report on Contra drug links concluded that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB113/index.htm |title=The Oliver North File |publisher=Gwu.edu |access-date=17 August 2011}}</ref>

The Reagan administration's support for the Contras continued to stir controversy well into the 1990s. In August 1996, ''[[San Jose Mercury News]]'' reporter [[Gary Webb]] published a series titled ''Dark Alliance'', alleging that the contras contributed to the rise of [[crack cocaine]] in California.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/nsaebb2.htm|title=The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations|work=gwu.edu}}</ref>

Gary Webb's career as a journalist was subsequently discredited by the leading U.S. papers, ''The New York Times'', the Washington Post, and the ''Los Angeles Times''. An internal CIA report, entitled, "Managing a Nightmare", shows the agency used "a ground base of already productive relations with journalists" to help counter what it called "a genuine public relations crisis."<ref>{{cite news |last1=Devereaux |first1=Ryan |title=How the CIA Watched Over the Destruction of Gary Webb |url=https://theintercept.com/2014/09/25/managing-nightmare-cia-media-destruction-gary-webb/|work=The Intercept |date=25 September 2014}}</ref> In the 1980s, Douglas Farah worked as a journalist, covering the civil wars in Central America for the Washington Post. According to Farah, while it was common knowledge that the Contras were involved in cocaine trafficking, the editors of the Washington Post refused to take it seriously:

<blockquote>If you're talking about our intelligence community tolerating — if not promoting — drugs to pay for black ops, it's rather an uncomfortable thing to do when you're an establishment paper like the Post. If you were going to be directly rubbing up against the government, they wanted it more solid than it could probably ever be done.<ref>[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/10/kill-the-messenger_n_5962708.html "Kill The Messenger: How The Media Destroyed Gary Webb"] Huffington Post, 10/10/2014</ref></blockquote>

An investigation by the [[United States Department of Justice]] also stated that their "review did not substantiate the main allegations stated and implied in the ''Mercury News'' articles." Regarding the specific charges towards the CIA, the DOJ wrote "the implication that the drug trafficking by the individuals discussed in the ''Mercury News'' articles was connected to the CIA was also not supported by the facts."<ref name="oig.justice.gov">{{Cite web|url=https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/exsump1.htm|title=CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy|website=oig.justice.gov}}</ref> The CIA also investigated and rejected the allegations.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/cocaine/report/conclusions.html|archive-url=https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20100327062446/https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/cocaine/report/conclusions.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=27 March 2010|title=Conclusions — Central Intelligence Agency}}</ref>

===Propaganda===
During the time the US Congress blocked funding for the contras, the Reagan government engaged in a campaign to alter public opinion and change the vote in Congress on contra aid.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 5">Lee et al. 1987, p. 5</ref> For this purpose, the [[United States National Security Council|NSC]] established an interagency working group, which in turn coordinated the [[Office of Public Diplomacy]] for Latin America and the Caribbean (managed by [[Otto Reich]]), which conducted the campaign.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 5"/> The S/LPD produced and widely disseminated a variety of pro-contra publications, arranged speeches and press conferences.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 5"/> It also disseminated "white propaganda"—pro-contra newspaper articles by paid consultants who did not disclose their connection to the Reagan administration.<ref>"It also disseminated what one official termed 'white propaganda': pro-Contra newspaper articles by paid consultants who did not disclose their connection to the Administration." As seen at: Lee et al. 1987, p. 5</ref>

On top of that, Oliver North helped [[Carl Channell]]'s tax-exempt organization, the [[National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty]], to raise $10 million, by arranging numerous briefings for groups of potential contributors at the premises of the White House and by facilitating private visits and photo sessions with President Reagan for major contributors.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 6">Lee et al. 1987, p. 6</ref> Channell in turn, used part of that money to run a series of television advertisements directed at home districts of [[congressman|Congressmen]] considered swing votes on contra aid.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 6"/> Out of the $10 million raised, more than $1 million was spent on pro-contra publicity.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 6"/>

===International Court of Justice ruling===
{{Main|Nicaragua v. United States}}
In 1984 the Sandinista government filed a suit in the [[International Court of Justice]] (ICJ) against the United States (''Nicaragua v. United States''), which resulted in a 1986 judgment against the United States. The ICJ held that the U.S. had violated [[international law]] by supporting the contras in their rebellion against the Nicaraguan government and by [[Naval mine|mining]] Nicaragua's harbors. Regarding the alleged human rights violations by the contras, however, the ICJ took the view that the United States could be held accountable for them only if it would have been proven that the U.S. had effective control of the contra operations resulting in these alleged violations.<ref>"Having reached the above conclusion, the Court takes the view that the contras remain responsible for their acts, in particular the alleged violations by them of humanitarian law. For the United States to be legally responsible, it would have to be proved that that State had effective control of the operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, VII (5)</ref> Nevertheless, the ICJ found that the U.S. encouraged acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law by producing the manual ''[[Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare]] (Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas'') and disseminating it to the contras.<ref>"Finds that the United States of America, by producing in 1983 a manual entitled 'Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas', and disseminating it to contra forces, has encouraged the commission by them of acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, (9)</ref> The manual, amongst other things, advised on how to rationalize killings of civilians<ref name="ReferenceC">In the case of shooting "a citizen who was trying to leave the town or city in which the guerrillas are carrying out armed propaganda or political proselytism", the manual suggests that the contras "explain that if that citizen had managed to escape, he would have alerted the enemy." As seen at: Sklar 1988, p. 179</ref> and recommended to hire professional killers for specific selective tasks.<ref name="Sklar 1988, p. 181">Sklar 1988, p. 181</ref>

The United States, which did not participate in the merits phase of the proceedings, maintained that the ICJ's power did not supersede the [[Constitution of the United States]] and argued that the court did not seriously consider the Nicaraguan role in El Salvador, while it accused Nicaragua of actively supporting armed groups there, specifically in the form of supply of arms.<ref>International Court of Justice 1986, VIII (1)</ref> The ICJ had found that evidence of a responsibility of the Nicaraguan government in this matter was insufficient.<ref>"In any event the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the Court that the Government of Nicaragua was responsible for any flow of arms at either period." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, VIII (1)</ref> The U.S. argument was affirmed, however, by the dissenting opinion of ICJ member U.S. Judge Schwebel,<ref>"But the Court, remarkably enough, while finding the United States responsible for intervention in Nicaragua, failed to recognize Nicaragua's prior and continuing intervention in El Salvador." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel</ref> who concluded that in supporting the contras, the United States acted lawfully in collective self-defence in El Salvador's support.<ref>"concluded that the United States essentially acted lawfully in exerting armed pressures against Nicaragua, both directly and through its support of the contras, because Nicaragua's prior and sustained support of armed insurgency in El Salvador was tantamount to an armed attack upon El Salvador against which the United States could react in collective self-defence in El Salvador's support." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel</ref> The U.S. blocked enforcement of the ICJ judgment by the [[United Nations Security Council]] and thereby prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any actual compensation.<ref name="law">{{cite journal|author=Morrison, Fred L. |title=Legal Issues in The Nicaragua Opinion |journal=American Journal of International Law |date=January 1987 |volume=81 |issue=1 |pages=160–166 |url=http://bailey83221.livejournal.com/55750.html |doi=10.2307/2202146 |jstor=2202146 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120205163909/http://bailey83221.livejournal.com/55750.html |archive-date=5 February 2012}} "Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision. Nicaragua vs United States (Merits)"</ref> The Nicaraguan government finally withdrew the complaint from the court in September 1992 (under the later, post-FSLN, government of [[Violeta Chamorro]]), following a repeal of the law requiring the country to seek compensation.<ref name="HRW report">{{cite web|title=Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 – Nicaragua |url=http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,HRW,,NIC,467fca491e,0.html |access-date=18 September 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121009082531/http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher%2CHRW%2C%2CNIC%2C467fca491e%2C0.html |archive-date=9 October 2012}}</ref>