Editing Combined arms (section)

==20th-century developments==
[[File:Vietnam, Manöver, 1963.jpg|thumb|upright=1.4|American aircraft, infantry, and armored vehicles working together during the [[Vietnam War]]]]

===First World War===
The development of modern combined arms tactics began in the [[First World War]]. Early in the Western Front, fighting descended into stagnant [[trench warfare]]. Generals on both sides applied conventional military thinking to the new weapons and situations that they faced. In these early stages, tactics typically consisted of heavy artillery barrages followed by massed frontal assaults against well entrenched enemies. These tactics were largely unsuccessful and resulted in large loss of life.

As the war progressed new combined arms tactics were developed, often described then as the "all arms battle". These included direct close [[artillery]] [[fire support]] for attacking soldiers (the [[creeping barrage]]), [[Air support#World War I|air support]] and mutual support of [[tank]]s and infantry. One of the first instances of combined arms was the [[Battle of Cambrai (1917)|Battle of Cambrai]], in which the British used tanks, artillery, infantry, small arms and air power to break through enemy lines.<ref>{{cite web |last=Palmer |first=Peter J. |url=http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/great-war-on-land/61-battlefields/955-cambrai-1917-myth-great-tank-battle.html |title=Cambrai 1917: The myth of the great tank battle |website=WesternFrontAssociation.com |date=2009-05-31 |access-date=April 5, 2017 |df=dmy-all |archive-date=4 March 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304002249/http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/great-war-on-land/61-battlefields/955-cambrai-1917-myth-great-tank-battle.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> Previously such a battle would have lasted months with many hundreds of thousands of casualties. Co-ordination and planning were the key elements, and the use of combined arms tactics in the [[Hundred Days Offensive]] in 1918 allowed the Allied forces to exploit breakthroughs in the enemy trenches, forcing the surrender of the [[Central Powers]].

===Second World War===
In World War II combined arms was a fundamental part of some operational doctrines like [[Heinz Guderian]]'s [[Blitzkrieg]],<ref name=cab92/> or the Soviet [[Deep operation|deep battle]] doctrine, which was based on combining tanks, mobile units (mechanised infantry or cavalry) and infantry, while supported by artillery.<ref name=oart>Lt. Col. Wilson C. Blythe Jr. [https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2018/Blythe-Operational-Art/ A History of Operational Art] Military Review, November–December 2018.</ref>

===Cold War years===
In 1963 the [[United States Marine Corps]] formalized the concept of the [[Marine Air-Ground Task Force]], which combined Marine aviation and Marine ground units for expeditionary missions.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.usmc.mil/13thmeu/Thunderingthird/basics.htm |title=What is a Marine expeditionary unit? |work=Home of the Thundering Third |publisher=United States Marine Corps |date=2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071117103710/http://www.usmc.mil/13thmeu/Thunderingthird/basics.htm |archive-date=17 November 2007 |df=dmy-all}}</ref>

The [[Vietnam War]] had a profound influence on the development of the US Army's combined arms doctrine. Due to the very difficult terrain that prevented access to the enemy-held [[area of operation|areas of operation]], troops were often deployed by [[air assault]]. For this reason, US troops in Vietnam saw six times more combat than in preceding wars, due to less time spent on logistic delays. The result: an infantry unit increased in effectiveness by a factor of four for its size, when supported with helicopter-delivered ammunition, food and fuel.<ref>{{cite book |last=Stanton |first=Shelby |year=1999 |title=The 1st Cav[elry] in Vietnam: Anatomy of a division |pages=111–132 |publisher=Presidio Press |location=Novato}}</ref> In time the US Army in Vietnam also learned to combine helicopter operations and [[airmobile infantry]] with the armoured and artillery units operating from [[fire support base]]s as well as the US [[brown-water navy]] and [[USAF]] [[close air support]] units supporting them.<ref>{{cite book |last=Schlight |first=John |title=Help from Above: Air Force close air support of the Army 1946–1973 |year=2003 |pages=299–352 |publisher=Air Force History and Museums Program |location=Washington, D.C.}}
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[[AirLand Battle]] was the overall conceptual framework that formed the basis of the US Army's European warfighting doctrine from 1982 into the late 1990s. AirLand Battle emphasized close coordination between land forces acting as an aggressively maneuvering defense, and air forces attacking rear-echelon forces feeding those front line enemy forces.<ref name=oart/>

In the 1991 [[Gulf War]], [[General Schwarzkopf]] used a mix of strikes by fixed-wing aircraft including [[carpet bombing]] and precision bombing in combination with large numbers of strikes by [[attack helicopters]]. During the ground assault phase, tanks and other [[armoured fighting vehicle]]s supported by attack aircraft swept over remaining forces. The front line moved forward at upwards of 40–50&nbsp;km/h at the upper limit of the Army's tracked vehicles.<ref name=scales98>Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War. Robert H. Scales, Potomac Books, Inc., 1998</ref><ref name=cab92>Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1992</ref><ref name=stewart10>War in the Persian Gulf: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm : August 1990-March 1991. Richard Winship Stewart, Government Printing Office, 2010</ref><ref name=schubert95>The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Frank N. Schubert, Center of Military History, United States Army, 1995</ref>

===Post Cold War (1992–present)===
[[File:2013.2.27 육군 26사단 장갑하차전투훈련 Republic of Korea Army 26th Division (11918611034).jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|South Korean combat vehicles and infantry in [[Gyeonggi Province]]]]

In 2000, the US Army began developing a new set of doctrines intended to use information superiority to wage warfare. Six pieces of equipment were crucial for this: [[Boeing E-3 Sentry|AWACS]] (for [[Airborne early warning and control]]), [[JSTARS]] (for [[Airborne ground surveillance]]), [[Global Positioning System|GPS]], [[SINCGARS|VHF SINCGARS]] (for ground and airborne communications), and [[Rugged computer|ruggedized computers]]. The mix is supplemented by satellite photos and passive reception of enemy radio emissions, forward observers with digital target designation, specialized scouting aircraft, anti-artillery radars and [[gun-laying]] software for artillery.

Based on this doctrine, many US ground vehicles moved across the landscape alone. If they encountered an enemy troop or vehicle concentration, they would assume a defensive posture, lay down as much covering fire as they could, [[target designation|designate the target]]s for requested air and artillery assets. Within a few minutes, on station aircraft would direct their missions to cover the ground vehicle. Within a half-hour heavy attack forces would concentrate to relieve the isolated vehicle. In an hour and a half the relieved vehicle would be resupplied.

In 2020, the [[Israel Defense Forces]] established a [[Multidimensional Unit (IDF)|dedicated combined arms battalion]] to test the viability of full integration of infantry, armor, and aircraft into a single battalion command structure. The unit fields [[Merkava Mk. 4|Merkava Mk.4]] main battle tanks, [[F-16D]] multirole fighters, [[IAI Heron|Heron]] and [[Elbit Hermes 450|Hermes 450]] drones, and [[Boeing AH-64 Apache|AH-64 Apache]] helicopters.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Gross |first=Judah Ari |date= |title=In 1st drill, IDF's Ghost Unit tests out new tactics with jets, tanks and robots |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-1st-drill-idfs-ghost-unit-tests-out-new-tactics-with-jets-tanks-and-robots/ |access-date= |work=The Times of Israel}}</ref>