Editing Blitzkrieg (section)

===Germany===
{{Main|Infiltration tactics}}
In 1914, German strategic thinking derived from the writings of [[Carl von Clausewitz]] (1 June 1780 – 16 November 1831), [[Helmuth von Moltke the Elder]] (26 October 1800 – 24 April 1891) and [[Alfred von Schlieffen]] (28 February 1833 – 4 January 1913), who advocated maneuver, mass and envelopment to create the conditions for a decisive battle ({{lang|de|Vernichtungsschlacht}}). During the war, officers such as [[Willy Rohr]] developed tactics to restore maneuver on the battlefield. Specialist [[light infantry]] (''[[Stosstruppen]]'', "storm troops") were to exploit weak spots to make gaps for larger infantry units to advance with heavier weapons, exploit the success and leave isolated strong points to the troops that were following up. Infiltration tactics were combined with short [[hurricane bombardment|hurricane artillery bombardments]], which used massed artillery. Devised by Colonel [[Georg Bruchmüller]], the attacks relied on speed and surprise, rather than on weight of numbers. The tactics met with great success in [[Operation Michael]], the [[German spring offensive]] of 1918 and restored temporarily the war of movement once the Allied trench system had been overrun. The German armies pushed on towards Amiens and then Paris and came within {{convert|120|km|mi}} before supply deficiencies and Allied reinforcements halted the advance.{{sfn|Perrett|1983|pp=30–31}}

The historian James Corum criticised the German leadership for failing to understand the technical advances of the First World War, conducting no studies of the [[machine gun]] prior to the war and giving [[history of the tank|tank production]] the lowest priority during the war.{{sfn|Corum|1992|p=23}} After Germany's defeat, the [[Treaty of Versailles]] limited the [[Reichswehr]] to a maximum of 100,000 men, which prevented the deployment of mass armies. The [[German General Staff]] was abolished by the treaty but continued covertly as the ''[[Truppenamt]]'' (Troop Office) and was disguised as an administrative body. Committees of veteran staff officers were formed within the ''Truppenamt'' to evaluate 57 issues of the war to revise German operational theories.{{sfn|Corum|1997|p=37}} By the time of the Second World War, their reports had led to doctrinal and training publications, including H. Dv. 487, ''Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen'' ("Command and Battle of the Combined Arms)", known as ''Das Fug'' (1921–1923) and ''[[Truppenführung]]'' (1933–1934), containing standard procedures for combined-arms warfare. The ''Reichswehr'' was influenced by its analysis of pre-war German military thought, particularly infiltration tactics since at the end of the war, they had seen some breakthroughs on the Western Front and the maneuver warfare which dominated the [[Eastern Front (World War I)|Eastern Front]].

On the Eastern Front, the war did not bog down into [[trench warfare]] since the German and the Russian Armies fought a war of maneuver over thousands of miles, which gave the German leadership unique experience that was unavailable to the trench-bound Western Allies.{{sfn|Corum|1992|p=7}} Studies of operations in the East led to the conclusion that small and coordinated forces possessed more combat power than large uncoordinated forces.

After the war, the ''Reichswehr'' expanded and improved infiltration tactics. The commander in chief, [[Hans von Seeckt]], argued that there had been an excessive focus on encirclement and emphasised speed instead.{{sfn|Corum|1997|p=30}} Seeckt inspired a revision of ''[[Bewegungskrieg]]'' (maneuver warfare) thinking and its associated ''[[Auftragstaktik]]'' in which the commander expressed his goals to subordinates and gave them discretion in how to achieve them. The governing principle was "the higher the authority, the more general the orders were"; it was the responsibility of the lower echelons to fill in the details.{{sfn|Citino|2005|p=152}} Implementation of higher orders remained within limits that were determined by the training doctrine of an elite officer corps.{{sfn|Condell|Zabecki|2008|pp=3–5}}

Delegation of authority to local commanders increased the tempo of operations, which had great influence on the success of German armies in the early war period. Seeckt, who believed in the Prussian tradition of mobility, developed the German army into a mobile force and advocated technical advances that would lead to a qualitative improvement of its forces and better coordination between motorized infantry, tanks, and planes.{{sfn|Wheeler-Bennett|1980|p=101}}