Editing Berlin Wall (section)

==Erection of the inner German border==
{{Further|Inner German border|Emigration from the Eastern Bloc}}
By the early 1950s, the Soviet approach to controlling national movement, restricting emigration, was emulated by most of the rest of the Eastern Bloc, including East Germany.<ref name="dowty114">{{Harvnb|Dowty|1989|p=114}}</ref> The restrictions presented a quandary for some Eastern Bloc states, which had been more economically advanced and open than the Soviet Union, such that crossing borders seemed more natural—especially where no prior border existed between East and West Germany.<ref name="dowty116">{{Harvnb|Dowty|1989|p=116}}</ref>

Up until 1952, the demarcation lines between East Germany and the western occupied zones could be easily crossed in most places.<ref name="dowty121">{{Harvnb|Dowty|1989|p=121}}</ref> On 1 April 1952, East German leaders met the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in Moscow; during the discussions, Stalin's foreign minister [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] proposed that the East Germans should "introduce a system of passes for visits of West Berlin residents to the territory of East Berlin [so as to stop] free movement of Western agents" in the GDR. Stalin agreed, calling the situation "intolerable". He advised the East Germans to build up their border defenses, telling them that "The demarcation line between East and West Germany should be considered a border—and not just any border, but a dangerous one ... The Germans will guard the line of defence with their lives."<ref name="harrison240">{{Harvnb|Harrison|2003|p=240-fn}}</ref>

Consequently, the [[inner German border]] between the two German states was closed, and a barbed-wire fence erected. The border between the Western and Eastern sectors of Berlin, however, remained open, although traffic between the Soviet and the Western sectors was somewhat restricted. This resulted in Berlin becoming a magnet for East Germans desperate to escape life in the GDR, and also a flashpoint for tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.<ref name="cnn.com"/>

In 1955, the Soviets gave East Germany authority over civilian movement in Berlin, passing control to a regime not recognized in the West.<ref name="harrison98">{{Harvnb|Harrison|2003|p=98}}</ref> Initially, East Germany granted "visits" to allow its residents access to West Germany. However, following the defection of large numbers of East Germans (known as ''[[Republikflucht]]'') under this regime, the new East German state legally restricted virtually all travel to the West in 1956.<ref name="dowty121"/> Soviet East German ambassador [[Mikhail Pervukhin]] observed that "the presence in Berlin of an open and essentially uncontrolled border between the socialist and capitalist worlds unwittingly prompts the population to make a comparison between both parts of the city, which unfortunately does not always turn out in favour of Democratic [East] Berlin."<ref name="harrison99"/>

===Berlin emigration loophole===
With the closing of the inner German border officially in 1952,<ref name="harrison99">{{Harvnb|Harrison|2003|p=99}}</ref> the border in Berlin remained considerably more accessible because it was administered by all four occupying powers.<ref name="dowty121"/> Accordingly, Berlin became the main route by which East Germans left for the West.<ref>Paul Maddrell, ''Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany 1945–1961'', p. 56. [[Oxford University Press]], 2006</ref> On 11 December 1957, East Germany introduced a new passport law that reduced the overall number of refugees leaving Eastern Germany.<ref name="cnn.com"/>

It had the unintended result of drastically increasing the percentage of those leaving through West Berlin from 60% to well over 90% by the end of 1958.<ref name="harrison99"/> Those caught trying to leave East Berlin were subjected to heavy penalties, but with no physical barrier and [[Berlin U-Bahn|subway]] train access still available to West Berlin, such measures were ineffective.<ref name="dowty122">{{Harvnb|Dowty|1989|p=122}}</ref> The Berlin sector border was essentially a "[[loophole]]" through which Eastern Bloc citizens could still escape.<ref name="harrison99"/> The 3.5&nbsp;million East Germans who had left by 1961 totalled approximately 20% of the entire East German population.<ref name="dowty122"/>

An important reason that passage between East Germany and West Berlin was not stopped earlier was that doing so would cut off much of the railway traffic in East Germany. Construction of a new railway bypassing West Berlin, the [[Berlin outer ring]], commenced in 1951. Following the completion of the railway in 1961, closing the border became a more practical proposition.{{citation needed|date=August 2020}}<ref>{{Cite web |title=A Brief History of the Berlin Crisis of 1961 |url=https://www.archives.gov/files/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/1961-berlin-crisis/overview/berlin-wall-overview.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/https://www.archives.gov/files/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/1961-berlin-crisis/overview/berlin-wall-overview.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-09 |url-status=live}}</ref>

===Brain drain===
The emigrants tended to be young and well-educated, leading to the [[Human capital flight|"brain drain"]] feared by officials in East Germany.<ref name="thackeray188"/> [[Yuri Andropov]], then the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|CPSU]] Director on Relations with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, wrote an urgent letter on 28 August 1958 to the Central Committee about the significant 50% increase in the number of East German intelligentsia among the refugees.<ref name="harrison100">{{Harvnb|Harrison|2003|p=100}}</ref> Andropov reported that, while the East German leadership stated that they were leaving for economic reasons, testimony from refugees indicated that the reasons were more political than material.<ref name="harrison100"/> He stated "the flight of the intelligentsia has reached a particularly critical phase."<ref name="harrison100"/>

By 1960, the combination of World War II and the massive emigration westward left East Germany with only 61% of its population of working age, compared to 70.5% before the war. The loss was disproportionately heavy among professionals: engineers, technicians, physicians, teachers, lawyers, and skilled workers. The direct cost of manpower losses to East Germany (and corresponding gain to the West) has been estimated at $7&nbsp;billion to $9&nbsp;billion, with East German party leader [[Walter Ulbricht]] later claiming that West Germany owed him $17&nbsp;billion in compensation, including reparations as well as manpower losses.<ref name="dowty122" /> In addition, the drain of East Germany's young population potentially cost it over 22.5&nbsp;billion marks in lost educational investment.<ref>Volker Rolf Berghahn, ''Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century'', p. 227. [[Cambridge University Press]], 1987</ref> The brain drain of professionals had become so damaging to the political credibility and economic viability of East Germany that the re-securing of the German communist frontier was imperative.<ref name="pearson75">{{Harvnb|Pearson|1998|p=75}}</ref>

The exodus of emigrants from East Germany presented two minor potential benefits: an easy way to smuggle East German secret agents to West Germany, and a reduction in the number of citizens hostile to the communist regime. Neither of these advantages, however, proved particularly useful.<ref>{{harvnb|Crozier|1999|pp=170–171}}</ref>

{{anchor|Construction}}