Editing Battle of Narva (1700) (section)

===Preparations===
On the afternoon of {{OldStyleDate|29 November|1700|18 November}}, Charles XII approached the village of Lagena, 7 miles from Narva, and made a final inspection of his army. Charles was not sure if Narva was still holding, so he ordered to give the Swedish recognition signal by cannon shots and then got the same response from the fortress. Earlier, the Sheremetev's cavalry joined the main forces.{{sfn|Massie|1980|p=328}} Thus, the Russian siege camp was warned about the enemy's approach. De Croÿ inspected the army and ordered it to increase vigilance, prepare firearms, and keep half of the army on alert throughout the night. On the morning of the next day, "before sunrise," it was ordered to give soldiers the charges and build the entire army. Among other instructions was the prohibition against opening fire earlier than 20–30 steps to the enemy.{{sfn|Петров [Petrov]|1901|pp=223–224}}

On 19 ([[Adoption of the Gregorian calendar#Sweden|OS]]), 20 ([[Swedish calendar|S.S.]]){{Sfn|von Essen|2024|p=XVIII}} or 30 ([[Adoption of the Gregorian calendar#Sweden|NS]]) November 1700<ref name=Frost230232>Frost (2003), pp. 230, 232</ref>, Charles XII positioned his 10,500 men<ref name=SwBO>{{Cite web |url=http://rusmilhist.blogspot.ru/2011/04/swedish-bo-in-battle-of-narva-192030.html |title=Swedish BO in the battle of Narva, 19(20)/30 Nov 1700 |access-date=5 March 2018 |archive-date=5 March 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180305202617/http://rusmilhist.blogspot.ru/2011/04/swedish-bo-in-battle-of-narva-192030.html |url-status=live }}</ref> (another 2,000 men were garrisoned in the city and would take part in the battle at a later stage) opposite the besieging Russian army of about 34,000 to 40,000 troops.<ref name=kuvaja/><ref name="Svenska slag">Ericson (2003), p. 257</ref><ref name=Frost230232/><ref name="Profiriev">Porfiriev (1958), p. 145</ref>

The Swedes approached the Russian army at 10 a.m. and began to prepare for an attack. Charles and his generals examined the Russian position, and the soldiers stored the fascines to overcome the ditches surrounding it. De Croÿ was concerned about the small size of the Swedish army and suspected that this was only the vanguard of the main forces. Sheremetev proposed to lead the army out of the entrenchment in the field and attack the Swedes but was not supported by other generals.{{sfn|Беспалов [Bespalov]|1998}} De Croÿ decided to leave the army stretched for {{convert|4|mi}} and sandwiched between two rows of ramparts.{{sfn|Massie|1980|p=330}} The space between the ramparts was uneven: about {{convert|1200|m}} on the right Russian flank, about {{convert|250|m}} in the center, and on the left flank – only {{convert|60|–|100|m}}. There were many barracks for soldiers between the ramparts, which made it difficult to maneuver.{{sfn|Петров [Petrov]|1901|p=199}}

In the center of the Russian position was the Goldenhof Hill, fenced on all sides by barracks and sharpened stakes ([[Cheval de frise|''the chevaux de frise'']]) and adapted to all-around defence.{{sfn|Петров [Petrov]|1901|p=199}} Charles divided his infantry into two parts and directed them to the north and south of the Goldenhof Hill. On the right (southern) flank were 11 "field" battalions under the command of Vellingk. On the left (northern) flank were 10 "field" battalions under the command of Rehnskiöld, including a small column of two battalions under the command of [[Magnus Stenbock]], where Charles was himself.{{clarify |date=May 2020 |reason=The words "was Charles himself" does not fit with the rest of the sentence.}} Grenadiers with fascines marched in the vanguard of the infantry columns. The Swedish cavalry (≈4,300 men) covered the flanks of the infantry and had to prevent Russian attempts to exit the fortifications. The Swedish artillery (37 guns at all), located on a small rise, bombarded the places planned for the attack.{{sfn|Massie|1980|p=332}}<ref name=SwBO/><ref name="Davies2011">{{cite book |author=Brian Davies |title=Empire and Military Revolution in Eastern Europe: Russia's Turkish Wars in the Eighteenth Century |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RJcg5lNqjS8C |date=2011 |publisher=A&C Black |isbn=978-1-4411-6238-0 |page=65 |access-date=2018-03-12 |archive-date=2023-11-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231130064402/https://books.google.com/books?id=RJcg5lNqjS8C |url-status=live }}</ref>

The exact battle order of the Russian army is unknown – Russian documents are not preserved, and the Swedish data are contradictory. It is known that the "division" (''general'stvo'') of Trubetskoy was located in the center. It was the weakest part of the three main divisions: there were only two "regular" infantry regiments, and they were even worse drilled than the rest – they were formed as late as August 1700, and in September, Trubetskoy already marched to Narva. Trubetskoy also had four weak regiments of local ''streltsy'' from Novgorod and [[Pskov]] garrisons and, may be, there were two regular infantry regiments temporarily separated from other divisions.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://rusmilhist.blogspot.ru/2010/11/russian-bo-at-narva-on-1930-nov-1700-by.html |title=Russian BO at Narva on 19/30 Nov, 1700 by Fer & Wolff. |access-date=2018-03-07 |archive-date=2018-03-08 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180308041604/http://rusmilhist.blogspot.ru/2010/11/russian-bo-at-narva-on-1930-nov-1700-by.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>Великанов В.С. К вопросу об организации и численности русской армии в нарвском походе 1700. // "Война и мир. Новые исследования и материалы". Материалы 2-й международной научно-практической конференции. СПб, 2011. Ч. 1. С. 130–143</ref>